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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON THE ECONOMICS OF NETWORKS
Yiran Chen
Hanming Fang
Empirical studies of social and economic networks are facilitated by the growing
availability of network data. This area of research focuses on understanding two major
questions: how networks affect economic outcomes and how networks are formed.
This dissertation studies these questions respectively. The first chapter examines the
impact of social networks on agents’ economic outcomes in the context of job referrals
in the labor market. The second chapter relates to the formation of financial networks
with latent traits in the context of U.S. campaign contributions.
In the first chapter, “A Structural Analysis of Job Referrals and Social Networks:
The Case of the Corporate Executives Market”, I develop and structurally implement
a labor market search model in which workers, in addition to directly receiving job
offers, also receive referrals from their social contacts. In the model, referrals are
generated endogenously: an external referral occurs when a friend rejects an offer
he/she receives, and an internal referral occurs when a friend leaves his/her current
job. I estimate the model by Generalized Method of Moments using data on the
labor market history and the social connections of executives in S&P 500 firms. Using
the estimated model, I find that referrals play a substantial role in the executive
labor market. More than one quarter of the job transitions and raises are driven by
v
referrals. Shutting down referrals reduces executives’ welfare by an equivalence of a
two to seven percentage points reduction in income. I also evaluate the impacts of the
social networks’ structure by comparing the outcomes under the observed networks
and alternative randomly formed networks. I find that the welfare distribution is
more unequal under the random networks. I further investigate the mechanisms for
these effects through the lens of two network statistics: friends’ popularity and local
community clustering.
In the second chapter, “Inferring the Ideological Affiliations of Political Committees
via Financial Contributions Networks” (co-authored with Hanming Fang), we address
the missing data problem for about two thirds of the political committees that do
not self-identify their party affiliations in their registration with the Federal Election
Commission. In this chapter, we propose and implement a novel Bayesian approach to
infer the ideological affiliations of political committees based on the network of financial
contributions among them. In Monte Carlo simulations, we demonstrate that our
estimation algorithm achieves very high accuracy in recovering these committees’ latent
ideological affiliations when the pairwise difference in ideology groups’ connection
patterns satisfy a condition known as the Chernoff-Hellinger divergence criterion.
We illustrate our approach using the campaign finance records from the 2003-2004
election cycle. Using the posterior mode to categorize the ideological affiliations of
the political committees, our estimates match the self-reported ideology for 94.63% of
those committees who self-reported to be Democratic and 89.49% of those committees
who self-reported to be Republican.
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Introduction
Empirical studies of social and economic networks are facilitated by the growing
availability of network data. This area of research focuses on understanding two major
questions: how networks are formed, and how networks affect economic outcomes. This
dissertation consists of two chapters and studies these questions respectively. The first
chapter examines the impact of social networks on agents’ economic outcomes in the
context of job referrals in the labor market. This study focuses on workers’ decisions
given the observed networks and evaluates the welfare implications of different network
configurations. The second chapter relates to the formation of financial networks with
latent traits in the context of U.S. campaign contributions. This study uses a network
formation model and observed network to recover the latent traits of the economic
agents.
In the first chapter, “A Structural Analysis of Job Referrals and Social Networks:
The Case of the Corporate Executives Market”, I analyze quantitatively the value
of social networks in the context of job referrals in the labor market. The existing
literature has documented the importance of job referrals and social connections, but
most of them only focus on the effect of direct connections, i.e., who you know. The
main contribution of this chapter is evaluating the impact of the full social network
structure.
Network structure beyond direct connections provides useful and interesting insights.
For example, the value of a friend may depend on the number of friends he/she has.
Additionally, it is not clear whether a friend with many connections is more valuable
1
than a friend with few connections because on the one hand, a friend with many
connections is in a good position to provide help, on the other hand, however, it
also leads to stronger competition for his/her attention and help. Theoretically, the
relative importance of these two forces is ambiguous, and thus it requires an empirical
evaluation. This is an example in which indirect connections have a non-trivial effect on
the value of direct connections. To study questions like this, I develop and implement
a general framework to quantify the impact of the full social network structure in the
labor market.
I build a labor search model with job referrals, which generates the two forces
mentioned before as well as other network effects. The empirical environment is
the senior executive labor market in the U.S., specifically, the C-suite in S&P 500
companies. This is a market where referrals could potentially play an important role
because typically people cannot directly apply for these positions. Referrals provide
candidates with additional chances to meet with firms. I combine data from three
sources, including information on executives’ labor market history and their social
networks, and estimate the model using Generalized Method of Moments.
The key findings are the following. First, I find referrals to be important both
statistically and economically. A model specification test rejects a model without
referral, and a simulation shows that more than a quarter of job transitions and wage
raises are driven by referrals. Second, I evaluate the impact of social network structure.
At an individual level, I provide quantitative answers to the following questions: (1)
whether a well-connected friend is beneficial and (2) whether connections among a
person’s friends are beneficial. Additionally, at a global level, I investigate how the
change of network structure affects the distribution of executives’ welfare and further
2
investigate the mechanism.
In the second chapter, “Inferring the Ideological Affiliations of Political Committees
via Financial Contributions Networks” (co-authored with Hanming Fang), we develop
and apply a method to recover the latent traits of economic agents through network
data and a formation model in the context of U.S. campaign finance.
In campaign finance, a large number of organizations send and receive political
donations. Theses organizations include election campaigns, political action com-
mittees, and lobbyists, among others, which we will refer to as political committees.
About two thirds of these committees do not self-identify their party affiliation in
their registration with the Federal Election Commission, and the goal of this paper is
to recover their latent political ideology. It is important to understand these political
committees’ ideologies because they are the direct collectors of individual political
donations. In order to understand the behavior of individual donors, it is necessary to
understand the organizations to which they contribute.
To this end, we build a network formation model based on the Stochastic Block
Model and estimate the model by Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method using
the observed political donation networks.
In Monte Carlo simulations, we demonstrate that our estimation algorithm achieves
very high accuracy in recovering these organizations’ latent ideological affiliations
when the pairwise difference in ideology groups’ connection patterns satisfy a condition
known as the Chernoff-Hellinger divergence criterion. We illustrate our approach using
the campaign finance records from the 2003-2004 election cycle. Using the posterior
mode to categorize the ideological affiliations of the political committees, our estimates
match the self-reported ideology for 94.63% of those committees who self-reported to
3
be Democratic and 89.49% of those committees who self-reported to be Republican.
Our method contributes to the political economy literature in the following aspects.
First, it does not assume a bipartite graph with mutually exclusive sets of donors
and recipients. Second, it is valid with one observation of the network. Third, it
does assume homophily. In other words, it does not require political committees
to be most likely to donate to other committees with the same ideology, which is
potentially a problematic assumption for the politically independent. Additionally,
our method contributes to the community detection literature in the following aspects.
First, it accommodates rich vertex-level and edge-level observable characteristics, and
it incorporates the strength of the edge. Second, it incorporates the self-reported
political affiliations from a subset of the committees.
4
Chapter 1
A Structural Analysis of Job Referrals and Social Networks:
The Case of the Corporate Executives Market
1.1 Introduction
Job referrals are an important channel through which workers find jobs and firms
fill vacancies.1 Because of referrals, workers who are more socially interconnected may
experience better labor market outcomes and advance more quickly in their careers.
In this paper, I study the network effects of job referrals and investigate the impacts
of social network structure on workers’ labor market outcomes. I develop a job search
model that incorporates referral and non-referral job offers and different kinds of
social networks. The network structure is dynamic and evolves as workers move across
jobs. To estimate the model, I combine three different data sources on the corporate
executive labor market.
In my model, workers directly receive job offers as well as referrals from their
friends. Referrals are generated endogenously: an external referral occurs when a
friend rejects an offer that he/she receives, and an internal referral occurs when a
friend leaves his/her current job. As a result of this referral process, the quantity and
1For example, Granovetter (1973) reports that 56% of the job seekers in a Boston suburb obtained
their jobs through social contacts. Other surveys at different locations and times report numbers
ranging from 25% to 87%. Marsden and Gorman (2001) report that 37% of U.S. firms often use
referral in recruitment. Other surveys at different locations and times report numbers ranging from
36% to 88%. See Topa (2011) for a detailed summary.
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the quality of referrals depend not only on the worker’s number of friends but also on
the quality of these friends’ jobs. Moreover, the model generates rich network effects
beyond immediate friends. First, the popularity of a friend affects referrals. On the
one hand, a popular friend means high competition for referrals, lowering a worker’s
probability of receiving a particular referral sent by his/her popular friend (competition
effect). On the other hand, a popular friend benefits from his/her large set of friends’
referrals, increasing the quantity and the quality of referrals he/she sends out (ripple
effect). Second, local clustering, defined as the fraction of a worker’s friends who are
also friends with one another, also affects referrals. An advantage of high clustering is
that it keeps the positive spillovers in an inner circle (closeness effect). A disadvantage
is that it limits the positive spillovers from a distance (isolation effect).
My empirical analysis is based on three data sets: (1) Compustat Executive
Compensation (ExecuComp), (2) BoardEx, and (3) U.S. Stock Database from the
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). The first data set is used to construct
a panel of individuals’ employment history in the executive market along with their
on-the-job compensation. The second data set is used to construct three social
networks representing social connections established via education, work, and other
social activities. The third data set provides firms’ financial variables.
My analysis first provides reduced-form evidence on job referrals in the executive
labor market. First, I show that socially connected executives’ compensation is posi-
tively correlated, controlling for time-invariant individual characteristics, time-specific
shocks, and industry-specific shocks. This result supports my model’s prediction
that executives with better jobs send better quality referrals, increasing their friends’
compensation. Second, I show that an individual is more likely to make a career
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advancement when his/her executive friends leave their current jobs, controlling for
time-invariant individual characteristics and time-specific shocks. This finding sug-
gests that executives who leave their current jobs send referrals that help their friends
advance in their careers.
I then estimate the structural job search model by Generalized Method of Moments
(GMM). The estimation results show both the statistical and economical significance of
job referrals. My model nests a model with no referrals, and a specification test rejects
such a model. Simulations from my model provide a way of assessing the importance
of referrals in the job market dynamics in this labor market. A decomposition shows
that 27.86% of non-executive to executive transitions, 66% of executive job-to-job
transitions, and 82.1% of raises are driven by referrals.
I use the estimated model to perform two counterfactual experiments. The first
experiment evaluates the welfare effect of referrals by varying the probability of referrals.
I find that shutting down referrals reduces executives’ welfare by an equivalence of a
2-7% decrease in annual income and that increasing referral probability to one boosts
executives’ welfare by an equivalence of a 6-16% increase in annual income.
The second experiment examines the welfare effect of network structure by varying
the network structure. Specifically, a new set of counterfactual networks are generated
in which the individuals have the same number of friends as the observed networks,
but the connections are formed randomly. I find that the welfare distribution is more
unequal under the randomly formed networks. I further investigate the mechanisms
for these effects through the lens of two network statistics: friends’ popularity and
local clustering. First, in terms of friends’ popularity, the competition effect dominates
the ripple effect. The random networks increase friends’ popularity for individuals
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with a small number of friends and decrease friends’ popularity for individuals with
a large number of friends. Therefore, the increased competition for referral makes
individuals with a small number of friends worse off, and the decreased competition
for referral makes individuals with a large number of friends better off, which increases
inequality. Second, in terms of local clustering, the isolation effect dominates for
individuals with a small number of friends, and the closeness effect dominates for
individuals with a large number of friends. The random networks universally decrease
the local clustering. Therefore, the decreased isolation effect makes individuals with a
small number of friends better off, and the decreased closeness effect makes individuals
with a large number of friends worse off, which decreases inequality. Overall, the
competition effect resulting from the change in friend popularity dominates, generating
greater inequality under the random networks. This experiment highlights the effects
of network structures beyond the number of friends.
My paper contributes to three strands of the literature. First, it contributes to
studies of the impact of social connections on executive compensation (e.g., Shue,
2013; Engelberg et al., 2013) by building a model that formalizes the mechanisms by
which social connections impact executives’ compensation and job transitions. Second,
it contributes to studies of labor search models with job referrals (e.g., Montgomery,
1992; Mortensen and Vishwanath, 1994; Calvó-Armengol and Zenou, 2005; Ioannides
and Soetevent, 2006; Galenianos, 2014; Arbex et al., 2018) by incorporating the
full structure of the network (beyond the number of friends). The model presents a
general framework to study a rich set of network effects of job referrals. Third, it
contributes to studies of labor market dynamics on social networks (e.g., Topa, 2001;
Calvó-Armengol and Jackson, 2004; Calvó-Armengol and Jackson, 2007) by modeling
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micro-founded workers’ decisions and wage bargaining processes.
Literature Review
My paper is related to four broad strands of the literature. First, it complements
the literature on labor market peer effect and job referrals in the general labor
market.2 Surveys show that referrals are frequently used by workers to find jobs (e.g.,
Granovetter, 1973; Pellizzari, 2010) and by firms to fill vacancies (e.g., Marsden and
Gorman, 2001).3 Additionally, empirical studies (e.g., Topa, 2001; Conley and Topa,
2007; Schmutte, 2014) show that local job referrals generate positive spatial correlation
in workers’ employment statuses and wage premia. More recently, Burks et al. (2015)
and Brown et al. (2016) characterize the relationships among referrals, match quality,
wage trajectories, and turnover using data sets with direct information on referrals. In
addition to documenting empirical patterns, some studies develop theoretical models
on referrals, starting with the pioneering work by Boorman (1975). Some studies
model referrals as means to reduce search friction by providing more opportunities for
workers and firms to meet. Others model referrals as means to reduce information
friction by providing firms with more information on worker quality or match quality
(e.g., Rees, 1966; Montgomery, 1991; Arrow and Borzekowski, 2004; Dustmann et al.,
2015). My paper focuses on the role referral plays in mitigating search friction, and I
discuss related papers in reviewing the search literature.
Second, my paper contributes to the literature on executive compensation.4 In
2See Ioannides and Datcher Loury (2004) and Topa (2011) for comprehensive surveys.
3See Holzer (1988), Corcoran et al. (1980), Granovetter (1995), Gregg and Wadsworth (1996),
and Addison and Portugal (2002) for additional evidence on workers’ usage of referrals; see Holzer
(1987), Neckerman and Kirschenman (1991), Miller and Rosenbaum (1997), Fernandez et al. (2000),
and Brown et al. (2016) for additional evidence on firms’ usage of referrals. A more comprehensive
and detailed listing can be found in Topa (2011).
4See Frydman and Jenter (2010) and Edmans and Gabaix (2016) for comprehensive surveys.
9
the literature, some researchers view the level of total compensation as a competitive
outcome (e.g., Gabaix and Landier, 2008; Terviö, 2008), while others view it as rent
extraction and managerial entrenchment (e.g., Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Kuhnen and
Zwiebel, 2008). My model combines both views by incorporating competition from
outside offers and allowing executives to earn positive rent through bargaining. Because
the focus of my study is job search and referrals, my paper abstracts from problems
arising from asymmetric information such as learning about executive ability (e.g.,
Taylor, 2013) or contracting in the presence of hidden action and hidden information
(e.g., Gayle et al., 2015; Gayle et al., 2016).
Among the literature on executive compensation, my paper directly contributes to
studies examining the impact of executives’ social connections on their compensation.
Previous studies focus mostly on documenting the empirical relationship between
social connection and compensation.5 For example, Shue (2013) uses the random
assignment of MBA students to sections at the Harvard Business School to show that
executive compensation is significantly more similar among graduates from the same
section than among graduates from different sections, and that this effect is more
than twice as strong in the year following alumni reunions. Engelberg et al. (2013)
investigate CEOs’ social connections to other executives and directors outside their
firms and show that these connections increase CEO compensation, and that the
increase is higher for connections with “important” people such as CEOs of big firms.
My paper contributes to this literature by providing additional empirical evidence,
and moreover, a structural model that formalizes the mechanisms by which social
connections impact executives’ compensation and job transitions.
5There is another set of studies examining the impact of executives and directors’ social connections
on firm performance. See El-Khatib et al. (2015), Hwang and Kim (2009), Fracassi and Tate (2012),
Cai and Sevilir (2012), Larcker et al. (2013), and Ruan (2017).
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Third, my paper contributes to the theoretical and empirical literature on labor
search models.6 There is a large body of literature on sequential random job search.
For example, the wage posting model in Burdett and Mortensen (1998) is adapted
and empirically implemented in Van den Berg and Ridder (1998), Bontemps et al.
(1999), Bontemps et al. (2000), Meghir et al. (2015), Shephard (2017), and Aizawa
and Fang (2018). The wage bargaining model in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) and
Cahuc et al. (2006) is adapted and empirically implemented in Dey and Flinn (2005)
and Bagger et al. (2014). My model is based on that of Cahuc et al. (2006), in which
workers search both on and off the job, climb the productivity ladder, and bargain
their wages with the firms.
Among the literature on labor search, my paper directly contributes to studies of
referrals in search-based frameworks, in which referral is modeled as an additional
channel of job arrival. Previous studies do not accommodate rich social network
structure and generate very limited network effects. In early studies such as Mont-
gomery (1992) and Mortensen and Vishwanath (1994), there is no notion of social
connections. In later studies such as Calvó-Armengol and Zenou (2005), Ioannides
and Soetevent (2006), Galenianos (2014), and Arbex et al. (2018), referrals are sent
through social networks. However, they do not incorporate network structure beyond
the degree distribution (i.e., the number of social connections), and they impose
strong assumptions on the network structure to achieve this tractability.7 My paper
6See Rogerson et al. (2005) for a survey of theoretical studies and Eckstein and Van den Berg
(2007) for a survey of empirical studies.
7In Calvó-Armengol and Zenou (2005) and Ioannides and Soetevent (2006), a worker randomly
draws new friends in every period, so only the immediate friends matter. In Galenianos (2014),
a worker has a continuum of friends, so the unemployment rate of one’s friends does not change
in the steady state. In Arbex et al. (2018), the random network formation model, combined with
the worker’s information structure, implies that a worker’s degree is a sufficient statistic for his/her
future value.
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differs from this set of papers in that it does not impose assumptions on how the
networks are formed, and that it uses the full structure of the network (the adjacency
matrices), which generates rich network effects. I highlight the importance of the
network structure beyond the number of friends by showing in my counterfactual
experiment that networks with the same degree sequence but different connection
patterns lead to different welfare distribution. Additionally, my model allows for a
rich characterization of referrals, both internal and external. In Calvó-Armengol and
Zenou (2005) and Ioannides and Soetevent (2006), there are only external referrals.
In their models, jobs are identical, so employed workers send referrals whenever they
receive outside job offers, while in my paper jobs are heterogeneous, and employed
workers only pass along unwanted jobs. In Galenianos (2014) and Arbex et al. (2018),
there are only internal referrals. In their models, employed workers randomly send
referrals identical to their own jobs, while in my paper this only occurs when a worker
leaves his/her current job, a modeling choice driven by the small number of executive
positions.
Finally, my paper contributes to studies on the labor market dynamics on social
networks such as Topa (2001), Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2004), Calvó-Armengol
and Jackson (2007), and Fontaine (2008).8 These studies model job transitions of
socially connected workers as a Markov process on a network, with the full network
structure incorporated. Topa (2001) and Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2004) focus
on employment dynamics. In their models, an employed worker randomly contacts
an unemployed friend and then the friend becomes employed. Calvó-Armengol
and Jackson (2007) further incorporate wage dynamics. These three papers take a
statistical approach and abstract from workers’ decision-making problem and firms’
8See Jackson et al. (2017) for a survey of the broad literature on social networks.
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wage-setting problem. My paper complements their studies by formally formulating
workers’ decision problem and the wage bargaining process, providing micro-founded
employment and wage dynamics. In Fontaine (2008), wage is bargained, but the
network is assumed to be complete, while my model accommodates any network
configuration.9 To the best of my knowledge, there are not many empirical studies of
job referrals with explicit network models.10 My paper contributes to this literature by
developing a tractable yet flexible model with micro foundation for empirical analysis.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 presents a job
search model with referrals. Section 1.3 describes the data and shows reduced-form
evidence. Section 1.4 describes the estimation strategy. Section 1.5 presents the
estimation results. Section 1.6 discusses the counterfactual experiments. Section 1.7
concludes.
1.2 Model
Social Networks
In this section I describe the social networks through which referrals are sent.
There are n workers in the labor market, indexed by i. Among them, there are three
types of social connections established via overlapping experience in school, work,
and social activities. Connections are undirected, and new ones are formed over time.
These three types of connections constitute three networks. In these networks, a
node represents a worker and an edge represents a social connection. At time t, the
9In a complete network, every pair of distinct nodes is connected. A complete network simplifies
analysis because it eliminates heterogeneity in network position.
10Topa (2001) is one such empirical paper. As discussed, it does not feature micro-founded
worker’s decision problem and wage-setting process.
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networks are characterized by adjacency matrices
Y Edu,t = {yEdu,tij }1≤i,j≤n, Y Work,t = {y
Work,t
ij }1≤i,j≤n, Y Social,t = {y
Social,t
ij }1≤i,j≤n,
where yEdu,tij = 1 if workers i and j have established a school connection by time t,
and yEdu,tij = 0 otherwise; the same holds true for y
Work,t
ij and y
Social,t
ij .
Both Y Edu,t and Y Social,t are exogenous. Part of Y Work,t is exogenous, and part
of Y Work,t is endogenous as a result of transition in the executive labor market.11 I
assume that when individuals make labor market decisions, they do not consider the
implied changes to the endogenous work network. This assumption is an implication
of Assumption 1 (static expectation) which will be discussed later.
Additionally, define a simplified network that does not distinguish the different
types of connections
Y All,t = {yAll,tij }1≤i,j≤n,
where yAll,tij = max{y
Edu,t
ij , y
Work,t
ij , y
Social,t
ij }, i.e., y
All,t
ij = 1 as long as there is some kind
of social connection between i and j.
For any network k ∈ {Edu, Work, Social, All}, define worker i’s friends in
network k at time t as the set of nodes it is directly connected to:
Nk,t(i) = {j | yk,tij = 1}. (1.1)
Define worker i’s degree in network k at time t as the number of i’s friends:
dk,ti = |Nk,t(i)|. (1.2)
11Endogenous connections are established between the executives in the same company. Other
workplace connections are viewed as exogenous if one of the individuals is not an executive. For
example, when executives in different companies serve on the same board of directors in a third
company, this connection is viewed as exogenous to the model of executive labor market.
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Finally, define worker i’s local clustering coefficient in network k at time t as the
number of connections between i’s friends divided by the number of possible connections
between them:
ck,ti =

|{yk,tjl :j,l∈N
k,t(i),yk,tjl =1}|
(d
k,t
i
2 )
if dk,ti > 1
0 otherwise
, (1.3)
where dk,ti and Nk,t(i) are defined in (1.2) and (1.1). Local clustering coefficient is a
measure of how tightly connected a local network is. It takes a value between [0, 1],
characterizing the fraction of worker i’s friends who are also friends with one another.
To avoid verbosity, throughout the paper, when I refer to friend, degree, or local
clustering coefficient without specifying a particular network, I mean those associated
with the simplified network Y All. Additionally, to ease notation, I omit time superscript
t when it does not cause confusion.
Job Search with Referrals
In this section I describe the job search model with referrals through social
connections. I follow the terminology in the standard search literature, but certain
terms should be interpreted in the context of the executive labor market: specifically,
“workers” refer to executives and candidates for executive jobs, “wage” refers to the
value of the compensation package, and “unemployment” refers to the status of not
working in an executive job. The basic settings are similar to Cahuc et al. (2006).
A novel feature in my model is that workers can send referrals to friends after they
reject an offer or leave their current jobs, which affects both job transition and wage
bargaining.
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I consider a labor market with a finite number of workers and firms. Workers and
firms are matched randomly in a frictional labor market. Time is continuous. Workers
enjoy instantaneous utility U(x) from income x and discount the future at rate ρ.
Production. Workers differ in their abilities (denoted as a) as well as their positions
in the social networks. Firms differ in their productivities (denoted as p). A firm is
modeled as a collection of jobs with the same productivity. The marginal product for
a worker-firm pair (a, p) is ap. An unemployed worker receives an income flow of ab,
which he/she has to forgo upon finding a job.
Direct Job Arrivals and Job Separations. Firms and workers meet randomly.
Unemployed workers receive direct job offers at Poisson rate λ0, and employed workers
at rate λ1. The productivity p of the firm from which an offer originates is randomly
distributed on [pmin, pmax] according to cdf F (p). Exogenous job separations occur at
Poisson rate δ.
Referrals. Referrals are by-products of traditional types of labor market transitions.
They always follow direct job arrivals or job separations, when workers reject offers
or leave their current firms.12 Specifically, there are three situations under which a
worker sends a referral:
1. External referral following direct job arrival: if a worker rejects a direct offer,
he/she may refer one of his/her friends to the firm he/she declines. I call it an
external referral because it is initiated by an individual outside of the firm.
12In this model, a worker cannot refer a friend to his/her current firm unless he/she himself/herself
leaves. This modeling choice is driven by the small number of executive positions in each firm.
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2. Internal referral following direct job arrival: if a worker leaves his/her current
firm because he/she accepts a better job offer, he/she may refer one of his/her
friends to the firm he/she leaves. I call it an internal referral because it is
initiated by an individual who has worked at the firm.
3. Internal referral following job separation: if a worker leaves his/her firm as a
result of exogenous separation, he/she may refer one of his/her friends to the
firm he/she leaves.13 This is also an internal referral.
Workers are assumed to be nonstrategic in sending referrals. They send referrals
with probability π1 after direct job arrivals and with probability π0 after job separations.
Conditional on sending a referral, a recipient is sampled according to the following
sequential statistical process:
1. Sample employment status: sample unemployed friends with probability νu and
employed friends with probability νe = 1− νu.
2. Sample a network: sample school friends, work friends, and social-activity friends
with probability (ωEdu, ωWork, ωSocial) ∈ ∆2. When not all three types of friends
are present, only sample from the available types and normalize the probability
accordingly.
3. Sample a friend: conditional on employment status and type of network, sample
one friend randomly.
13Job separations can be either involuntary or voluntary. Voluntary separations such as retirement
or leaving for health reasons may lead to internal referrals.
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More precisely, conditional on friend j ∈ NAll(i) sending a referral, the probability for
worker i to receive this referral is
γi←j =

νu(ξ
Edu∩u
j ·
yEduij
dEdu∩uj
+ ξWork∩uj ·
yWorkij
dWork∩uj
+ ξSocial∩uj ·
ySocialij
dSocial∩uj
) if si = u,
νe(ξ
Edu∩e
j ·
yEduij
dEdu∩ej
+ ξWork∩ej ·
yWorkij
dWork∩ej
+ ξSocial∩ej ·
ySocialij
dSocial∩ej
) if si = e,
(1.4)
where s = {si}i=1,...,n is a vector of employment statuses for all workers. For each net-
work k ∈ {Edu,Work, Social}. dk∩uj = |Nk(j) ∩ {i : si = u}| is the number of j’s un-
employed friends in network k, and dk∩ej = |Nk(j)∩{i : si = e}| is the number of j’s em-
ployed friends in network k. ξk∩uj =
1(dk∩uj >0)ω
k
1(dEdu∩uj >0)ω
Edu+1(dWork∩uj >0)ω
Work+1(dSocial∩uj >0)ω
Social
is the probability for j to send referrals to unemployed friends in network k, and
ξk∩ej =
1(dk∩ej >0)ω
k
1(dEdu∩ej >0)ω
Edu+1(dWork∩ej >0)ω
Work+1(dSocial∩ej >0)ω
Social is the probability for j to
send referrals to employed friends in network k.
In this model, a referral is a chance for a worker to meet with a firm: an additional
source of job arrival. It is tied to the firm’s productivity, not to the wage offered to the
worker sending the referral. All the wages are bargained between worker-firm pairs.
I make the following additional assumptions of the referral process. First, sending
a referral is costless and takes no time. Second, unemployed workers do not send
referrals when they reject job offers.14 Third, referrals have no immediate “chain effect”:
when a worker rejects a referral, he/she no longer passes it along to his/her friends;
when a worker accepts a referral and change jobs, he/she does not send an internal
referral about the job he/she leaves.15 This assumption is supported by reduced-form
14This assumption guarantees the tractability of the model. It ensures that the “reservation
productivity” for an unemployed worker is a single agent decision problem. Otherwise, if unemployed
workers are allowed to send referrals after rejecting job offers, the “reservation productivities” for
unemployed workers will be interdependent, resulting in a game among the workers. In terms of
the empirics, the estimation results show few unemployed workers reject offers. Therefore, this
assumption is relatively innocuous quantitatively.
15This assumption reduces the computational intensity of the model. Relaxing this assumption
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evidence in Section 1.3 that there is no significant co-movement in job transitions
beyond immediate friends.
Wage Bargaining. Wages are bargained over by workers and firms, and the bargain-
ing process is the same for direct offers and referrals. In the bargaining, information is
complete. All participating agents observe one another’s types: the firm’s productivity
p, and the worker’s ability a as well as his/her state variable Γ which embodies
information relevant to the arrivals of referrals. For expository purposes, I focus on
bargaining here and defer the description of Γ to later. Firms can vary their wage offers
according to the characteristics (a,Γ) of the particular worker they meet. They can
also counter the offers received by their employees from competing firms. Additionally,
wage contracts are long-term contracts that can be renegotiated by mutual agreement
only. Finally, the bargaining outcome is such that a worker obtains his/her reservation
value and a share β of the additional worker rent, where β represents the worker’s
bargaining power.16
Formally, let V0(a,Γ) denote the lifetime value of an unemployed worker with
ability a and state variable Γ; let V1(a, w, p,Γ) denote that of the same worker when
employed at a firm of productivity p and paid a wage w. The bargained wage between
a type-(a,Γ) unemployed worker and a type-p firm, denoted as φ0(a, p,Γ), satisfies
V1(a, φ0(a, p,Γ), p,Γ) = V0(a,Γ) + β[V1(a, ap, p,Γ)− V0(a,Γ)]. (1.5)
will not substantially change the analytical property of the model. It is useful to note that this
assumption is not as restrictive as it seems. Although in the short run referrals only affect immediate
friends, in the long run the network effects will propagate beyond immediate friends (the ripple
effect).
16When the worker’s utility is linear, this can be interpreted as a Nash bargaining solution. In
more general cases, Cahuc et al. (2006) show that this is the outcome of a strategic bargaining game
adapted from Rubinstein (1982).
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In this equation, V0(a,Γ) is the worker’s reservation value, V1(a, ap, p,Γ) is the max-
imum value the worker can hope to extract from the match with the firm, and
[V1(a, ap, p,Γ)− V0(a,Γ)] is the additional worker rent brought about by this match.
Note that the worker only accepts the offer if V1(a, ap, p,Γ) ≥ V0(a,Γ). Equivalently,
this can be characterized by a productivity threshold p0(a,Γ), defined by
V1(a, ap0(a,Γ), p0(a,Γ),Γ) = V0(a,Γ). (1.6)
If p ≥ p0(a,Γ), the worker accepts the offer; otherwise, he/she rejects it.
When a worker employed at firm p is contacted by an outside firm p′, the incumbent
firm and the poaching firm compete for the worker. If the poaching firm is more
productive than the incumbent (p′ > p), it wins the bargain by offering a wage
φ1(a, p, p
′,Γ) such that
V1(a, φ1(a, p, p
′,Γ), p′,Γ) = V1(a, ap, p,Γ) + β[V1(a, ap
′, p′,Γ)− V1(a, ap, p,Γ)]. (1.7)
In this case, the worker’s reservation value is the maximum value he/she can extract
from the incumbent firm, V1(a, ap, p,Γ).
If the poaching firm is less productive than the incumbent (p′ ≤ p), the incumbent
retains the worker by offering a renegotiated wage φ1(a, p′, p,Γ) such that
V1(a, φ1(a, p
′, p,Γ), p,Γ) = V1(a, ap
′, p′,Γ) + β[V1(a, ap, p,Γ)− V1(a, ap′, p′,Γ)]. (1.8)
Note that renegotiation requires mutual agreement, so it is only triggered if φ1(a, p′, p,Γ)
is higher than the worker’s current wage w. Equivalently, this can be characterized by
a productivity threshold q(a, w, p,Γ), defined by
φ1(a, q(a, w, p,Γ), p,Γ) = w. (1.9)
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If the poaching firm’s productivity is relatively high (q(a, w, p,Γ) < p′ ≤ p), the worker
gets a raise in the incumbent firm; if the poaching firm’s productivity is too low
(p′ ≤ q(a, w, p,Γ)), the outside offer is discarded.
Labor Market Transitions and Referrals. With the descriptions above, I can
fully characterize the worker’s labor market transitions and referrals.
1. When an unemployed type-(a,Γ) worker meets a firm p, either from direct arrival
or referral,
a) If p ≥ p0(a,Γ), the worker accepts the offer at a bargained wage φ0(a, p,Γ);
b) Otherwise, the worker rejects the offer.
2. When an employed type-(a,Γ) worker at firm p paid at wage w meets an outside
firm p′, either from direct arrival or referral,
a) If p′ > p, the worker moves to the new firm with a wage φ1(a, p, p′,Γ).
Additionally, if this follows a direct job arrival, the worker may refer a
friend to the firm he/she leaves (internal referral).
b) If q(a, w, p,Γ) < p′ ≤ p, the worker stays at the current firm with a raise
to φ1(a, p′, p,Γ).
Additionally, if this follows a direct job arrival, the worker may refer a
friend to the firm he/she rejects (external referral).
c) If p′ ≤ q(a, w, p,Γ), the worker keeps the current wage at the current firm.
Additionally, if this follows a direct job arrival, the worker may refer a
friend to the firm he/she rejects (external referral).
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3. When an employed worker is exogenously separated from his/her current job,
he/she may refer a friend to the firm he/she leaves (internal referral).
State Variable Γi. Γi = {Γi0(·),Γi1(·)} are distributions of the productivities of
worker i’s friends’ jobs, when i is unemployed and employed respectively.17 More
precisely, Γi0(p) and Γi1(p) are the “head count” of i’s friends working at firms with
productivities no greater than p, where each friend j is weighted by γi←j, his/her
probability of sending referral to i. As γi←j, defined in (1.4), depends on recipient i’s
employment status, so does Γi. Specifically, Γi0 is calculated using γi←j for unemployed
i, and Γi1 is calculated using γi←j for employed i:
Γi0(p) =
∑
j∈NAll(i)
γi←j(si = u) · 1(pj ≤ p),
Γi1(p) =
∑
j∈NAll(i)
γi←j(si = e) · 1(pj ≤ p).
(1.10)
In the following part, I discuss two properties of Γi. First, (λ1, π1, δ, π0, F,Γi)
fully characterize worker i’s instantaneous arrival rate and distribution of referrals.
To illustrate this point, first consider the referrals from one particular friend j.
External referral from j arrives at rate λ1π1F (pj)γi←j , and the associated productivity
distribution is F truncated above at pj. Internal referral from j arrives at rate
[λ1π1(1 − F (pj)) + δπ0]γi←j, and the associated productivity is pj. Then use Γi to
aggregate over friends.
Second, (λ1, π1, δ, π0, F,Γi) are not sufficient statistics to forecast the dynamics of
Γi. The dynamics of Γi depend on the dynamics of friends’ jobs {pj}j∈NAll(i). Friends’
jobs are affected by referrals they receive, i.e. {Γj}j∈NAll(i), and thus their friends jobs
17Rigorously speaking, they are not probability distributions because the total measures do not
necessarily equal one.
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{{p′j}j′∈NAll(j)}j∈NAll(i). By similar argument, the interdependence goes further on the
network (ripple effects). Therefore, the dynamics of Γi is determined by the structure
of the full networks and the dynamics of all workers’ jobs.18 Even though referrals do
not have immediate effect beyond direct friends, in the long run, referrals generate
ripple effects that spread across the whole network.
Worker’s Information Set. First, a worker i observes the following information
about his/her local networks:
NEdu(i), NWork(i), NSocial(i);
{dEdu∩uj , dEdu∩ej , dWork∩uj , dWork∩ej , dSocial∩uj , dSocial∩ej }j∈NAll(i).
19
He/she knows the identities of his/her friends and the types of their connections.
Additionally, he/she knows his/her friends’ degree in unemployed and employed school
network, work network, and social-activity network, so he/she can calculate the level
of “competition” for referrals. Second, he/she observes the productivities of his/her
friends’ jobs:
{pj}j∈NAll(i).
Therefore, a worker has enough information to calculate the instantaneous Γi.
Workers’ Forward-Looking Behavior. I make the following assumptions on
workers’ forward-looking behavior.
Assumption 1. Workers have static expectation of Γ.
18For networks with multiple components, rigorously speaking, the dynamics of Γi is determined
by the structure of the connected component containing i and the dynamics of the workers in the
component.
19It is reasonable to assume that a worker knows only his/her local network. Previous studies (e.g.,
Friedkin, 1983; Krackhardt, 1987; Krackhardt, 2014; and Banerjee et al., 2017) show that people
have little knowledge of their social network structure beyond immediate friends.
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Workers do not forecast the dynamics of Γ. When workers bargain with firms,
they calculate Γ using the latest information and assume it does not change. In other
words, workers ignore future changes of their networks as well as their friends’ jobs,
and thus ignore future changes of the arrival rate and distribution of referrals in their
calculation of future values. This assumption can be interpreted as bounded rationality.
Given workers’ limited information, it is forbiddingly difficult to calculate Γ’s law of
motion for two main reasons. First, Γ is high dimensional; second, the calculation
requires integration over the structures of the unobserved part of the networks and
integration over non-friends’ jobs.20
This assumption introduces discrepancy between the worker’s problem of solving
bargained wage and my (the researcher’s) problem of studying the dynamics. It should
be emphasized that this assumption only applies to the worker’s problem and does not
apply to my study of the dynamics. I incorporate the evolution of the networks and
analyze the labor market transitions of all workers according to the model description
in the previous parts.
This assumption has two implications. First, in making labor market decisions, a
worker does not consider the implied change to the endogenous work network. For
example, a worker will not accept an “undesirable” job for the sole purpose of becoming
friends with another worker in the same firm. This implication is not unrealistic,
especially in the executive labor market, because an individual can achieve similar
purpose by actively building on his/her social-activity network, whose evolution is
accommodated in my model. Second, in sending referrals, a worker does not consider
20An alternative modeling approach is to approximate Γ with a low dimensional object and approx-
imate its law of motion by imposing further assumptions. This alternative approach accommodates
dynamics at the expense of accuracy. In this paper, I choose to use the accurate characterization of
Γ and forgo the dynamics.
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the implied change to friends’ jobs. This implication is innocuous, especially for
referrals following direct job offers. To illustrate, consider a situation when worker i
refers a job to friend j and j accepts. This will not increase helpful referrals from j to
i because the best referral from j is as good as j’s own job, which i has forgone.
Assumption 2. Workers are rationally forward looking in all other aspects.
Given the arrivals of referrals, workers have rational expectations on future job
arrivals, job separations, and bargained wages.
Worker’s Problem and Bargained Wage. An unemployed worker’s value func-
tion is characterized by
ρV0(a,Γ) = U(ab) (1.11a)
+ λ0
∫ pmax
p0(a,Γ)
[V1(a, φ0(a, x,Γ), x,Γ)− V0(a,Γ)]dF (x) (1.11b)
+ δπ0
∫ pmax
p0(a,Γ)
[V1(a, φ0(a, y,Γ), y,Γ)− V0(a,Γ)]dΓ0(y) (1.11c)
+ λ1π1
∫ pmax
p0(a,Γ)
∫ y
p0(a,Γ)
[V1(a, φ0(a, x,Γ), x,Γ)− V0(a,Γ)]dF (x)dΓ0(y) (1.11d)
+ λ1π1
∫ pmax
p0(a,Γ)
∫ pmax
y
[V1(a, φ0(a, y,Γ), y,Γ)− V0(a,Γ)]dF (x)dΓ0(y), (1.11e)
where φ0(a, p,Γ) is the bargained wage defined in (1.5), and p0(a,Γ) is the reservation
productivity defined in (1.6). To understand expression (1.11), note that line (1.11a)
represents the flow utility; line (1.11b) represents the expected value of receiving a
direct job offer; line (1.11c) represents the expected value of receiving an internal
referral following friends’ job separations; line (1.11d) represents the expected value
of receiving an external referral following friends’ job arrivals; and finally, line (1.11e)
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represents the expected value of receiving an internal referral following friends’ job
arrivals.
An employed worker’s value function is characterized by
ρV1(a, w, p,Γ) = U(w) (1.12a)
+ δ[V0(a,Γ)− V1(a, w, p,Γ)] (1.12b)
+ λ1
∫ p
q(a,w,p,Γ)
[V1(a, φ1(a, x, p,Γ), p,Γ)− V1(a, w, p,Γ)]dF (x) (1.12c)
+ λ1
∫ pmax
p
[V1(a, φ1(a, p, x,Γ), x,Γ)− V1(a, w, p,Γ)]dF (x) (1.12d)
+ δπ0
∫ p
q(a,w,p,Γ)
[V1(a, φ1(a, y, p,Γ), p,Γ)− V1(a, w, p,Γ)]dΓ1(y) (1.12e)
+ δπ0
∫ pmax
p
[V1(a, φ1(a, p, y,Γ), y,Γ)− V1(a, w, p,Γ)]dΓ1(y) (1.12f)
+ λ1π1
∫ p
q(a,w,p,Γ)
∫ y
q(a,w,p,Γ)
[V1(a, φ1(a, x, p,Γ), p,Γ)− V1(a, w, p,Γ)]dF (x)dΓ1(y)
(1.12g)
+ λ1π1
∫ pmax
p
∫ p
q(a,w,p,Γ)
[V1(a, φ1(a, x, p,Γ), p,Γ)− V1(a, w, p,Γ)]dF (x)dΓ1(y)
(1.12h)
+ λ1π1
∫ p
q(a,w,p,Γ)
∫ pmax
y
[V1(a, φ1(a, y, p,Γ), p,Γ)− V1(a, w, p,Γ)]dF (x)dΓ1(y) (1.12i)
+ λ1π1
∫ pmax
p
∫ y
p
[V1(a, φ1(a, p, x,Γ), x,Γ)− V1(a, w, p,Γ)]dF (x)dΓ1(y) (1.12j)
+ λ1π1
∫ pmax
p
∫ pmax
y
[V1(a, φ1(a, p, y,Γ), y,Γ)− V1(a, w, p,Γ)]dF (x)dΓ1(y), (1.12k)
where φ1(a, p, p′,Γ) is the bargained wage defined in (1.7), and q(a, w, p,Γ) is the
productivity threshold defined in (1.9). To understand expression (1.12), note that
line (1.12a) represents the flow utility; line (1.12b) represents the expected value of
experiencing a job separation; line (1.12c) represents the expected value of a wage
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raise resulting from a direct job offer; line (1.12d) represents the expected value of a
job change resulting from a direct job offer; line (1.12e) represents the expected value
of a wage raise resulting from an internal referral following friends’ job separations;
line (1.12f) represents the expected value of a job change resulting from an internal
referral following friends’ job separations; lines (1.12g) and (1.12h) represent the
expected value of a wage raise resulting from an external referral following friends’
job arrivals for friends with productivity lower than and higher than p respectively;
line (1.12i) represents the expected value of a wage raise resulting from an internal
referral following friends’ job arrivals; line (1.12j) represents the expected value of
a job change resulting from an external referral following friends’ job arrivals; and
finally, line (1.12k) represents the expected value of a job change resulting from an
internal referral following friends’ job arrivals.
In Appendix 3.1, I provide details on solving the reservation productivity p0(·) and
bargained wages φ0(·), φ1(·). Specifically, I show that for CRRA utility function
U(x) =

lnx if α = 1
x1−α−1
1−α if α 6= 1
, (1.13)
the reservation productivity is given by the implicit function
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ln p0(a,Γ) =

ln b
+β(λ0 − λ1)
∫ pmax
p0(a,Γ)
F̄ (x)x−1
ρ+δ+λ1βF̄ (x)+[λ1π1βF̄ (x)+δπ0β]Γ̄1(x)
dx
+δπ0β
∫ pmax
p0(a,Γ)
(Γ̄0(y)−Γ̄1(y))y−1
ρ+δ+λ1βF̄ (y)+[λ1π1βF̄ (y)+δπ0β]Γ̄1(y)
dy
+λ1π1β
∫ pmax
p0(a,Γ)
(Γ̄0(x)−Γ̄1(x))F̄ (x)x−1
ρ+δ+λ1βF̄ (x)+[λ1π1βF̄ (x)+δπ0β]Γ̄1(x)
dx
if α = 1
1
1−α ln
{
b1−α
+(1− α)β(λ0 − λ1)
∫ pmax
p0(a,Γ)
F̄ (x)x−α
ρ+δ+λ1βF̄ (x)+[λ1π1βF̄ (x)+δπ0β]Γ̄1(x)
dx
+(1− α)δπ0β
∫ pmax
p0(a,Γ)
(Γ̄0(y)−Γ̄1(y))y−α
ρ+δ+λ1βF̄ (y)+[λ1π1βF̄ (y)+δπ0β]Γ̄1(y)
dy
+(1− α)λ1π1β
∫ pmax
p0(a,Γ)
(Γ̄0(x)−Γ̄1(x))F̄ (x)x−α
ρ+δ+λ1βF̄ (x)+[λ1π1βF̄ (x)+δπ0β]Γ̄1(x)
dx
}
if α 6= 1,
(1.14)
and the bargained wages are given by
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lnφ1(a, p
L, pH ,Γ) =

ln a+ β ln pH + (1− β) ln pL
−δπ0(1− β)2
∫ pH
pL
Γ̄1(y)y−1
ρ+δ+λ1βF̄ (y)+[λ1π1βF̄ (y)+δπ0β]Γ̄1(y)
dy
−λ1(1− β)2
[ ∫ pH
pL
F̄ (x)x−1
ρ+δ+λ1βF̄ (x)+[λ1π1βF̄ (x)+δπ0β]Γ̄1(x)
dx
+π1
∫ pmax
pH
∫ pH
pL
F̄ (x)x−1
ρ+δ+λ1βF̄ (x)+[λ1π1βF̄ (x)+δπ0β]Γ̄1(x)
dxdΓ1(y)
+π1
∫ pH
pL
∫ y
pL
F̄ (x)x−1
ρ+δ+λ1βF̄ (x)+[λ1π1βF̄ (x)+δπ0β]Γ̄1(x)
dxdΓ1(y)
]
if α = 1
ln a+ 1
1−α ln
{
β(PH)1−α + (1− β)(PL)1−α
−(1− α)δπ0(1− β)2
∫ pH
pL
Γ̄1(y)y−α
ρ+δ+λ1βF̄ (y)+[λ1π1βF̄ (y)+δπ0β]Γ̄1(y)
dy
−(1− α)λ1(1− β)2
[ ∫ pH
pL
F̄ (x)x−α
ρ+δ+λ1βF̄ (x)+[λ1π1βF̄ (x)+δπ0β]Γ̄1(x)
dx
+π1
∫ pmax
pH
∫ pH
pL
F̄ (x)x−α
ρ+δ+λ1βF̄ (x)+[λ1π1βF̄ (x)+δπ0β]Γ̄1(x)
dxdΓ1(y)
+π1
∫ pH
pL
∫ y
pL
F̄ (x)x−α
ρ+δ+λ1βF̄ (x)+[λ1π1βF̄ (x)+δπ0β]Γ̄1(x)
dxdΓ1(y)
]}
if α 6= 1,
(1.15)
and
φ0(a, p,Γ) = φ1(a, p0(a,Γ), p,Γ). (1.16)
Model Property.
Proposition 1. Job transitions are independent of ability.
All the job transitions, including UE, EE, and EU, are independent of workers’
abilities. First, by model assumption, direct job arrivals and job separations are
independent of workers’ abilities. Additionally, workers’ optimal accept/reject decisions
are independent of abilities: for employed workers, they always climb the productivity
ladder; for unemployed workers, the reservation productivities are independent of
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their abilities as shown in (1.14). Therefore, referrals are independent of workers’
abilities because they are generated as results of employed workers’ job separations and
accept/reject decisions after direct job offers. Finally, workers’ optimal accept/reject
decisions with respect to referrals are independent of abilities.
This property is mainly driven by two modeling assumptions. The first assumption
is that direct job offer arrivals and job separations do not depend on workers’ abilities.
This assumption rules out the possibility for high-ability workers to encounter more
frequent or better quality jobs, because previous empirical studies find little evidence
of sorting between executive ability and firm productivity.21 This assumption also rules
out the possibility for low-ability workers to experience more frequent job separations,
because in the executive market most of the separations are voluntary due to personal
reasons/retirement/death and only a small fraction are forced due to low competence.22
The second assumption is no information asymmetry in wage bargaining. This
assumption guarantees that worker ability is fully compensated in all bargained wages,
and thus when contacted by the same firm, low-ability and high-ability workers have
the same accept/reject incentives. It abstracts from asymmetric information problems
because they are not of first order importance for the purpose of studying network
effects of referrals. Moreover, in the executive market, the problem of asymmetric
information is less severe because there are typically abundant records on a candidate’s
past performance, upon which a firm can evaluate his/her ability.
21For example, Terviö (2008) and Gabaix and Landier (2008) estimate assignment models between
firms and CEOs. Under the assumption of positive assortative matching, their empirical results show
very small dispersion in CEO ability. This suggests that, quantitatively, there is no significant sorting
between worker ability and firm productivity.
22For example, Huson et al. (2001), Kaplan and Minton (2006), and Taylor (2010) use the news
on the Wall Street Journal to categorize whether a separation is voluntary or forced. They show that
on average, only 2% of the CEOs are forced to leave their job each year. Additionally, some of the
forced separations are caused by personal scandals that are not directly related to the executives’
competence in generating output, the ability in this model.
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Corollary 1. The speed of career advancement depends on referrals.
Career advancement (UE and EE transitions) depends on referrals because referrals
are an additional channel of job arrivals. As discussed earlier, the arrival rate and
distribution of referrals are determined by Γ, the productivities of friends’ jobs.
Variation in Γ leads to variation in referrals and ultimately to variation in the speed
of career advancement.
Proposition 2. The level of compensation depends on worker ability.
Specifically, log wage is additively separable in ability as shown in (1.15) and (1.16):
lnφ1(a, p
L, pH ,Γ) = ln a + lnφ1(1, p
L, pH ,Γ), lnφ0(a, p,Γ) = ln a + lnφ0(1, p,Γ). In
this model, ability only comes into play in the wage bargaining process, and thus it is
reflected in the level of wage.
This property is mainly driven by two parametric assumptions. First, output and
unemployment income are multiplicative in worker ability. Second, workers receive
their reservation value and a share of the additional rent through bargaining. These
are standard assumptions in the literature, with a reasonable depiction of the reality
and the convenience of tractability.
It is useful to note that the additive separability of log wage implies that the
wage growth rate is independent of ability. Instead, wage growth depends on referrals
because it results from competing offers.
Discussion: Networks and Referrals
My model generates a rich set of network effects, and I discuss some of them in
this section.
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First, a worker’s number of friends is not the only thing that matters. A worker’s
friends act like filters in sending referrals. The distribution of referrals from one
particular friend is censored by the productivity of this friend’s job. In other words,
the best referral one can expect from a friend is as good as the friend’s own job.
Therefore, the better a friend’s job, the better the referral he/she sends. Referral
prospects depend not only on the number of friends, but also on friends’ success in
their careers.
Second, friends of a friend matter. On the one hand, they “compete” for job referrals,
which lowers a worker’s probability of receiving a particular referral (competition
effect).23 On the other hand, they send referrals to a worker’s friend, improving the
friend’s job. This increases the quantity and the quality of the referrals the friend
sends out, which ultimately benefits the worker (ripple effect). These two mechanisms
work in opposite directions, and the net effect of friends of friends is qualitatively
ambiguous. Through a quantitative analysis with a counterfactual experiment in
Section 1.6, I find that the competition effect is more important.
Third, mutual friends matter. More precisely, the clustering structure, i.e., whether
a worker’s friends are also friends with one another, affects referrals. I illustrate the
effects of clustering using Figure 1.1 as an example. Consider worker A in these two
networks.24 According to the definition in (1.3), worker A’s local clustering coefficient
cA = 0 for the network on the left because none of his/her friends are connected; it
is cA = 2(42)
= 1
3
for the network on the right because there exist two connections
among his/her friends over six possible connections. Therefore, worker A’s network
23Workers do not actively compete for referrals. I use “compete” in a statistical sense.
24Note that in both networks, worker A has four friends, and each friend has two friends (a
fifty-percent chance for A to receive a friend’s referral). Therefore, for worker A, both the number
of friends and the level of competition for referral are the same in the two networks. The major
difference of the two networks is clustering.
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on the right has a higher level of clustering. An advantage of clustering is that it
Figure 1.1: Low vs. High Clustering
keeps the positive spillovers in an inner circle (closeness effect). Consider the scenario
when friend B sends out a referral, but not to A. In the low-clustering network,
this referral goes to F , who will not be able to help A directly. In comparison, in
the high-clustering network, this referral goes to C who is a friend of worker A and
will be able to help A directly. In this sense, clustering helps. A disadvantage of
clustering is that it limits positive spillovers from afar (isolation effect). Consider
an alternative scenario when friends {B,C,D,E} get unlucky and experience few
good shocks. In the low-clustering network, worker A can still benefit in the long
run from the good shocks to friends of friends {F,G,H, I} through their referrals to
{B,C,D,E}. In the high-clustering network, however, there is no such channel. In
this sense, clustering hurts. These two mechanisms work in opposite directions, and
the net effect of clustering is qualitatively ambiguous. Through a quantitative analysis
with a counterfactual experiment in Section 1.6, I find that the relative importance of
these two effects is heterogeneous.
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1.3 Data
In this section I describe my data sets and present summary statistics and reduced-
form evidence. I combine three data sets: (1) Compustat Executive Compensation
(ExecuComp); (2) BoardEx; and (3) the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)
U.S. Stock Database.
Data Sets
Compustat Executive Compensation. Compustat Executive Compensation
(hereafter, ExecuComp) provides executive compensation data collected directly from
companies’ annual proxy statements filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC).25 Most companies report around 5 executives for a given year, typically
the C-Suite, including the chief executive officer (CEO), the chief financial officer
(CFO), and the chief operating officer (COO), etc. I use ExecuComp to construct
a panel of individuals’ employment history in the executive market along with their
on-the-job compensation.
BoardEx. BoardEx provides network connection data among board members and
senior executives in notable public and private companies collected from publicly
available information. Social connections are defined by overlaps in education, private
and public companies, and other social activities such as charities, clubs, business
associations, and university board memberships, etc. I use BoardEx to construct three
evolving networks for education, workplace, and social activities respectively. Addi-
25A proxy statement is a document containing the information the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) requires companies to provide to shareholders so they can make informed
decisions about matters that will be brought up at an annual or special stockholder meeting. It is
also known as Form DEF 14A.
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tionally, BoardEx also provides information on the gender and nationality composition
of the board of the directors.
U.S. Stock Database from the Center for Research in Security Prices. The
U.S. Stock Database from the Center for Research in Security Prices (hereafter, CRSP)
provides stock market data for equity securities traded on the major U.S. stock
exchanges. CRSP contains information such as price, quote, market capitalization,
shares outstanding, trading volume, etc. I use CRSP to construct companies’ financial
variables.
Sample Construction. In my estimation sample, I include individuals who have
ever worked as senior executives in S&P 500 companies between (and including) 2007
and 2015 and merge the data in ExecuComp and BoardEx.26 The resulting sample
consists of a total of 4,192 individuals. In constructing employment history, I code the
time when an individual is not an executive in an S&P 500 firm as “unemployment”.
This should not be interpreted literally; instead it should be interpreted as not being
employed in the specific labor market under study. Additionally, as my model rules
out downward job-to-job transition, I code a transition from an executive job in a
high market cap company to another executive job in a low market cap company as if
the individual goes through unemployment in between the jobs. Finally, I construct
three evolving social networks. For each year t, a network includes all the connections
established before t. Additionally, I assume that once a connection is formed, it will
26I use a sample period after 2006 because of a change in the reporting rule of the executives’
total compensation. In 2006, the Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 123R changed the reporting
requirements of the DEF 14A form. Under this new reporting regime, the cost of all employee
stock options, as well as other equity-based compensation arrangements, have to be reflected in the
financial statements based on the estimated fair value of the awards.
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never be lost. The resulting education network is fixed over time, and the work and
social-activity networks monotonically grow larger over time. It is useful to note that
not all work connections are established as a result of movements in the executive
labor market. Examples of exogenous work connections are those formed when one or
both individuals serve on the board of directors or in lower management positions.
In the end, I discuss the potential issue of missing connections in the constructed
networks. On the one hand, connections with individuals out of the sample are not
included. On the other hand, some connections between individuals in the sample
may not be recorded in BoardEx if the information is not publicly available such as
attending the same church. Due to these data limitations, the constructed networks
are subnetworks of the “true” networks and may potentially lead to underestimation
of the effect of referrals.
Summary Statistics
Executives and Firms. Table 1.1 reports the summary statistics for the executives
and the firms in the data. Executives in S&P 500 firms have an average annual
compensation of 6.09 million dollars, with a median of 3.89 million. Most of the
individuals in the sample are between the ages of 38 and 61 at the beginning of the
sample period, with both the mean and the median being around 49. Moreover, 91%
of them are male. S&P 500 firms in the sample period have an average monthly stock
return of 0.69% and an average market capitalization of 29.47 billion dollars. The
size of the board of directors ranges from 7 to 15, with a mean of 10.96. The average
proportion of male directors is 85%, and the average proportion of foreign directors is
11%.
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Variable Mean 5% 25% 50% 75% 95%
Panel A: Executives
Compensation 6.09 1.15 2.31 3.89 7.27 17.68
Age in 2007 48.98 38 44 49 54 61
Male 0.91
Panel B: Firms
Stock Return 0.69% -0.62% 0.35% 0.71% 1.11% 2.21%
Market Capitalization 29,472.24 4,698.01 7,481.18 13,489.17 29,597.99 121,726.30
Board Size 10.96 7.80 9.31 10.87 12.18 14.81
Board Gender Ratio 0.85 0.72 0.81 0.85 0.89 0.97
Board Nationality Mix 0.11 0 0 0.07 0.18 0.38
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics: Executives and Firms
Notes: (1). Compensation is the the total annual compensation reported in the SEC filings. It
is the sum of the salary, bonus, the value of stock and option awards, non-equity incentive plan
compensation, change in pension value and nonqualified deferred compensation earnings, and other
compensations such as perquisites and personal benefits etc. Compensation reported in this table is
adjusted for inflation, in the unit of 2015 U.S. million dollar. (2). Stock return is monthly return. (3).
Market capitalization is adjusted for inflation, in the unit of 2015 U.S. million dollar. (4). Board size
is the number of directors on the board. (5). Board gender ratio is the proportion of male directors.
(6). Board nationality mix is the proportion of foreign directors.
Networks. Table 1.2 reports the summary statistics for the social networks. For each
network, I report the distributions of degree (defined in (1.2)) and clustering coefficient
(defined in (1.3)) at the beginning (2007), the middle (2011), and the end (2015) of the
sample period. The education network does not change over time. About half of the
individuals have no school friends. Conditional on having school friends, the average
number of school friends is 6.35. The work network grows moderately; the average
number of work friends increases from 16.40 in 2007 to 24.76 in 2015. The social-
activity network grows more rapidly; the average number of social-activity friends
increases from 0.45 in 2007 to 13.57 in 2015. These new social-activity connections
are formed unevenly. About half of the individuals have no social-activity connections
throughout the entire sample period, whereas the top 5% added more than 60 new
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connections.
These networks exhibit two key features. The first feature is high level of clus-
tering.27 The average clustering coefficient conditional on d > 0 ranges from 0.40 to
0.65, meaning for an average individual more than 40% of his/her friends are also
friends with one another.28 In comparison, the average clustering coefficient for a
randomly formed network is around 0.05. The second feature is sorting on degree,
i.e., high-degree individuals’ friends are often high-degree, and low-degree individuals’
friends are often low-degree. The correlations between own degree and the average
of friends’ degrees are 0.85, 0.69, and 0.74 respectively for the education, work, and
social-activity networks. In comparison, the correlation for a randomly formed network
is around 0.20.
Labor Market Transitions. Tables 1.3 and 1.4 report the summary statistics for
the labor market transitions. Each year, the average fraction of non-executives is
47.21%, and their annual transition rate from non-executive to executives (UE) is
16.09%. The average fraction of executives is 52.79%, their annual transition rate to
executives in a more productive firm (EE) is 0.72%, and their annual transition rate
to non-executives (EU) is 13.03%. Career advancement is defined as either a UE or
EE transition. The annual rate of career advancement is 7.97%. The average duration
of the non-executive spell is 3.97 years for the right-censored spells and 3.87 years for
those ending with an executive job. The average duration of an executive job spell is
27The definition of a connection requires two individuals to have overlapping time in an organization.
Therefore, with people joining and leaving at staggered time, the resulting networks are not collections
of cliques (a clique is a subgraph such that every two distinct nodes are connected; all the nodes in a
clique have clustering coefficients of 1).
28Clustering coefficient is meaningful only for individuals with friends. Clustering coefficient for
an individual with no friend is defined to be 0.
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Variable Mean
Mean
Conditional on d > 0 5% 25% 50% 75% 95%
Panel A: Network Y Edu
dEdu 3.67 6.35 0 0 1 5 24
cEdu 0.27 0.47 0 0 0 0.52 1
Panel B: Network Y Work
dWork,2007 16.40 17.08 1 7 11 20 52
cWork,2007 0.63 0.65 0 0.41 0.64 0.92 1
dWork,2011 20.76 20.97 5 9 14 25 61
cWork,2011 0.60 0.61 0.20 0.39 0.58 0.86 1
dWork,2015 24.76 24.76 7 11 18 31 69
cWork,2015 0.56 0.56 0.21 0.35 0.52 0.77 1
Panel C: Network Y Social
dSocial,2007 0.45 3.87 0 0 0 0 3
cSocial,2007 0.04 0.40 0 0 0 0 0.41
dSocial,2011 4.39 12.25 0 0 0 2 26
cSocial,2011 0.18 0.52 0 0 0 0.32 0.89
dSocial,2015 13.57 26.48 0 0 1 9 66
cSocial,2015 0.27 0.53 0 0 0 0.53 0.96
Panel D: Network Y All
dAll,2007 20.42 20.92 2 8 15 26 60
cAll,2007 0.50 0.51 0.13 0.29 0.43 0.69 1
dAll,2011 28.41 28.57 5 12 20 37 78
cAll,2011 0.46 0.46 0.16 0.27 0.39 0.61 1
dAll,2015 41.15 41.15 8 15 27 49 130
cAll,2015 0.43 0.43 0.17 0.26 0.37 0.55 0.94
Table 1.2: Network Statistics
Notes: (1). d is degree, defined in Eq.(1.2). It is the number of an individual’s friends. (2). c is
clustering coefficient, defined in Eq.(1.3). It gives the proportion of an individual’s friends who are
friends with one another. (3). The time superscript for Y Edu is omitted because it does not change
in the sample period.
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5.26 years for the right-censored spells, 3.30 years for those ending with transitions to
non-executives, and 3.10 years for those ending with transitions to executive jobs in
more productive firms.
Conditional on U Conditional on E Unconditional
UE Transition EE Transition EU Transition Career Advancement
Annual Transition Rate 16.09% 0.72% 13.03% 7.97%
Table 1.3: Job Transition
Notes: (1). A UE transition is defined as the transition from non-executive to executive. (2). An EE
transition is defined as the transition from one executive job to another. (3). An EU transition is
defined as the transition from executive to non-executive. (4). A career advancement is defined as
either a UE or EE transition.
Panel A: Unemployment Spell
Type of Transition Number of Spells Mean of Spell Duration Std. Dev. of Spell Duration
Right Censored 1,984 3.97 2.32
To Employment 2,547 3.87 2.37
Panel B: Job Spell
Type of Transition Number of Spells Mean of Spell Duration Std. Dev. of Spell Duration
Right Censored 2,208 5.26 3.08
To Unemployment 2,422 3.30 2.15
To Another Job 127 3.10 1.85
Table 1.4: Durations
Notes: (1). An unemployment spell is defined as the period when an individual is not an executive.
(2). The unit of time is one year.
Reduced-form Evidence
In this part, I present suggestive evidence on the presence of job referrals in
the executive labor market and supporting evidence on my model assumption of no
immediate “chain effect” from friends of friends.
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Correlation in Friends’ Compensation. This analysis shows that socially con-
nected executives’ compensation is correlated, which is consistent with the implication
of my job referral model. I regress an executive’s compensation on the average of
his/her friends’ compensation and a set of covariates according to the following Spatial
Auto-Regressive model (SAR):
lnwi,t = ρ
∑
j∈Nk,t(i) lnwj,t
dk,ti
+ (xi,t)
Tβ + ui + vt + εi,t, (1.17)
where lnwi,t is executive i’s log compensation in year t, and
∑
j∈Nk,t(i) lnwj,t
dk,ti
is the
average of i’s executive friends’ log compensation in year t. xi,t is a vector of exogenous
covariates including the executive’s age, his/her employer’s financial variables and
governance variables, and industry dummy. ui is the individual fixed-effects, and vt is
the time fixed-effects. εi,t is an i.i.d. error term. Coefficient ρ, sometimes referred to as
the “social interaction parameter”, measures the percentage change in i’s compensation
in response to a one percentage increase to friends’ compensation.
In this regression,
∑
j∈Nk,t(i) lnwj,t
dk,ti
is correlated with the error term εi,t because of
simultaneous equations. To address the endogeneity problem, I use instrumental
variables. The instruments are the exogenous covariates of friends and friends of
friends. More precisely, (1.17) can be written in the following compact form
lnw = ρW lnw + xβ + u+ v + ε, (1.18)
and I use Wx and W 2x as instruments for W lnw.
Table 1.5 reports the results of the Spatial Auto-Regressive regression in (1.17),
where different columns correspond to different network specifications. Column (1)
uses the simplified network, which does not distinguish between different types of social
connections; column (2) uses the school network; column (3) uses the work network;
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and column (4) uses the social-activity network. These results illustrate that, across
all specifications of networks, an executive’s compensation is positively correlated with
his/her friends’ compensation. This correlation is driven by neither the correlation in
time-invariant individual characteristics nor time- or industry-specific shocks because
of the inclusion of individual, time, and industry fixed-effects. The positive correlation
in socially connected executives’ compensation supports my model’s prediction that
executives with better jobs send better quality referrals, increasing their friends’
compensation.
Dependent variable: log(Comp)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean ( Friend’s log(Comp) ) 0.3858∗∗∗
(0.0274)
Mean ( School Friend’s log(Comp) ) 0.2105∗∗∗
(0.0404)
Mean ( Work Friend’s log(Comp) ) 0.5573∗∗∗
(0.0364)
Mean ( Social-Activity Friend’s log(Comp) ) 0.0207∗
(0.0082)
Observations 18,481 18,481 18,481 18,481
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 1.5: Correlation of Socially Connected Executives’ Compensation
Notes: (1). This table summarizes the results of a Spatial Auto-Regressive regression with individual,
year, and industry fixed effects, where the dependent variable is the log of annual compensation.
(2). Column (1) uses the simplified network, which does not distinguish between types of social
connections; column (2) uses the school network; column (3) uses the work network; and column
(4) uses the social-activity network. (3). Instrumental variables are used to address the endogeneity
problem arising from simultaneous equations. (4). Other covariates include age, age2, and dummy
for serving on the board of directors; the board’s size, gender ratio, and nationality mix; and firm’s
lagged log(market cap) and stock return. (5). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Co-movement in Friends’ Job Transitions. This analysis shows that individuals
are more likely to make career advancement when their executive friends leave their
current jobs, which suggests the presence of referrals. Table 1.6 reports the results
of a Logit regression. It shows that an individual is more likely to make an upward
transition (UE or EE) when there is a friend(s) who experiences job-to-job transition
(EE) or job separation (EU) in the same or the previous year. This corresponds to
internal referrals following direct job arrivals or job separations. The individual fixed
effects control for time-invariant individual characteristics, and the year fixed effects
rule out time-specific shocks.29 It is useful to note that given the small number of EE
transitions, most of the co-movements are in the form of individuals making upward
transitions following friends’ downward transitions, which are unlikely to be driven by
cohort effect or industry-specific shocks. To interpret the quantitative results, note
that the coefficients in Logit regressions represent log odds ratios. For example, a log
odds ratio of 0.6957 is equivalent to an odds ratio of 2.005, meaning the odds of career
advancement for an individual whose friends change jobs is twice that of an individual
whose friends do not change jobs. In terms of the probability of career advancement,
it corresponds to a 4.7% increase in absolute terms according to the OLS estimates in
Table 3.2.
Lack of Co-movement Beyond Immediate Friends. This analysis shows the
lack of co-movement in job transitions beyond immediate friends, which motivates my
model assumption ruling out immediate “chain effect” from friends of friends. Table
29The Logit regression with individual fixed effects uses a subsample of the individuals with
the same total number of career advancements: in this case, individuals with exactly one career
advancement during the sample period. As a robustness check, the results of an OLS regression with
year and individual fixed effects using the full sample are reported in Table 3.2.
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Dependent variable: 1(Career Advancement)∈ {0, 1}
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1 (Job Transition
Among Executive Friends) 0.6957∗∗∗
(0.0934)
. . . from School 0.2706∗∗∗
(0.0769)
. . . from Work 0.7954∗∗∗
(0.0870)
. . . from Social Activity 0.2508∗∗
(0.0944)
Observations 19,360 19,360 19,360 19,360
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 1.6: Co-movement in Socially Connected Executives’ Job Transitions
Notes: (1). This table summarizes the results of a Logit regression with year and individual fixed
effects, where the dependent variable is whether an individual experiences a career advancement.
(2). A career advancement is defined as either a transition from non-executive job to executive job
(UE) or a transition between executive jobs with productivity increase (EE). (3). Variable 1 (Job
Transition Among Executive Friends) is a dummy variable that equals one if any friend experiences a
transition between executive jobs with productivity increase (EE) or a transition from executive job
to non-executive job (EU) in the same year or the previous year. (4). The scope of friends varies for
different network specifications. Column (1) uses the simplified network, which does not distinguish
between types of social connections; column (2) uses the school network; column (3) uses the work
network; and column (4) uses the social-activity network. (5). The Logit regression with individual
fixed effects uses a subsample of the individuals with the same total number of career advancements:
in this case, individuals with exactly one career advancement during the sample period. (6). Other
covariates include age2, age3, whether an individual was an executive in the previous year, and the
productivity of the job in the previous year if the individual was an executive. (7). Standard errors
are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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1.7 shows that an individual’s probability of career advancement responds to the
job-to-job transition (EE) and job separation (EU) of immediate friends, but not to
that of friends of friends.30 The results suggest that, in the short run, individuals do
not significantly benefit from friends of friends.
30 I exclude immediate friends in defining friends of friends and only include those who are not
immediate friends. Additionally, in this exercise, I use the simplified network Y All which does not
distinguish between different types of social connections because it is problematic to restrict to
friends of friends in each of the networks Y Edu, YWork, Y Social. Such restriction excludes a significant
number of friends of friends across different types of social connections, for example, a work friend of
a school friend.
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Dependent variable: 1(Career Advancement)∈ {0, 1}
(1) (2)
1(Job Transition Among Executive Friends) 0.6338∗∗∗
(0.1401)
1(Job Transition Among Executive Friends of Friends) 0.2637
(0.4536)
Number of Job Transition Among Executive Friends 0.0595∗∗
(0.0216)
Number of Job Transition Among Executive Friends of Friends 0.0035
(0.0031)
Observations 19,360 19,360
Individual FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Table 1.7: Lack of Co-movement in Job Transition Beyond Immediate Friends
Notes: (1). This table summarizes the results of a Logit regression with year and individual fixed
effects, where the dependent variable is whether an individual experiences a career advancement.
(2). A career advancement is defined as either a transition from non-executive job to executive job
(UE) or a transition between executive jobs with productivity increase (EE). (3). The simplified
network, which does not distinguish between types of social connections, is used to define friends as
well as friends of friends. (4). Friends of friends exclude immediate friends and only include those
who are not immediate friends. (5). Variable 1(Job Transition Among Executive Friends (or Friends
of Friends)) is a dummy variable that equals one if any friend (or friend of friends) experiences a
transition between executive jobs with productivity increase (EE) or a transition from executive
job to non-executive job (EU) in the same year or the previous year. (6). Variable Number of Job
Transition Among Friends (of Friends of Friends) is the total number of EE or EU transitions among
friends (or friends of friends) in the same year or the previous year. (7). The Logit regression with
individual fixed effects uses a subsample of the individuals with the same total number of career
advancements: in this case, individuals with exactly one career advancement during the sample
period. (8). Other covariates include age2, age3, whether an individual was an executive in the
previous year, and the productivity of the job in the previous year if the individual was an executive.
(9). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
46
1.4 Estimation Strategy
In this section I present my estimation method. In my empirical application, I
use the following specifications. The productivity distribution upon job arrival, F , is
truncated log normal:
ln p ∼ N (µp, σp), p ∈ [pmin, pmax]. (1.19)
Following Terviö (2008) and Gabaix and Landier (2008), I use the firm’s market
capitalization as the empirical counterpart for productivity. Additionally, I set pmin
and pmax to be the observed lowest and highest market capitalization. An executive’s
bargaining power is a function of his/her number of executive friends:
β =
exp(β0 + β1d
All∩e)
1 + exp(β0 + β1dAll∩e)
, (1.20)
where dAll∩ei = |{j|j ∈ NAll(i), sj = e}| is i’s number of executive friends. Executive
ability a follows a log normal distribution:
ln a ∼ N (µa, σa). (1.21)
Log compensation has additive i.i.d. measurement error ε:
ε ∼ N (0, σε).31 (1.22)
The unit of time is one year, and I set the continuous time discount rate ρ to be 0.05
(an annual discount rate of 0.95).32
31This measurement error should be interpreted as benefits in the compensation package that
are not included in the calculation of the value of total compensation. For example, perks such as
traveling with a private jet.
32Flinn and Heckman (1982) shows that it is difficult to separately identify the discount factor
from the flow unemployed income in standard search models.
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I estimate the parameters via a minimum-distance estimator, which follows Imbens
and Lancaster (1994) and Petrin (2002). The objective function is based on the
generalized method of moments (GMM) with three sets of moments. The first two sets
of moments are in the form of log-likelihood, which I aim to maximize by requiring that
the first derivatives should equal zero. Specifically, the first set of moments characterizes
the likelihood of the executives’ compensation immediately after career advancement;
the second set of moments characterizes the likelihood of the productivities of socially
isolated workers’ first jobs. The third set of moments are in the form of traditional
moments, characterizing executives’ labor market transitions. Accordingly, parameters
θ = (θ1, θ2, θ3) can be grouped into three sets, where θ1 = 〈α, β0, β1, ln(b), σa, σε〉 is
mostly relevant to the first set of moments, θ2 = 〈µp, σp〉 is most relevant to the second
set, and θ3 = 〈λ0, λ1, δ, π0, π1, νu, ωEdu, ωWork〉 is most relevant to the third set.
Specifically, the targeted moments are
M(θ) =

∂ ln(L1(θ))
∂θ1
∂ ln(L2(θ))
∂θ2
m− E[m;θ]
 , (1.23)
where L1 is the first likelihood of executive compensation, which I discuss in more
detail in Section 1.4; and L2 is the second likelihood of firm productivity, which I
discuss in more detail in Section 1.4; and m is a vector of moments for labor market
transitions, which I describe in Section 1.4. Then I estimate the parameters using the
following objective function:
θ̂ = arg min
θ
M(θ)′WM(θ), (1.24)
where W is the weight matrix. I choose W to be the diagonal elements of the optimal
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weight matrix.33
Likelihood of Executive Compensation
L1 is the likelihood of the executives’ compensation immediately after career ad-
vancement. When executive i experiences a career advancement (UE or EE transition)
at time t, the observed compensation in the new job is given by
lnwit = lnφ1(1, p
L
it, p
H
it ,Γit) + ln ai + εit, (1.25)
where pHit is the productivity of the new job, pLit is the productivity of the old job for
an EE transition or the reservation productivity calculated according to (1.14) for a
UE transition, φ1 is the equilibrium wage function (1.15), ai is unobserved ability, and
εit is unobserved measurement error. Let ui = ln ai − µa, then log compensation can
be rewritten as
lnwit = lnφ1(1, p
L
it, p
H
it ,Γit) + µa + ui + εit. (1.26)
This is a standard random effect model (Maddala, 1971) satisfying
E(ui|pLit, pHit ,Γit) = 0, (1.27)
E(εit|pLit, pHit ,Γit) = 0, E(uiεit|pLit, pHit ,Γit) = 0. (1.28)
The orthogonality condition (1.27) holds because of the model implication that worker
i’s ability is uncorrelated with his/her own and his/her friends’ job dynamics, which
is shown in Proposition 1. Condition (1.28) holds because of the independence
assumption on the measurement errors.
33 Altonji and Segal (1996) show that the asymptotic optimal weight matrix may induce bias in
finite sample estimates.
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Additionally,
E(uiuj|pLit, pHit ,Γit) =

σ2a if i = j
0 otherwise
, E(εitεjs|pLit, pHit ,Γit) =

σ2ε if i = j and t = s
0 otherwise
.
(1.29)
The complete expression of the likelihood function is given in Appendix 3.3.
Likelihood of Firm Productivity
L2 is the likelihood of the productivities of socially isolated workers’ first jobs. The
isolated unemployed workers only face direct job arrivals with productivity distribution
F . Upon arrival, they accept jobs above their reservation productivity p0 as described
by (1.14). Therefore, their accepted jobs are distributed independently according to
F truncated below by p0. The complete expression of the likelihood function is given
in Appendix 3.3.
Moments of Labor Market Transitions
Referrals introduce interdependence in friends’ jobs and thus interdependence in
labor market transitions, which is difficult to characterize by likelihood. Instead, I
simulate the model and target some moments of the transitions.
Targeted Moments. I include the following standard moments: the frequencies of
UE, EE, and EU transitions, and the means and the standard deviations of the employ-
ment and the unemployment spells. In addition, I include moments characterizing the
co-movement in socially connected individuals’ job transitions to capture the effects
of referrals. These moments include, for each type of social connection, the fraction of
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unemployed individuals experiencing UE transition conditional on whether they have
friends experiencing EU transition, the fraction of unemployed individuals experiencing
UE transition conditional on whether they have friends experiencing EE transition,
the fraction of employed individuals experiencing EE transition conditional on whether
they have friends experiencing EU transition, and the fraction of employed individuals
experiencing EE transition conditional on whether they have friends experiencing EE
transition.
Simulation. In the model, direct job arrivals and job separations are independent
continuous-time Poisson processes.34 In the simulation, I preserve the continuous-
time setting by simulating the waiting times.35 After the simulation, I discretize the
simulated data so that it is comparable to the discrete-time observations in the data.
The simulation procedure is described in the following.
The simulation follows an iterative procedure. Each iteration k starts at time tk−1
with the employment/unemployment status and job productivity of all the workers
being s = (s1, ..., sn) and p = (p1, ...pn). For each unemployed worker, simulate one
waiting time for direct job offer ∆tArrivalU,ki ; for each employed worker, simulate one
waiting time for direct job offer ∆tArrivalE,ki and another waiting time for job separation
∆tSeparation,ki . The shortest waiting time among all is ∆t∗,k = min
{
{∆tArrivalU,ki : si =
u}, {∆tArrivalE,ki ,∆t
Separation,k
i : si = e}
}
.36 Set tk = tk−1 + ∆t∗,k. If tk > T , where T is
34The continuous-time setting rules out simultaneous events.
35 For a Poisson process with arrival rate λ, at any given time point, the waiting time until
the next arrival follows an exponential distribution with mean 1λ , i.e., the cdf of waiting time is
F (t) = 1− e−λt.
36In the implementation, I use a slightly different but statistically equivalent approach to reduce
computational intensity. Instead of sampling separate arrival times for each person, I only sample three
order statistics tArrivalU = min{tArrivalUi : si = u}, tArrivalE = min{tArrivalEi : si = e}, tSeparation =
min{tSeparationi : si = e}. tArrivalU follows an exponential distribution with mean 1|{i:si=u}|·λ0 ;
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a pre-specified length of time, the simulation is completed. Otherwise, proceed with the
following. Record tk as the time of the k-th event, along with the corresponding event
type ∈ {Arrival for U, Arrival for E, Separation} and person i∗. If the event is an
arrival for an unemployed worker i∗, first sample the job’s productivity, then the worker
makes the decision to accept or reject (si∗ and pi∗ change accordingly). If the event
is an arrival for an employed worker i∗, first sample the job’s productivity, then the
worker makes the decision to accept or reject (si∗ and pi∗ change accordingly), which
leads to an internal or external referral with probability π1. If a referral is generated,
sample a recipient j∗ ∈ NAll,tk(i∗), then the recipient makes the decision to accept or
reject (sj∗ and pj∗ change accordingly). If the event is a job separation, i∗ becomes
unemployed (si∗ and pi∗ change accordingly), which leads to an internal referral with
probability π0. If a referral is generated, sample a recipient j∗ ∈ NAll,t
k
(i∗), then the
recipient makes the decision to accept or reject (sj∗ and pj∗ change accordingly). This
completes iteration k. The next iteration starts at time tk with the new s and p.
Note that the memoryless property allows me to “reset the Poisson clock” in each
iteration.37 Specifically, in each iteration, I only use the shortest waiting time and do
not carry the rest of the waiting times to the subsequent iterations. For the subsequent
iteration, I simulate a new set of waiting times to generate the arrival time and the
type of the event.
similarly, tArrivalE follows an exponential distribution with mean 1|{i:si=e}|·λ1 , and t
Separation follows
an exponential distribution with mean 1|{i:si=e}|·δ .
37Memoryless refers to the property that the distribution of the waiting time (until an arrival)
does not depend on how much time has elapsed already.
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Identification
In this part, I provide heuristic arguments for identification of the structural
parameters. The first set of parameters, θ1 = 〈α, β0, β1, ln(b), σa, σε〉, are identified
from executive compensation immediately after career advancement. The utility
parameter α governs the inter-temporal incentives, and it is therefore identified from
the curvature of the log compensation function with respect to log productivity.38 The
bargaining parameters β0 and β1 are identified from the overall correlation between log
compensation and log productivity, and the intuition is the following. In one extreme
case of no bargaining power, an executive’s initial compensation is negatively correlated
with employer productivity because he/she trades lower present compensation for
higher continuation value. In the other extreme case of full bargaining power, an
executive’s compensation is equal to the marginal product, and thus is positively
correlated with employer productivity. Unemployed productivity ln(b) is identified
from the within-person difference between compensation after UE transition and EE
transition.39 The dispersion parameter of ability σa is identified from the covariance
of within-person residual terms, and the dispersion parameter of measurement error
σε is identified from the variance of the residual terms net of σ2a.
The second set of parameters, the location and dispersion parameters of pro-
ductivity distribution, θ2 = 〈µp, σp〉, are identified from the observed distribution
of the productivities of socially isolated workers’ first jobs. With the log-normal
parametric assumption, they are identified from the mean and variance of the observed
distribution.
38 1
α gives the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution.
39When α 6= 1, ln(b) and E ln(a) can be separately identified even without within-person comparison.
The reason is that E ln(a) enters the expression of lnw linearly, while ln(b) enters non-linearly.
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The third set of parameters, θ3 = 〈λ0, λ1, δ, π0, π1, νu, ωEdu, ωWork〉, are identified
from the labor market transitions. The job separation rate δ is identified from the
duration of employment spell and the frequency of employment-to-unemployment
transition. The probability of referral following job separation π0 is identified from
the co-movement of individuals’ career advancement and their friends’ job separations.
Similarly, the probability of referral following job arrival π1 is identified from the co-
movement of individuals’ career advancement and their friends’ job-to-job transitions.
The probability of referring an unemployed friend νu is identified by comparing the co-
movement of individuals’ unemployment-to-employment transitions and their friends’
job-to-job transitions or job separations vs. the co-movement of individuals’ job-to-
job transitions and their friends’ job-to-job transitions or job separations, given the
productivity distribution. The job arrival rates λ0 and λ1 are identified from the
frequency of unemployment-to-employment transition and job-to-job transition given
the job separation rate δ, the referral parameters (π0, π1, νu), and the productivity
distribution parameters (µp, σp). The probabilities of referring through different types
of social connections, ωEdu and ωWork, are identified from the difference in co-movement
pattern in the three different social networks.40
1.5 Estimation Results
Parameter Estimates
Table 1.8 reports the parameter estimate. The estimates of the bargaining pa-
rameters show that the executives generally have high bargaining power, and their
40ωSocial = 1− ωEdu − ωWork.
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bargaining power is increasing in their number of executive friends. Most of the individ-
uals’ bargaining powers range from 0.62 to 0.79.41 The estimate of the unemployment
productivity implies an annual income of 0.52 million dollars for an average-ability
individual in a non-executive job. The estimated offer arrival rates for non-executives
and executives are 0.130 and 0.006 respectively, implying average waiting times of 7.67
years and 165 years respectively for direct job offers. The estimated referral probabili-
ties after job separation and job arrival are 0.228 and 0.794 respectively. The referral
probability after job separation is lower than that after job arrival potentially because
some separations are forced, and in these cases there is no chance for referral. The
estimated probability of referring non-executive friends is 0.626, and that of referring
executive friends is 0.374. Therefore, the model implication that the executives are
more selective in accepting jobs, combined with the empirical estimates that they
receive fewer direct offers as well as referrals, jointly contribute to the low number
of job-to-job transitions observed in the data. Finally, the estimated probabilities of
referral through different types of networks show that the executives are most likely
to refer their work friends (with probability 0.653), then their social-activity friends
(with probability 0.192), and lastly their school friends (with probability 0.155).
Statistical and Economical Significance of Referrals
It is useful to note that the estimated referral probabilities π0 and π1 are both
statistically and economically significantly different from zero. A Wald test of the joint
hypotheses H0 : π0 = π1 = 0 rejects a nested model with no referral, χ2(2) = 1171618,
p=0.42 To further understand the economic significance of referrals, I decompose the
41 99% of the individuals have fewer than 50 executive friends.
42The critical value for a significance level of 0.001 is 13.82.
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Parameter Notation Estimate Std. Err.
Panel A: Parameters in θ1 = 〈α, β0, β1, ln(b), σa, σε〉
CRRA Coefficient α 1.393 0.13340
Constant in the Logit Function for Bargaining Power β0 0.500 0.38150
Slope in the Logit Function for Bargaining Power β1 0.017 0.00240
Log (Unemployment Productivity) ln(b) 6.866 0.07653
Dispersion Para. of Executives’ Lognormal Ability Dist. σa 0.355 0.00725
Dispersion Para. of Compensations’ Normal Measurement Error Dist. σε 0.634 0.00088
Panel B: Parameters in θ2 = 〈µp, σp〉
Location Para. of Firms’ Lognormal Productivity Dist. µp 9.550 0.01772
Dispersion Para. of Firms’ Lognormal Productivity Dist. σp 1.240 0.00083
Panel C: Parameters in θ3 = 〈λ0, λ1, δ, π0, π1, νu, ωEdu, ωWork〉
Offer Arrival Rate for the Unemployed λ0 0.130 0.00004
Offer Arrival Rate for the Employed λ1 0.006 0.00001
Job Separation Rate δ 0.147 0.00004
Probability of Referral Following Job Separation π0 0.228 0.00045
Probability of Referral Following Job Arrival π1 0.794 0.00073
Probability of Referring an Unemployed Friend νu 0.626 0.00051
Probability of Referring a School Friend ωEdu 0.155 0.00013
Probability of Referring a Work Friend ωWork 0.653 0.00014
Table 1.8: Parameter Estimates
sources of job dynamics through simulation and report the results in Table 1.9. The
table shows that for non-executives’ UE transitions, 72.15% result from direct job
offers, 1.60% from referrals following friends’ job arrivals, and 26.26% from referrals
following job separations. For executives’ EE transitions, the proportions are 34.00%,
3.07%, and 62.93% respectively; and for their wage raises, the proportions are 17.91%,
5.37%, and 76.73% respectively. These numbers show the following patterns. First,
for all three types of transitions, referrals following friends’ job separations lead to far
more transitions than those following friends’ job arrivals. This is due to the large
number of job separations compared to the number of on-the-job offer arrivals, even
though the probability of sending a referral is lower in the former case than the latter.
Second, referrals contribute to higher proportions of job dynamics for executives (EE
transition and wage raise) than for non-executives (UE transition). This suggests
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that the ratio of referral arrival rate and direct job offer arrival rate is larger for the
executives than the non-executives. Third, for executives, referrals contribute to a
higher fraction of wage raises than job-to-job transitions. The reason is that compared
with direct offers, referred jobs are less likely to be more productive than executives’
current jobs as they are no better than friends’ own jobs.
Panel A: Source of Accepted Offer in UE Transition
Direct Offer
Referrals Following
Friends’ Job Arrivals
Referrals Following
Friends’ Job Separations
Number 1851.7 41.0 673.9
% 72.15 1.60 26.26
Panel B: Source of Accepted Offer in EE Transition
Direct Offer
Referrals Following
Friends’ Job Arrivals
Referrals Following
Friends’ Job Separations
Number 37.6 3.4 69.6
% 34.00 3.07 62.93
Panel C: Source of Competing Offer in Wage Raise
Direct Offer
Referrals Following
Friends’ Job Arrivals
Referrals Following
Friends’ Job Separations
Number 34.7 10.4 148.7
% 17.91 5.37 76.73
Table 1.9: Sources of Job Dynamics: Direct Offers and Referrals
Notes: The reported numbers are averages over 100 simulations.
Model Fit
Figure 1.2 shows the fit for executive compensation conditional on firm productivity
and number of executive friends. The model is able to replicate the empirical pattern
that executive compensation is increasing in both the firm productivity and the number
of executive friends. Figure 1.3 shows the fit for the productivity distribution, in which
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I compare the empirical distribution of the socially isolated individuals’ first jobs in
the data and the parametrically estimated probability density function in the model.
The model is capable of capturing the general shape of the empirical histogram. Table
1.10 shows the fit for the moments in job transitions. The model is able to replicate
the spell durations and the frequencies of transitions in the model. Additionally, it is
able to replicate the co-movement pattern that the probability of career advancement
is higher when some friends leave current jobs than when no friend does. I show
the fit for co-movement moments for each type of social connection separately in an
additional Table 3.3 in Appendix 3.4.
Figure 1.2: Model Fit for Executive Compensation
Notes: (1). The empirical measurement for firm productivity is market capitalization. (2). The unit
for compensation and market capitalization are both 2015 U.S. million dollar.
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Figure 1.3: Model Fit for Productivity Distribution
Notes: (1). The empirical measurement for firm productivity is market capitalization, and the unit is
2015 U.S. million dollar. (2). The histogram plots the distribution of the socially isolated individuals’
first jobs’ productivities.
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Moments Data Model
Mean of Employment Spell 3.9193 4.1457
Std. Deviation of Employment Spell 2.3548 2.8232
Mean of Unemployment Spell 4.4119 4.0953
Std. Deviation of Unemployment Spell 2.8509 2.8276
Frequency of UE Transition 0.6076 0.6109
Frequency of EE Transition 0.5778 0.5832
Frequency of EU Transition 0.0303 0.0296
Fraction of unemployed individuals experiencing UE transition
. . . . . . if there is no friend experiencing EU transition 0.0812 0.1344
. . . . . . if there are friends experiencing EU transition 0.1717 0.1753
. . . . . . if there is no friend experiencing EE transition 0.1541 0.1603
. . . . . . if there are friends experiencing EE transition 0.1870 0.1926
Fraction of employed individuals experiencing EE transition
. . . . . . if there is no friend experiencing EU transition 0.0028 0.0031
. . . . . . if there are friends experiencing EU transition 0.0077 0.0078
. . . . . . if there is no friend experiencing EE transition 0.0054 0.0053
. . . . . . if there are friends experiencing EE transition 0.0130 0.0156
Table 1.10: Model Fit: Moments in Job Transitions
Notes: (1). A UE transition is defined as the transition from non-executive to executive. An EE
transition is defined as the transition from one executive job to another with a productivity increase.
An EU transition is defined as the transition from executive to non-executive. (2). Frequency of
transition is calculated as the total number of transitions during sample period divided by the number
of individuals. (3). The table reports the co-movement moments (last 8 rows) for the simplified
network, which does not distinguish between different types of social connections.
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1.6 Counterfactual Experiments
In this section, I use the estimated model to perform two sets of counterfactual
experiments. First, I evaluate the effect of referrals by varying the referral probabilities.
Second, I examine the effect of network structure by comparing the observed networks
with randomly formed networks.
Varying Referral Probabilities
In this set of counterfactual experiments, I vary the referral probabilities, π0 and π1.
In the baseline model, these probabilities are estimated to be π0 = 0.228 for referrals
following friends’ job separations and π1 = 0.794 for referrals following friends’ job
arrivals. In two counterfactual experiments, I set the referral probabilities to be zero
(π0 = 0, π1 = 0) and one (π1 = 1, π1 = 1) respectively.
I compare the outcomes in the counterfactual models with the baseline model, in
terms of the number of referrals received and the executive’s lifetime utility measured
by consumption equivalence. In Table 1.11, I break down the individuals by their
network degrees and report their outcomes. As expected, for both counterfactual
experiments and both outcome measures, referrals have stronger effects for higher
degree individuals. High degree individuals have higher gains from referrals partly
because they receive more referrals, and partly because they can extract a higher
share of the surplus in wage bargaining once they receive a referral.43
In the case of setting referral probabilities to zero (“no referral”), the lowest degree
group loses 0.17 referrals (in a total time span of 9 years), which is equivalent to a
43Recall that bargaining power depends on the number of executive friends. This heterogeneity
generates, even in the absence referrals (π0 = π1 = 0), a difference in individual welfare (consumption
equivalence) across degree groups.
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2.62% reduction in annual income; the highest degree group loses 0.35 referrals, which
is equivalent to a 6.93% reduction in annual income.
In the other case of setting referral probabilities to one (“mandatory referral”), the
changes in outcomes are more significant. For all degree groups, the change generates
more than 0.5 additional referrals, which is equivalent to a 6.73% increase in annual
income for the lowest degree group and a 15.96% increase for the highest degree group.
Degree d < 20 20 ≤ d < 40 40 ≤ d < 60 60 ≤ d < 80 d >= 80
Number of Referrals Received
Baseline 0.17 0.22 0.25 0.31 0.35
π0 = 0, π1 = 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
∆ -0.17 -0.22 -0.25 -0.31 -0.35
π0 = 1, π1 = 1 0.56 0.71 0.80 0.99 1.07
∆ 0.39 0.49 0.55 0.68 0.71
Annual Consumption Equivalence (million $)
Baseline 1.35 1.43 1.53 1.62 1.82
π0 = 0, π1 = 0 1.32 1.37 1.46 1.51 1.68
%∆ -2.62% -3.59% -4.26% -6.31% -6.93%
π0 = 1, π1 = 1 1.45 1.56 1.72 1.86 2.12
%∆ 6.73% 9.38% 12.19% 15.09% 15.96%
Group Size 1,684 1,188 593 289 438
mean(Degree) 11.58 28.30 48.40 68.62 145.60
Table 1.11: Counterfactual Experiment: Varying Referral Probabilities
Notes: (1). All the changes are calculated with respect to the baseline model, in which referral
probabilities are π0 = 0.228 and π1 = 0.794. (2). The reported numbers are averages over 100
simulations. (3). The time span used in the simulation is 9 years, the same as the sample length. (4).
d is the degree for Y All,2015, the simplified network in the final sample period.
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Random Networks
In this counterfactual experiment, I vary the network structure. Specifically, I
generate a new set of education, work, and social-activity networks such that the
degree of each individual in each year is the same as the observed networks (baseline),
but the connections are formed at random.44 I find that the welfare distribution is
more unequal under the random networks, and I investigate the underlying mechanism
through the lens of two local network statistics.
Differences in the Local Network Structures
Before I present the results, it is useful to first examine the difference between the
structure of the observed networks and the random networks. By design, the two sets
of networks have equal degrees for all individuals at all time. The main difference lies
in two other local structures: friends’ popularity and local clustering.
Friends’ Popularity. I measure friends’ popularity by average friend degree. Define
i’s average friend degree in network k to be∑
j∈Nk(i) d
k
j
|Nk(i)|
, (1.30)
the average degree of i’s friends’. It can be interpreted as the level of “popularity” of
friends.
The patterns of the difference in average friend degree between the two sets of
networks are heterogeneous with respect to own degree. As described in Section
1.3, the observed networks exhibit sorting on degree. Low-degree individuals tend to
44I describe the algorithm for simulating random network with a given degree sequence in Appendix
3.5.
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have more low-degree friends in the observed network. Therefore, they have lower
average friend degree in the observed network, compared with the random network.
High-degree individuals tend to have more high-degree friends in the observed network.
Therefore, they have higher average friend degree in the observed network, compared
with the random network. Figure 1.4 breaks down the individuals by their own degrees
and plots the distributions of average friend degrees for the observed and the random
networks respectively.
Figure 1.4: Distribution of Average Friend Degree for Low (Left), Medium (Middle),
High (Right) Degree Individuals
Notes: (1). Average friend degree, defined in Eq.(1.30), gives the average degree of an individual’s
friends. (2). The figure on the left uses the subset of individuals with degree less than 60; the figure
in the middle uses the subset of individuals with degree greater than or equal to 60 and less than 80;
and the figure on the right uses the subset of individuals with degree greater than or equal to 80. (3).
The degree and the average friend degree are calculated based on the simplified network in the final
sample period, Y All,2015, for the observed and the random network respectively.
Local Clustering. I measure the level of clustering by the local clustering coefficient
defined in (1.3). It gives the fraction of an individual’s friends who are also friends
with one another.
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The observed networks exhibit universally a far higher level of clustering than the
random networks. Figure 1.5 plots the distributions of local clustering coefficients
for the observed and the random networks respectively. In the observed networks,
88% of the individuals have clustering coefficients above 0.2, and 50% above 0.35. In
stark contrast, in the random networks, 97.50% of the individuals have clustering
coefficients below 0.2, and 50% below 0.03.
Figure 1.5: Distribution of Clustering Coefficient
Notes: (1). Clustering coefficient, defined in Eq.(1.3), gives the fraction of an individual’s friends
who are also friends with one another. (2). The clustering coefficients are calculated based on the
simplified network in the final sample period, Y All,2015, for the observed and the random network
respectively.
Effects of Network Structures on Referrals
In this part, I consider a change from the observed networks to random networks
with the same degree sequences and examine the resulting changes in referral patterns
as well as executive welfare.
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Overall Effects. Figure 1.6 shows that the random networks lead to greater in-
equality, compared with the observed networks. Under random networks, there are
more individuals with low welfare and also more individuals with high welfare, which
is a result of increased inequality in referrals. Table 1.12 breaks down the individuals
by degree and reports the changes in their local network structures and labor market
outcomes. The decrease in the clustering coefficient is significant for all degree groups.
The average friend degree increases for the lower degree groups and decreases for the
highest degree group. In terms of the labor market outcomes, low-degree individuals
are worse off under the random networks, whereas high-degree individuals are better
off, as shown in their welfare measured by consumption equivalence. For example,
the lowest degree group receives 0.10 fewer referrals, which is equivalent to a 1.41%
reduction in annual income. The highest degree group receives 0.20 more referrals,
which is equivalent to a 3.52% increase in annual income.
Effects of Friend Popularity and Clustering by Degree Group. I investigate
the mechanisms for the overall effects through the lens of two local network structures
discussed in Section 1.6, friends’ popularity and local clustering. As discussed in
Section 1.2, the qualitative effects of these network structures on job referrals are
ambiguous. First, friends’ popularity has two countervailing effects on the arrivals
of referrals. On the one hand, a popular friend means high competition for referrals,
lowering a worker’s probability of receiving a particular referral sent by his/her popular
friend (competition effect). On the other hand, a popular friend benefits from his/her
large set of friends’ referrals, increasing the quantity and the quality of referrals he/she
sends out (ripple effect). Second, local clustering also has two countervailing effects on
the arrivals of referrals. An advantage of high clustering is that it keeps the positive
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Degree Quintile 1 2 3 4 5
Clustering Coefficient
Observed Networks 0.70 0.49 0.35 0.31 0.31
Random Networks 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.07
∆ -0.65 -0.45 -0.30 -0.26 -0.23
Average Friend Degree
Observed Networks 35.74 48.52 58.84 68.67 98.80
Random Networks 89.91 84.40 83.23 84.05 91.14
∆ 54.17 35.88 24.40 15.39 -7.66
Number of Referrals Received
Observed Networks 0.16 0.18 0.21 0.25 0.33
Random Networks 0.06 0.10 0.16 0.27 0.52
∆ -0.10 -0.08 -0.05 0.02 0.20
Annual Consumption Equivalence (million $)
Observed Networks 1.34 1.37 1.42 1.49 1.71
Random Networks 1.32 1.36 1.42 1.49 1.77
%∆ -1.41% -0.51% 0.04% 0.39% 3.52%
Group Size 719 860 898 854 861
mean(Degree) 7.32 14.23 24.26 40.94 105.89
Table 1.12: Counterfactual Experiment: Random Networks
Notes: (1). All the changes are calculated with respect to the observed networks. (2). The reported
labor market outcomes are averages over 100 simulations. (3). The time span used in the simulation
is 9 years, the same as the sample length. (4). Degree, average friend degree, and clustering coefficient
are defined in (1.2), (1.30), and (1.3) respectively. They are calculated based on the simplified
network in the final sample period, Y All,2015, for the observed and the random network respectively.
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Figure 1.6: Distributions of Executive Welfare (Left) and Number of Referrals Received
(Right)
Notes: (1). Executive welfare is measured by annual consumption equivalence in million $. (2). In
the plot of distribution of executive welfare, all individuals with consumption equivalence higher than
2 million are plotted at 2 million. (3). In the plot of distribution of the number of referrals received,
all individuals with more than 1 referral are plotted at 1 referral. (4). The numbers are averages over
100 simulations. (5). The time span used in the simulation is 9 years, the same as the sample length.
spillovers in an inner circle (closeness effect). A disadvantage is that it limits the
positive spillovers from a distance (isolation effect).
I quantitatively analyze these network effects by regressing the percentage change
in the number of referrals an individual receives on the change in his/her average friend
degree and the change in his/her local clustering coefficient. I allow heterogeneous
effects with respect to an individual’s own degree by interacting the regressors with
degree group dummies. Table 1.13 reports the results.
The results show that for all degree groups, the marginal impact of higher friend
popularity is negative. This is driven by the competition effect from friends of
friends. As the change from the observed networks to the random networks induces
heterogeneous changes in friend popularity for different degree groups, the welfare
implication will also be heterogeneous.
68
Dependent variable: ∆% Number of Referrals
(∆Avg. Friend degree)× 1(degree < 20) -0.0056∗∗∗ (0.0008)
. . . × 1(20 ≤ degree < 40) -0.0081∗∗∗ (0.0011)
. . . × 1(40 ≤ degree < 60) -0.0074∗∗∗ (0.0016)
. . . × 1(60 ≤ degree < 80) -0.0085∗∗ (0.0028)
. . . × 1(80 ≤ degree < 100) -0.0149∗∗ (0.0047)
. . . × 1(100 ≤ degree < 150) -0.0095 (0.0056)
. . . × 1(degree ≥ 150) -0.0189∗ (0.0074)
(∆Clustering coef.) × 1(degree < 20) -0.0009 (0.1127)
. . . × 1(20 ≤ degree < 40) -0.6455∗∗∗ (0.1783)
. . . × 1(40 ≤ degree < 60) -0.8782∗∗∗ (0.2514)
. . . × 1(60 ≤ degree < 80) -0.4454 (0.4031)
. . . × 1(80 ≤ degree < 100) 0.4937 (0.6450)
. . . × 1(100 ≤ degree < 150) 1.5269 (0.9156)
. . . × 1(degree ≥ 150) 4.3564∗∗∗ (1.2196)
Observations 4,192
Table 1.13: Effects of Friend Popularity and Clustering on Job Referral
Notes: (1). This table summarizes the results of an OLS regression, where the dependent variable is
the percentage change in the number of referrals received. (2). Degree, average friend degree, and
clustering coefficient are defined in (1.2), (1.30), and (1.3) respectively. They are calculated based on
the simplified network in the final sample period, Y All,2015, for the observed and the random network
respectively. (3). Other covariates are degree, degree2, degree3. (4). Standard errors are reported in
parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Moreover, the marginal impact of higher clustering is negative for low-degree
groups, but positive for high-degree groups. The intuition for the heterogeneous effects
of clustering is the following. When an individual’s degree is low, the number of good
shocks among his/her immediate friends is low, so it is relatively more important
to be able to benefit from the spillovers from a distance. High clustering limits
such chances, generating a negative impact on referrals (isolation effect dominates).
When an individual’s degree is high, however, the number of good shocks among
his/her immediate friends is large enough, so it is relatively more important to
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keep these spillovers in an inner circle. High clustering provides such protections,
generating a positive impact on referrals (closeness effect dominates). As the change
from the observed networks to the random networks decreases the level of clustering
universally, the heterogeneous effects of clustering for different degree groups generate
heterogeneous welfare implication.
Qualitative Discussion. In summary, I present the change in two network statistics
in Section 1.6, the marginal effects of these changes in Table 1.13, and the overall effects
on referrals and thus welfare in Table 1.12. Many of these changes and effects are
heterogeneous, so it is useful to provide a qualitative summary. Table 1.14 summarizes
the qualitative effects of the changes in network structure on referrals through the
lenses of the two local network structures discussed above.
Low Degree High Degree
Friend Popularity
∆ Avg. Friend Degree increase decrease
Marginal Effect negative negative
Implied Change in Referrals decrease increase
Clustering
∆ Clustering Coefficient decrease decrease
Marginal effect negative positive
Implied Change in Referrals increase decrease
Overall
Change in Referrals decrease increase
Table 1.14: Qualitative Effects of a Change from the Observed Networks to the
Random Networks
For low-degree individuals, their friend popularity increases, and a negative
marginal effect implies a decrease in referrals. Their local clustering decreases, and
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a negative marginal effect implies an increase in referrals. Overall, the number of
referrals–and thus welfare–decreases.
For high-degree individuals, their friend popularity decreases, and a negative
marginal effect implies an increase in referrals. Their local clustering decreases, and
a positive marginal effect implies a decrease in referrals. Overall, the number of
referrals–and thus welfare–increases.
This counterfactual experiment highlights the importance of the network structure
beyond the number of friends. Although the observed and the counterfactual networks
have the same degree sequences, their difference in connection patterns leads to
different welfare distribution. Specifically, with high-degree individuals gaining and
low-degree individuals losing under the random networks, the distribution of referrals,
and thus welfare, is more unequal. This counterintuitive finding further demonstrates
the delicacy of the mechanisms in network models and the need for rigorous study.
1.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I study the network effects of job referrals and investigate the impact
of social network structure on workers’ labor market outcomes. I develop a job search
model that incorporates referral and non-referral job offers and different kinds of social
networks. In my model, the network structure is dynamic and evolves as workers
move across jobs. Workers directly receive job offers as well as referrals from their
friends. Referrals are generated endogenously: an external referral occurs when a
friend rejects an offer that he/she receives, and an internal referral occurs when a
friend leaves his/her current job. As a result of this referral process, the quantity and
the quality of referrals depend not only on the worker’s number of friends but also on
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the quality of these friends’ jobs. Moreover, the model incorporates the full network
structure beyond the number of friends, and it generates rich network effects beyond
immediate friends.
My empirical analysis combines three different data sources on the corporate
executive labor market. I first provide reduced-form evidence on job referrals in the
executive labor market. I then estimate the structural job search model by Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM). The estimation results show both the statistical and
economical significance of job referrals. My model nests a model with no referrals,
and a specification test rejects such a model. Simulations from my model show that
more than one quarter of job transitions and raises are driven by referrals.
I use the estimated model to perform two counterfactual experiments. The first
experiment evaluates the welfare effect of referrals by varying the probability of referrals.
I find that shutting down referrals reduces executives’ welfare by an equivalence of a
2-7% decrease in annual income and that mandatory referral boosts executives’ welfare
by an equivalence of a 6-16% increase in annual income.
The second experiment examines the welfare effect of network structure by varying
the network structure. Specifically, a new set of counterfactual networks are generated
in which the individuals have the same number of friends as the observed networks,
but the connections are formed randomly. I find that the welfare distribution is more
unequal under the randomly formed networks. I further investigate the mechanisms
for these effects through the lens of two network statistics: friends’ popularity and
local clustering, and my findings are as follows. First, in terms of friends’ popularity,
the competition effect dominates the ripple effect. Second, in terms of local clustering,
the isolation effect dominates for individuals with a small number of friends, and the
72
closeness effect dominates for individuals with a large number of friends. Overall, the
competition effect resulting from the change in friend popularity dominates, generating
greater inequality under the random networks. This experiment highlights the effects
of network structure beyond the number of friends.
This paper focuses on worker heterogeneity in network position. An interesting
extension is to incorporate more heterogeneity such as gender into the analysis
and study how referrals and social networks affect the gender pay gap and the
underrepresentation of female executives. Additionally, this paper abstracts from the
roles played by intermediaries such as executive search firms in soliciting referrals
as well as the executives’ strategic concerns in providing referrals. An interesting
extension to the model is to explicitly incorporate the executive search companies and
study their interactions with the executives in generating referrals. These are exciting
areas for future research.
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Chapter 2
Inferring the Ideological Affiliations of Political Committees
via Financial Contributions Networks
This chapter is co-authored with Hanming Fang.
2.1 Introduction
Campaign finance is an integral part of the U.S. politics, and political committees
are major participants in campaign finance related activities. We use the term Political
Committees (henceforth, PCs) to refer to federal political action committees (PACs),
party committees, campaign committees for presidential, house and senate candidates,
as well as issue-based groups or organizations, including lobbyists or fundraisers. They
collect contributions from individual donors, make contributions to other committees
and candidates, and spend money for or against candidates.
U.S. campaign finance laws mandate that political committees disclose all financial
transactions including the contributions they receive and their expenditures, thus
rendering numerous data for analyzing their campaign related activities. However,
the PCs are not mandated to file their party (or ideological) affiliations. Indeed, as
we will detail in Section 2.3, nearly 60% of PCs’ party affiliations are unreported.
This missing data problem may generate obstacles in the study of important issues
related to campaign finance. For example, for researchers who want to study the
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patterns of individual contributions using the individual contributions data provided
by the Federal Election Commission (FEC), it is important to know the ideological
affiliations of the PCs to which individual donors contribute. Nevertheless, in the
Contributions by Individuals (Year 2003-2004) data released by the Federal Election
Commission (FEC), about 24%, both in terms of the instance and the amount, of
individual contributions go to PCs with unknown party affiliations.
In this paper, we contribute to the methodologies that aim to address the missing
ideological affiliations of the PCs. We propose a method of inferring PCs’ ideological
affiliations from the financial transactions network among the PCs. The Contributions
to Committees from Committees data, also administered by the FEC, contains the
universe of all records of financial contributions among all registered PCs. We use this
data set of the contribution activities to construct a financial transactions network of
the PCs, where each PC is a vertex of the network, and the money flows between the
PCs form the (weighted) edges. The basic idea of our method of inferring ideological
affiliations of the PCs is simple. If the PCs tend to contribute more frequently
to other PCs with similar ideology, then the PCs that actually filed their party
affiliations, together with the structure of the observed financial transactions network,
should provide information about the ideologies of the PCs with unknown ideological
affiliations. Specifically, we build an economic model of link formation and transfer
amount, and use the ideas of “community detection” first developed in the stochastic
block model literature where contribution decisions (both the link formation and the
weights) depend on both the observed characteristics and the potentially latent (for
the PCs that do not file their party affiliations) ideologies of the potential contributing
and receiving PCs.
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Our model incorporates several new features that are absent in the existing
stochastic block model literature. First, we introduce weights and rich heterogeneity
in the edge formation process: the decision to make a contribution and its contribution
amount is not only governed by the latent political ideologies of the PCs, but also
depends on the vertex-level contextual information such as financial and institutional
characteristics. Second, we model the reported party affiliations of those PCs that do
self report their party affiliations as noisy measurements of their true latent ideologies.
Thus, our methodology allows us to estimate the latent ideologies of all PCs, including
those that self reported party affiliations.
We use three publicly available data sets in our analysis. Two are from the
campaign finance record in 2003-2004 election cycle, namely the Contributions to
Committees from Committees, and the Committee Master File, both maintained by
the FEC. We use the first data set to construct the financial transactions network
of the PCs, and we use the second data set to obtain the party affiliations of some
PCs (if they self report), as well as the designations and types of all PCs. The third
data set is additional industrial breakdown information of the PCs which we collected
from OpenSecret.org.45 Our data sets cover the universe of all PCs engaging in
transactions with other PCs in 2003-2004. This feature of our network data has
both advantages and disadvantages. An advantage is that it avoids potential bias
arising from analyzing a partially sampled network, but a major disadvantage is
the computational burden associated with the large network.46 There are 5,858
vertices (i.e., PCs) in the financial transactions network, 3,727 of which did not report
their party affiliations. Thus the number of potential ideological configurations is
45https://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/list.php
46Chandrasekhar and Lewis (2011) shows that bias arises when one works with partially sampled
network.
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enormous, specifically, 23727 even if we just allow for the binary ideology of Democrat
or Republican. For similar reasons, in a Bayesian approach that delivers a probability
distribution over different ideologies for each vertex (see Section 2.4 for details), exact
estimation of the posterior mode is infeasible. We instead propose a Gibbs sampler
algorithm to approximate the solution. In Monte Carlo Simulations, we demonstrate
that our estimation algorithm achieves very high accuracy in recovering the latent
party affiliations provided that the pairwise difference in ideology groups’ connection
patterns satisfy what is known as the Chernoff-Hellinger divergence criterion. We
illustrate our approach using the campaign finance record in the 2003-2004 election
cycle. Using the posterior mode to categorize the party affiliations of the PCs, our
estimated ideological affiliations match the self reported ideology for 94.36% of those
committees who self reported to be Democratic and 89.49% of those committees who
self reported to be Republican.
Related Literature. This paper is closely related to two strands of existing litera-
ture. In terms of the research question, our paper is related to the political economy
literature on the measurement of political ideologies. In terms of methodology, it is
related to the statistics literature on community detection.
We first discuss the literature on the measurement of political ideology. In a
seminal paper, Poole and Rosenthal (1985) proposed a measure of the ideology points
(NOMINATE score) of federal legislators using the roll call data. In their paper,
legislators’ ideology points can differ by election cycle, and bridge legislators and
bridge bills are used to ensure that the measures are comparable across time.47
47“Bridge legislators” are legislators who serve multiple terms; and “bridge bills” are bills that are
considered at different legislative cycles but with similar contents.
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Note that Poole and Rosenthal’s NOMINATE score is only available for members
of Congress, which is a very small sample (around 500 legislators in each election
cycle); and it is tied to voting behavior. Subsequently, ideology measurement for
other political actors are proposed based on the NOMINATE score. For example,
McCarty et al. (2006) combined NOMINATE score and the amount of contribution
from PACs to the legislators to estimate PACs’ ideology. Their proposed measure
is money-weighted average of the NOMINATE scores of the legislators to whom the
PAC has contributed. These measures could be biased because they do not account
for PACs’ contribution to losing candidates and other political actors. McKay (2008)
and McKay (2010) combined NOMINATE score and the preferred votes on key roll
calls published by interest groups to estimate interest groups’ ideologies. Her proposed
measure is the average of the NOMINATE scores of “perfectly scoring” legislators
whose votes are exactly the same as the preferred votes of the particular interest group.
These measures are only available for interest groups which publish their preferred
votes. Additionally, they could be biased: if an interest group publishes many key
votes, the number of “perfectly scoring” legislators could be too small and leads to
inaccuracy; if an interest group publishes only a few key votes, the number of “perfectly
scoring” legislators could be too large and artificially draws the measure toward the
center.
There are other proposed methods which do not rely on the NOMINATE score.
Some studies use the campaign finance data to jointly estimate candidates and
PACs’ ideologies. For example, McCarty and Poole (1998) proposed a measure
based on PAC’s contribution decision between incumbent-challenger pairs, excluding
unchallenged and open seat elections which account for a significant fraction in the
78
federal elections. Their measures are not available for candidates in these elections;
and are potentially biased for PACs which contributed in these elections. More
recently, Bonica (2013) proposed a method using the contributions from PACs to
candidates. This approach, from the perspective of network study, restricted the
sample to a directed bipartite graph, excluding connections among PACs or candidates,
as well as connections from candidates to PACs. In our paper, in contrast, we use
an unrestricted network incorporating all financial connections. Moreover, he uses
maximum likelihood estimation method which requires multiple observations, so he
pooled observations over a period of 30 years (1980-2010) and further restricted the
sample to PACs that have given to 30 or more unique candidates, and candidates who
have received from 30 or more unique PACs. Pooling data over time is potentially
problematic. It requires the assumption that the actor’s ideology is fixed in a span of
30 years. Differently, in our paper, we make inference about a PC’s ideology out of a
single observation of financial transactions network: for any PC, separate ideology
measures can be calculated for each election cycles. As a result, our measures are
well suited for the study of the time trend of political activities. Moreover, his sample
selection excludes candidates and PACs with small numbers of financial transactions.
However, in our paper, we cover a more extensive scope of political actors: a PC is
included as long as it has at least one financial transaction with another PC.
Other studies use data from the social media platforms. For example, Barberá
(2015) used the Twitter “following” links to estimate the ideology of the political
elites (accounts of candidates, parties, media, and journalists) and the mass (other
individual accounts) in multiple countries on the same scale. Similar to Bonica (2013),
he restricted the sample to a directed bipartite graph focusing on the mass following the
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elites. He used a Bayesian method and a two-stage estimation strategy that exploits
the bipartite structure. In the first stage, he used a sub-network induced by a random
subsample of the mass accounts and all the elite accounts, and jointly estimated their
ideologies. In the second stage, holding the first stage ideology measures of the elite
accounts fixed, he estimated the ideology for all the mass accounts using the full
network. This two stage procedure reduces the computational intensity; but using a
partially sampled network may lead to bias in the first stage, which may be further
propagated in the second stage. Our approach is different in that we simultaneously
estimate the ideologies of all PCs using the full network. Finally, one key difference
between Bonica (2013) and Barberá (2015) and our paper is that both of these papers
use spatial models. Spatial models assume a priori homophily: political actors with
closer ideology points have higher propensity to connect. This has an especially strong
implication on the centrists’ behavior. It rules out the possibility for the centrists to
have low propensity to connect with other centrists, and high propensity to connect
with the center-left and the center-right. In contrast, our model can accommodate
non-homophilic patterns. In fact, according to our estimates, the Independent PCs do
have higher propensity to form financial connections with Democratic and Republican
PCs than other Independent PCs.
We now discuss the literature of community detection. The main task in this
literature is to classify vertices in a network into different groups based on observed
connections. When repeated observations of the network are available, canonical
statistical tools can be directly applied. For example, Trebbi and Weese (2015) used
generalized method of moments to estimate, for each district (vertex), the fraction of
insurgents in different groups. The number of parameters is of order n, the number of
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vertices. Though large, it is fixed when the number of network observations T grows.
Therefore, standard asymptotic results and inference tools are valid.
When only one observation of the network is available, which is the case for our
application, the nature of the problem is changed. In this case, the only hope for
asymptotic result is to have network size n→∞; however, when the network size grows,
the number of parameters (of order n) also grows, which renders canonical statistical
tools invalid. Some popular approaches circumvent this issue by using model-free
heuristics: minimum-cut method in Stoer and Wagner (1997) minimizes the number
of edges between communities; modularity maximization method in Newman (2006)
maximizes the difference between the fraction of the edges within groups and its
expected value if edges were formed at random; convergence of iterated correlations
(CONCOR) method in Breiger et al. (1975) bisects the adjacency matrix by iteratively
calculating correlation coefficients among rows (or columns); and spectral method in
Newman (2013) extracts information of graph partition from the top few eigenvectors
of the adjacency matrix. Though widely used in practice, these approaches have
the following limitations. First of all, the first three methods all assume a priori
assortative communities, i.e., denser within-community connection than between-
community connection. They are not appropriate for problems where some group may
have higher external connectivity. For example, in our application, the Independent
PCs may engage in more transactions with Democratic and Republican PCs than
with other Independent PCs. We need a model which does not assume away this
possibility. Second, in the absence of a statistical model, none of these methods
allows for statistical inference: we cannot state how confident we are in the obtained
classification. Third, these methods cannot incorporate vertex level or vertex pair
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level heterogeneity beyond the latent community.
Therefore, we took a model-based approach instead - we build on the stochastic
block model (SBM) initiated by Snijders and Nowicki (1997) and Nowicki and Snijders
(2001). In the SBM, a network is randomly formed conditional on the underlying com-
munity structure, and the community structure itself is also stochastically generated.
This model is widely accepted as a canonical model for community detection and its
estimators have desirable properties. Recent studies characterized the information-
theoretic threshold for exact recovery, i.e. conditions on the data generating process
such that one observation of the network embodies enough information to exactly
recover the community structure. Mossel et al. (2014), Abbe et al. (2014), and Abbe
and Sandon (2015) studied this problem in unweighted networks. Jog and Loh (2015)
and Yun and Proutiere (2016) extended previous results to weighted networks. In
particular, they show that if the Chernoff-Hellinger divergence of community pair’s
connection patterns is above a particular threshold, the probability of correctly re-
covering the entire community structure converges to 1 as n → ∞. Kanade et al.
(2016) and Cai et al. (2017) studied this problem when a fraction of the vertices’s
community affiliations are revealed. Finally, Abbe (2017) provided a detailed review
of the recent development in the research of exact recovery in stochastic block models.
As explained earlier, exact solution to the Bayesian posterior mode is infeasible for
large network, and various algorithms are proposed to approximate the solution. For
example, the spectral algorithm can be viewed as an approximation to posterior
mode.48 The Gibbs sampler algorithm we use in this paper is an approximation to first
obtain the posterior distribution and then the posterior mode. From the perspective of
48The original discrete parameter space is relaxed to a sphere, and the spectral method is a
solution to the relaxed problem, and is derived through derivatives. A detailed description can be
found in Newman (2013).
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empirical implementation, a weakness of the generic SBM is the lack of heterogeneity
beyond community affiliations, so we introduce pair-wise heterogeneity in a similar
way as Peng and Carvalho (2015a) and Peng and Carvalho (2015b). These papers
proposed a degree correction strategy to capture vertex-level heterogeneity: they use
additional latent variable or observed degree to capture the popularity of a vertex,
and a “popular” vertex has higher propensities to connect to all other vertices. In this
paper, we allow heterogeneity at vertex pair level, by incorporating interactions of the
observable vertex level characteristics, such as location, industry, and budget. Apart
from richer specification, the use of observable characteristics has additional benefits:
it entails less computational intensity than the use of latent variable, and it avoids
the endogeneity problem from the use of observed degrees.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2.2, we introduce
the basic framework for the financial network among political committees, and describe
the statistical model of random network formation that we will empirically implement;
in Section 2.3, we describe the data sets used in our analysis, as well as several “naive”
methods that we attempted; in Section 2.4, we provide the details of the Bayesian
estimation procedure and arguments for identification; in Section 2.5, we present the
Monte Carlo results; in Section 2.6, we describe the specifications used in our empirical
implementation, and present the main empirical results; finally, in Section 2.7, we
conclude and discuss directions for future research.
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2.2 Financial Network of Political Committees
We represent the money-flow network among political committees as a static,
weighted and undirected graph.49 A graph G consists of vertices V and edges E . In
our model, each vertex i ∈ V = {1, ..., n} represents a PC. In our application, n
will represent the total number of PCs registered with the FEC, and is 5,858 for the
2003-2004 election cycle. Each edge (i, j) ∈ E is an unordered pair in V × V. In
our application, (i, j) ∈ E if there exists money flow, either unilateral or bilateral,
between committees i and j. A weighted graph also includes, for each edge (i, j) ∈ E , a
corresponding weight wij , which in our application will correspond to the sum of money
flows between the two PCs. Equivalently, a weighted graph G can be represented by a
weighted adjacency matrix y where
yij =
 wij if (i, j) ∈ E0 otherwise. (2.1)
In addition to the network structure described above, each committee i ∈ {1, ..., n} is
characterized by the following attributes: a unidimensional latent ideology xi, and
a multi-dimensional observable characteristics zi, which captures the financial and
institutional characteristics of the PC. The details of the variables contained in the
vector zi will be described in Section 2.6 when we present our empirical specification.
Ideologies of Vertices. We assume that there arem discrete categories of ideologies
where m ≥ 2. In our application, m will be equal to 3, corresponding to Democratic,
Republican and Independent respectively. We denote the true ideology of vertex
i ∈ V by xi ∈ {1, ...,m}. We assume that, for all vertices, their xi’s are latent and
49While both the model and the estimation strategy can be straightforwardly extended to a
directed graph, an undirected graph is adopted for computational tractability.
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unobserved to us. However, For a subset of vertices Vo ⊂ V, there exists a noisy
measure, denoted by x̂i ∈ {1, ...,m}, of the latent ideology xi; but for vertices in V\Vo,
we do not have this noisy measure. In our application, the size of Vo is typically about
1/3 of the size of V .50
To summarize, the framework for the financial network of PCs can be represented
by:
〈y,x, x̂, z〉 = 〈{yij}1≤i,j≤n, {xi}1≤i≤n, {x̂i}i∈Vo , {zi}1≤i≤n〉 . (2.2)
Note, however, since we do not observe x, the data consists of
DATA : 〈y, x̂, z〉 = 〈{yij}1≤i,j≤n, {x̂i}i∈Vo , {zi}1≤i≤n〉 . (2.3)
The goal of our empirical exercise is to make inference about the latent ideology x
based on data 〈y, x̂, z〉 .
A Statistical Model
As we explained in the introduction, the vector of latent ideologies x = (x1, ..., xn)
can be high-dimensional. To circumvent the high-dimensionality problem, we adopt
a Bayesian approach by assuming that each vertex can, a priori, be of ideology
k ∈ {1, ...,m} with probability θk where θ = (θ1, ..., θm) ∈ ∆m−1; and then we use its
observed links with other vertices and the weights of the links to render a posterior
probability distribution pi ∈ ∆m−1 over these categories. We will use the mode of the
posterior distribution pi as our best guess for i′s political or ideological affiliation.51
50In Appendix 4.8, we also implement a version of the model in which we assume that x̂i = xi for
all i ∈ Vo.
51Of course, the whole posterior distribution pi itself is of interest beyond its mode: pi will allow
us to provide a more continuous measure of i′s ideology spectrum. For example, two vertices may
end up with the same ideological categorization based on their posterior mode, while one vertex
could be more central than the other.
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Formally, our model of the financial network formation among PCs is based on
the stochastic block models of random network formation. In the model, the number
of vertices n, the number of blocks m, and vertices’ observable characteristics z are
assumed to be exogenous and fixed. The adjacency matrix Y, the ideology vector X,
and the noisy measure X̂ are assumed to be random.52
Prior. For any PC i ∈ V, its latent ideology Xi has the following marginal prior
distribution:
P(Xi = k) = θk for k = 1, ...,m (2.4)
where θ = (θ1, ..., θm) ∈ ∆m−1.
Measurement Error. For a PC i ∈ Vo ⊂ V, we observed i′s reported political
affiliation X̂i, which we interpret as a noisy measure of its true ideology Xi. Specifically,
P(X̂i = k|Xi = xi) =
 1− ε for k = xiε
m−1 for k ∈ {1, ...,m}\{xi},
(2.5)
where ε ∈ [0, 1) captures the rate of measurement error.53
Edge Formation. Conditional on the true ideologies, Xi, Xj, and observable char-
acteristics zi, zj, entries Yij’s in the weighted adjacency matrix are assumed to be
independently generated across (i, j) pairs:
52Throughout the paper, generic random variables are denoted by capital letters Y, X, and X̂,
whereas their realizations and specific configurations are denoted by small letters y, x, and x̂.
53ε can be pre-specified as 0 if there is good reason to believe that there is no error in report
(perhaps by the nature of the data set). Otherwise, a positive ε is more flexible because it allows for
measurement error, which makes it possible for the report x̂i to differ from the true ideology xi. We
will implement a version of the model restricting ε to be zero in Appendix 4.8, where we instead
hold out a subset of the vertices with self-reported ideologies in our estimation, and use the holdout
sample to validate our estimation results.
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Assumption 1 (Conditional Independence). For any pairs of PCs, (i, j) and
(i′, j′) , with either i 6= i′ or j 6= j′,
Yij ⊥ Yi′j′ |
(
Xi, Xj, zi, zj, Xi′ , Xj′ , zi′ , zj′
)
.
An economic interpretation of this assumption is as follows. A PC designs its general
principle in contributions according to its political ideology as well as its financial and
institutional characteristic. Following the principle, its staffs make decisions on whether
to contribute to a specific committee, and the idiosyncratic factors in each of these
decisions are unobserved by the researcher and are assumed to be independent. This
conditional independence assumption is a potentially strong assumption, because it
abstracts away from various possible strategic considerations that a political committee
may have in its contribution decisions; of course, the restrictiveness of this assumption
in practice depends on how complete the vector of characteristics z is. It is important to
note that Assumption 1 is stated conditional on the latent ideologies of the relevant PCs.
Thus, it allows for what we believe to be the first-order role of ideologies in political
contributions. Other characteristics of the PC, for example, its previous connections,
are also allowed to affect its contribution decisions, to the extent that such information
is contained in its characteristics z. In addition, it is well acknowledged that it is
difficult to establish asymptotic results in a network model in the presence of widespread
correlation (see, e.g., Leung (2016)); as a result, valid statistical inference using data
from a single network (or a small number of networks) necessitates restrictions on the
degree of correlation. Finally, conditional independence is a maintained assumption
in the literature of stochastic block model (Snijders and Nowicki (1997) and Nowicki
and Snijders (2001)), and the literature of classification in general (see, e.g., Koller
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and Friedman (2009)).54
Specifically, we assume that the edge formation process is as follows. For any pair
of vertices (i, j) ∈ V2 with i 6= j, conditional on (Xi, Xj) = (k, l) ∈ {1, ...,m}2 , and
zi, zj,
Yij > 0 if β0,kl + β1,kl(zi+zj) + β2,klzizj + eij > 0;
Yij = 0, otherwise, (2.6)
where (βkl,0, β1,kl,β2,kl) are the parameters governing the edge formation probability,
and zizj is a shorthand (with some abuse of notation) for interaction terms of zi and
zj. Because we deal with an undirected graph, we further assume that the process
(2.6) satisfies parameter symmetry over (k, l) , i.e.,
β0,kl = β0,lk,
β1,kl = β1,lk, (2.7)
β2,kl = β2,lk,
and that eij ∼ i.i.d. N (0, 1).
To simplify notation in the likelihood function in Section 2.4, we will denote the
conditional probability of two vertices i and j forming an edge as ηij and express it in
a compact form as:55
ηij(Xi, Xj) = P(Yij > 0|Xi, Xj, zi, zj)
= Φ
(
γ(Xi, Xj, zi, zj)
′β
)
, (2.8)
54For example, the naive Bayes model is widely used as a spam filter to classify emails into normal
vs. spam emails, and it assumes that conditional on text class, the presence of words are independent.
55Note that we omit the covariates zi and zj in the arguments of expression (2.8) for ηij for
notational convenience.
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where
γ(Xi, Xj, zi, zj) = D(Xi, Xj)
⊗
[1, zi+zj, zizj]
′ ,
D(Xi, Xj) =
[
1(Xi=k,Xj=l)∨(Xi=l,Xj=k)
]
1≤k≤l≤m ,
β = [β0,kl, β1,kl, β2,kl]
′
1≤k≤l≤m .
Weights of the Edge. Once two vertices form an edge, we assume that the weight
of their edge, which in our application will correspond to the total amount of financial
transactions between the two vertices, is drawn from a Q-valued discrete distribution
with probabilities that depend on ideological proximity. Specifically, conditional on
Yij > 0, if Xi = k,Xj = l, the Yij takes values (w1, ..., wQ) with probabilities
hkl ≡ (hkl,1, ..., hkl,Q) ∈ ∆Q−1. (2.9)
In our estimation we will pre-fix Q and the values (w1, ..., wQ). Again because we deal
with an undirected graph, we impose the natural symmetry assumption that
hkl = hlk. (2.10)
Discussions
First, we would like to note that the edge formation process as specified by (2.6)
can be interpreted as resulting from a model of matching. Two committees decide
whether to establish a financial connection based on their joint surplus from forming
a match. The surplus has a deterministic component β0,kl + β1,kl(zi+zj) + β2,klzizj
as well as a stochastic component eij. Parameters differ by ideology pair (k, l). βkl,0
captures the direct effect of ideology proximity, and β1,kl and β2,kl capture the effect
of committee specific characteristics interacting with ideology proximity. In other
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words, ideology influences the edge formation probability through both the constant
term and the coefficients.56
Second, financial and institutional characteristics zi and zj are included in the
specification (2.6) not only because they may be important factors in the PCs’
contribution decisions, but also, technically, it is our strategy for degree correction.
Without these covariates, the model is essentially the same as Snijders and Nowicki
(1997), where edge formation probability is governed only by ideology proximity. In
their model, variations in degree are attributed only to random shock and ideology
proximity. Moreover, the implied degree distribution is a mixture of m(m + 1)/2
binomial distributions. However, when the number of ideology categories is small, the
model-implied degree distribution may not be able to capture the empirical degree
distribution. Therefore, we include vertex specific characteristics to introduce richer
heterogeneity in the edge formation probability. This is a variant of the degree
correction strategy introduced in Peng and Carvalho (2015a) and Peng and Carvalho
(2015b). In addition to proximity of the latent ideology, Peng and Carvalho (2015a)
assume that the edge formation probability also depends on additional latent variables
ξi, ξj ∈ R, capturing vertex specific popularity. Peng and Carvalho (2015b) replace the
latent popularity variables with the quantile ranks of the vertices’ observed degrees
qi, qj ∈ {1, 2, ..., Q}. Our paper differs from Peng and Carvalho (2015b) in that the
characteristics we use do not involve any features of the network, rendering a much
cleaner model with which to perform statistical inference because the potential problem
of endogeneity is avoided. Compared to Peng and Carvalho (2015a), our paper has a
faster convergence rate and lower computational intensity because it does not require
56In an empirical application, additional constraints can be added: for example, restricting some
coefficients in β1,kl and β2,kl to be 0, or to be the same for different ideology pairs. We provide the
details of the additional restrictions in Section 2.6.
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inferring about additional latent variable ξi.
Finally, note that conditional on the latent ideologies of the vertices, our model of
network formation is equivalent to a pair-wise matching model. However, since the
vertices’ latent ideologies are not known, our edge formation process as specified in
(2.6) allows for correlation conditional on observables
{
X̂i
}
i∈Vo
and z. Moreover, the
correlation is spread all over the connected component of the network via the latent
ideologies. As a result, our network is not decomposable based on observables.
2.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Three data sets are used in our study, two of which are administrative data
sets from the Federal Election Commission (FEC) in 2003-2004 election cycle: the “
Committee Master File”, and the “Contributions to Committees from Committees”
data; and the third data set is collected from OpenSecrets.org.57
The “Committee Master File” contains basic information about all the PCs regis-
tered with the FEC. The PCs in this data set include federal political action committees
(PACs), party committees, campaign committees for presidential, house and senate
candidates, as well as groups or organizations such as lobbyists or fund raisers. This
data set also contains information on the PC’s geographical location, institutional
characteristics, and the self-reported party affiliation, if available.
The “Contributions to Committees from Committees” data contains the universe
of the contribution records between PCs. We observe the universe of records because
the campaign finance laws mandate the disclosure of all transactions and expenditure
related to federal election activities. In this data set, for each contribution, it lists the
57The website is maintained by the Center for Responsive Politics.
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contributor, recipient, and the amount of contribution. We will use this data set to
construct the complete network of financial transactions among the PCs.
Finally, the OpenSecrets.org data set contains the industry categorization for the
PCs. The data sources corresponding to each of the variables we use are summarized
in Table 2.1.
Variable Data Source
y Contributions to Committees from Committees
x̂ Committee Master File
z Committee Master File (location and institutional characteristics),
Contributions to Committees from Committees (imputed financial budget),
OpenSecrets.org (industry categorization).
Table 2.1: Data Source
Vertex Characteristics
In the 2003-2004 election cycle, 5,858 PCs participated in contribution activities
with other PCs and formed a financial network, among a total of 7,559 active PCs
(defined as PCs with either positive total receipts or positive total disbursement).58 We
do not include in our study the PCs that do not participate in financial contributions
with other PCs, though they could alternatively be viewed as isolated vertices in the
network. This is not particularly worrisome because the PCs excluded from our study
are financially insignificant. Among all PCs with positive receipts, the PCs in the
financial network accounted for 96.83% of total amount of receipts; and among all
58Information on total receipts and disbursement is obtained from data sets “Candidate Summary
(All Candidates)” and “PAC & Party Summary” released by the FEC. This information is missing for
89 PCs in the observed financial network. We define them as active, and use their budget in the
financial network as a proxy for their total receipts and total disbursement.
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PCs with positive disbursement, these PCs accounted for 96.87% of total amount of
receipts.
Since the campaign finance laws do not mandate that political committees report
their party affiliations, the Committee Master File has incomplete information on
the PCs’ political affiliation. In Table 2.2, we summarize the distribution of reported
party affiliations of the PCs in the Committee Master File. Respectively 17.4% and
17.12% of the PCs reported to be Democratic and Republican, while 1.01% of the
PCs reported to be Independent, and 0.85% of the PCs reported other affiliations
such as Labor Party or Conservative Party. Importantly, 63.62% of the PCs did not
report their party affiliations. In terms of financial significance, contributions sent
by the PCs without self reported political affiliations accounted for 15.25% of the
total amount of contributions among the PCs, and contributions received by them
accounted for 37.38% of the total contributions.
Reported Affiliation Frequency % of PC % of Contribution From % of Contribution To
Democratic 1,019 17.40 45.25 34.74
Republican 1,003 17.12 38.64 25.78
Independent 59 1.01 0.53 1.63
Other 50 0.85 0.33 0.46
Missing 3,727 63.62 15.25 37.38
Total 5,858 100 100 100
Table 2.2: Tabulation of Reported Party Affiliation
In Table 2.3 we describe the non-ideological characteristics included in our analysis.
Information on state and industry enables us to capture the effect of geographical and
industrial proximity on political contribution. Figure 2.1 shows that the District of
Columbia has the highest number of political committees (896), followed by California
(575), Virginia (436), Texas (301), New York (284), Pennsylvania (273) and Illinois
93
Characteristics Type Range
State Categorical 55 distinct categories
Industry Categorical 46 distinct categories
Committee Type Categorical 6 distinct categories
Committee Designation Categorical 3 distinct categories
National Dummy {0,1}
Budget (in $1,000) Continuous [0, 104064.2]
Table 2.3: Non-ideological Characteristics
Note: States include unincorporated territories.
(226). In Table 2.4, we provide a coarse industrial breakdowns of the political
committees. Besides “Other” , which aggregates many small industrial categories,
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate is the most represented industry (9.12%), followed by
Miscellaneous Business (6.96%), Health (5.43%) and Labor (5.19%). In our empirical
analysis, we drop the ideological and party affiliated sectors, and use a finer breakdown
for sectors such as Misc Business and Other. We provide a detailed description of the
construction of the industry variable in Appendix 4.1.
Committee type, committee designation, and national dummy are institutional
characteristics that are potentially related to contribution patterns. There are six
distinct categories of committee type in the Committee Master File: House campaign,
Senate campaign, Presidential campaign, qualified PAC, qualified Party and others.59
Table 2.5 shows that 27.72% of the committees are campaign committees of either
House, Senate or Presidential elections, 45.43% are qualified PACs, and 4.52% are
qualified Party committees, and the rest (“Other”) are mainly non-qualified committees.
59Qualified PACs need to have been in existence for six months and received contributions from
50 people and made contributions to five federal candidates. Qualified party committees need to have
been in existence for at least six months and received contributions from 50 people or are affiliated
with another party committee that meets these requirements.
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Figure 2.1: Geographical Distribution of Political Committees
In Table 2.6, we provide information about the committee designations. There are
three distinct categories of committee designation in the Committee Master File:
authorized by a candidate, joint fund-raiser, and others.60 Table 2.6 shows that 1.89%
of the committees are authorized by a candidate, 2.83% are joint fund-raisers, and
the majority of the rest are either principal campaigns or committees not authorized
by a candidate. We do not list principal campaigns separately because it would be
redundant given the more detailed categorization in committee type. Finally, the
national dummy listed in Table 2.3 takes value 1 if and only if the committee is one
of the following six committees: the Democratic National Committee (DNC), the
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC), the Democratic Congressional
60A committee is designated as “authorized by a candidate” if it is authorized by a candidate in
writing to receive contributions or make expenditures on behalf of the candidate, but is not her
principal campaign committee. A committee is designated as “a joint fundraiser ” if it is created by
two or more candidates, PACs or party committees to share the costs of fundraising, and split the
proceeds.
96
Campaign Committee (DCCC), the Republican National Committee (RNC), National
Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC), and National Republican Congressional
Committee (NRCC).
We compute a PC’s budget from its contribution record. It is constructed as the
sum of its contributions to all other PCs within this election cycle. Typically, this
amount is lower than a committee’s total receipts or total disbursements. We use
this measure because it is most powerful in explaining a PC’s probability of making
political contribution, and thus its total number of connections. In fact, the correlation
between a PC’s total receipts or disbursements and its number of contributions to
other PCs is low. The distribution of budget is given in Table 2.7 and Figure 2.2. It
has a wide range and a fat tail: 25.7% of the PCs have budget less than or equal to
$1,000, while 8% of the PCs have budget more than $500,000.
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Figure 2.2: Distribution of Budget
Note: Observations with budget higher than $500,000 are plotted at $500,000.
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Quantile All PCs Report Dem Report Rep Report Ind Missing/Report Other
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
25% 1.00 2.98 4.00 5.00 0.70
50% 10.00 32.75 48.07 20.00 6.08
75% 75.90 353.30 456.15 88.87 30.00
Max 104,064.19 104,064.19 55,873.70 2,386.53 9,180.75
Obs. 5,858 1,019 1,003 59 3,777
Table 2.7: Quantiles of Budget in $1,000
Descriptive Statistics of the Financial Transactions Network
The Contributions from Committees to Committees data set records 411,106
transactions among 5,858 political committees in the 2003-2004 election cycle. Figure
2.3 is a graphical representation of the network using graphing software Gephi.61 Each
vertex represents a PC, and the color of the vertex represents reported affiliation:
blue for Democratic, red for Republican, green for Independent, and yellow for
missing/other. For the purpose of this graph, we collapse multiple contributions with
the same direction between any pair of PCs into one edge: each edge represents a
directed financial connection; and we use the contributor’s color to represent the color
of the edge. Thus there are a total of 164,529 edges in Figure 2.3. This network
has 20 disconnected components.62 Nevertheless, the component in the center is
disproportionately large with 5,806 vertices. The subsequent description focuses on
this giant component.
Network Level Statistics. In the rest of the analysis we will consider the network
as undirected, thus we further collapse transactions with different directions between
any pair of PCs. We derive a financial network with 5,806 vertices and 145,406 edges.
61See https://gephi.org.
62A component is a maximum connected sub-network.
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Figure 2.3: Political Contribution Network
Note: Vertex color represents reported affiliation: blue for Democratic, red for Republican, green for
Independent, and yellow for missing. Edge color is the same as contributor’s color.
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Table 2.8 presents some of the key statistics for the financial transaction network
among the PCs. First, the network is sparse, yet well-connected. On the one hand,
the average degree is 50.09, i.e. on average, a PC is connected to only 0.86% of other
PCs.63 This indicates sparsity because the number of edges is only a small fraction
of all the vertex pairs. On the other hand, it has a diameter of 10, and an average
distance of 2.99.64 Both statistics indicate that the network is well-connected, which
poses a challenge for our study. Given the connectedness, there is no straightforward
approach to structurally decompose this giant component into separate sub-networks,
despite the visual patterns of clustering. Moreover, there is no other natural way
of decomposition. A common practice in the network applications is to partition
the full network into geographically disjoint sub-networks and assume no interaction
across sub-networks. However, this practice is not suitable in our application because
political contributions are not concentrated at local levels.
Number of vertices 5,806
Number of edges 145,406
Average degree 50.09
Diameter 10
Average distance 2.99
Table 2.8: Network Statistics
Distributions of Degrees and Edge Weights. To explore beyond the network-
level summary statistics, we further investigate the distribution of degrees. Figure
2.4 shows that the degree distribution has a large spread and a fat tail: the highest
63Degree is a vertex-level statistics. It is the number of direct connections a vertex has. Following
the notation introduced in the previous section, vertex i’s degree is given by di =
∑
j 6=i 1(yij > 0).
64The diameter of a network is calculated as the maximum length of the (finite) shortest paths
among vertex pairs. The average distance of a network is calculated as the average length of the
(finite) shortest paths among vertex pairs.
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degree is as large as 978. An important feature is that the shape of this distribution is
inconsistent with a mixture of a small number of binomial distributions–an implication
in the standard stochastic block model. To capture the observed degree distribution,
we introduce rich heterogeneity in our model. Specifically, we include budget whose
distribution has similar patterns to account for the variations in degree.
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Figure 2.4: Histogram of degree
Note: Observations with degree higher than 200 are plotted at 200.
Additionally, we study the sub-networks induced by reported Democratic, Repub-
lican and Independent PCs, and analyze connection patterns conditional on reported
affiliations. In Figure 2.5, we have three graphs for self-reported Democratic, Republi-
can, and Independent PCs respectively. In each graph, we present the distribution
of the PCs’ numbers of connections with the three groups of self identified PCs.
Self-reported Democratic and Republican PCs show evidence of homophily. On the
one hand, many PCs are financially connected with PCs affiliated to same party, and
a sizable of them have more than 20 such connections; on the other hand, only a small
number of PCs are financially connected with PCs affiliated to the other party, and
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most of them have less than 10 such connections. Self-reported Independent PCs show
similar connection pattern with the self-reported Democratic vs. Republican PCs.
Many are financially connected with both parties, and a sizable of them have more than
20 such connections. A small fraction are financially connected with other self-reported
Independent PCs, and most of them have less than 10 such connections - partially
due to the small number of self-reported Independent PCs. Note that we cannot
claim, based on the connection patterns between PCs with self reported affiliations,
that this is an evidence of heterophily. It is possible that they are connected with
a large number of Independent PCs without self-reported affiliations. Furthermore,
even if Independent PCs exhibit heterophily, this behavior does not invalidate either
our model or estimation. Identification only requires that PCs with different political
ideologies have different contribution patterns. This is at least true for the PCs with
self-reported affiliation, which is reassuring.
Finally, in order to infer about the unknown ideologies from the PCs with self
reported ideologies, an implicit assumption in our model is that the PCs without
self reported affiliations do not act systematically differently from the PCs with self
reported affiliations. Therefore, we reproduce the degree distribution in Figure 2.6 with
the composition of each bar marked by color. The degree distribution of PCs without
self reported affiliations is similar to that of the PCs with self reported affiliations.
This evidence is consistent with the assumption, though insufficient. In Section 2.6,
we will present more evidence on this after we have presented our estimation results.
The financial network also provides information on transfer amount (the sum of
the contribution amount) between pairs of connected PCs. Its distribution is given
in Table 2.9 and Figure 2.7. Most of them are small because of the regulations on
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Figure 2.5: Distributions of Number of Connections with Different Committees
Note: These figures only include observations with positive number of connections. Observations
with more than 200 connections are plotted at 200.
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Figure 2.6: Decomposition of Degree Distribution
Note: The same as Figure 2.4, but the composition of each bar, i.e., the composition of PCs with a
certain rage of degrees, is presented with different colors.
contribution limits (detailed description in Appendix 4.2). In addition, we present
the distribution of transfer amount conditional on reported ideology in Table 2.9 and
Figure 2.8. On average, the transfer amount is high between PCs with the same
reported affiliation, and low for the other cases. A caveat in interpreting these statistics
is that we exclude all the contributions involving PCs without self reported affiliations,
so they do not necessarily give the full picture of the contribution pattern.
Issues with Naive Alternative Methods
In this subsection, we briefly discuss the issues with some naive alternative methods
that we have attempted, and explain why they are invalid. We first define
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Figure 2.7: Empirical Distribution of Transfer Amount
Note: Bin size is 500. Observations with transfer amount higher than $50,000 are plotted at $50,000.
x̂i =

−1 if committee i is reported to be Democratic
0 if committee i is reported to be Independent
1 if committee i is reported to be Republican.
The naive method tries to find x∗ solving the following fixed point problem as a
solution to the ideology recovery problem: x̂
x∗
 = sign
y
 x̂
x∗

 . (2.11)
In other words, a PC is Democratic (Republican) if it is connected with more Demo-
cratic (Republican) PCs than Republican (Democratic) ones, or Independent if it
is connected with an equal number of Democratic and Republican PCs. However,
neither existence nor uniqueness of the solution is guaranteed. We attempted to
solve this problem by iteration method, but failed. The following example in Figure
2.9 illustrates the reason. According to the categorization rule described above, the
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Figure 2.8: Empirical Distribution of Transfer Amount Conditional on Self-Reported
Ideology
Note: Bin size is 500. Observations with transfer amount higher than $50,000 are plotted at $50,000.
two “unknown” vertices should be assigned Democratic. However, this assignment
generates inconsistency in the “Republican” vertex’s behavior: as a Republican PC, it
is connected with two Democratic PCs. There does not exist a categorization which
can reconcile such inconsistency, so the naive method proposed in (2.11) does not
guarantee a well-defined solution.
Since the solution concept above requires too strong a coherency in categorization,
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Figure 2.9: Non-Existence of Solution with Naive Method
a less restrictive method was also attempted:
xi =
∑
j∈Vo
yijx̂j. (2.12)
In this case, a PC’s ideology is defined by its connected PCs with self reported
affiliation. There are two major problems with this method. First, when a PC is
only connected to PCs with unreported affiliations, its ideology is not defined. If
we try to address this problem by iteratively applying the equation above, we go
back to the previous method. Second, categorization has very low precision for PCs
connected with few PCs with self reported affiliations and mostly with PCs with
unknown affiliations. The poor performance of naive methods necessitate the use of a
110
more sophisticated method.
2.4 Estimation
Given the model description, the likelihood of y, x̂ conditional on x, z is given by
P (y, x̂|x, z; ε,β,h)
= P (x̂|x; ε) P (y|x, z;β,h)
= (1− ε)nt
(
ε
m−1
)ne∏
1≤i<j≤n
[
ηij(xi, xj)hxixj(yij)
]1(yij>0) [1− ηij(xi, xj)]1(yij=0) ,
(2.13)
where nt =
∑
i∈Vo 1(xi = x̂i) is the number of vertices in Vo whose x̂i’s coincide with
xi’s, ne =
∑
i∈Vo 1(xi 6= x̂i) is the number of vertices in Vo whose x̂i’s differ from xi’s,
and hxixj(yij) = hxixj ,q if yij = wq where hxixj ,q is defined in (2.9).
We use the Maximum A Posteriori (MAP) estimator to recover the latent ideology.
It is a Bayesian estimator that equals the mode of the posterior probability. Specifically,
it solves
max
x∈{1,...,m}n
P (y, x̂|x, z; ε,β,h) P (x;θ) . (2.14)
Note that the Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE) solves
max
x∈{1,...,m}n
P (y, x̂|x, z; ε,β,h) , (2.15)
and that MAP is equivalent to MLE under uniform prior θ = ( 1
m
, ..., 1
m
).
We now argue for the validity of the MAP estimator, and propose a Bayesian
algorithm to obtain an approximate solution. Theoretically, statistical inference is
non-standard in our model. First of all, we have only one observation of the network,
i.e. one realization of y, x̂. Second, the number of parameters (the number of latent
political ideologies) grows with the network size. Therefore, canonical asymptotic
111
theory is not applicable. For example, law of large numbers cannot be directly applied.
As a result, in the recent literature, new concepts and tools are introduced to study
this problem. The following subsection summarizes the key concepts and results
mostly related to our study.
Threshold for Exact Recovery
In this subsection we describe the theoretical results in Yun and Proutiere (2016)
that justify our estimation using one observation of the network. The standard
stochastic block model was first introduced in Snijders and Nowicki (1997) and
Nowicki and Snijders (2001), and its exact recovery problems were studied in Mossel
et al. (2014), Abbe et al. (2014), and Abbe and Sandon (2015). The labeled stochastic
block model introduced weights on edges, and its exact recovery problems were studied
in Jog and Loh (2015) and Yun and Proutiere (2016). First, we provide a formal
definition of the labeled stochastic block model.
Definition 1 (Labeled Stochastic Block Model LSBM (n,θ, log(n)
n
W )). The La-
beled Stochastic Block Model generates an n-vertex random graph with commu-
nity affiliation X and weighted adjacency matrix Y according to the following
process. Each vertex is assigned a community affiliation Xi ∈ {1, 2, ...,m} inde-
pendently under probability θ = (θ1, ..., θm) ∈ ∆m−1. Conditional on community
affiliations, the edges are drawn independently. The edges Yij’s take discrete
values {0, w1, w2, ...wQ} where 0 represents no edge and wq represents an edge
with the specified (non-zero) weight. The distribution of edges is governed by
an m-by-m-by-Q matrix W . Specifically, vector W (k, l; ·) characterizes edge
112
distribution between a pair of vertices in communities k and l:
P(Yi,j = wq|Xi = k,Xj = l) =
log(n)
n
W (k, l; q) for q = 1, .., Q;
P(Yi,j = 0|Xi = k,Xj = l) = 1−
log(n)
n
Q∑
q=1
W (k, l; q).
(2.16)
Note that W is not indexed by the network size n, i.e. it does not change with n.
This implies that the distribution described above will change with n. More precisely,
the probability of having an edge scales as Θ( log(n)
n
) and the degree scales as Θ(log(n)).
This logarithmic growth rate of degree with respect to the network size is called
the logarithmic degree regime. The literature on exact recovery studies this regime
because it is dense enough that the graph is connected with high probability; yet it
is still sparse enough that the conditional independence condition yields asymptotic
independence of the failures of the component-MAP for different vertices.
Next, we provide the definition of exact recovery. Exact recovery is an asymptotic
requirement in the context of the SBM - a counterpart of consistency in the classical
statistical problems.65
Definition 2 (Exact Recovery). Exact recovery is solved if there exists an algo-
rithm such that P(Xest = X) → 1 as n → ∞ where Xest is the estimated
community affiliation.66
In other words, exact recovery requires that for a large enough network, the probability
of correctly recovering the entire community structure (i.e. no misclassification) is
almost 1. The most promising estimator to solve exact recovery is the MAP estimator
65 Exact recovery is sometimes referred to as strong consistency, reflecting the resemblance to
consistency.
66 The equivalence is up to group permutation of Xest with respect to community names.
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because it minimizes P(Xest 6= X) - if MAP fails in solving exact recovery, no other
algorithm can succeed (see, e.g., Abbe (2017) ).
In order to describe the condition for exact recovery, we first define the Chernoff-
Hellinger (CH) divergence (Abbe and Sandon (2015)).
Definition 3 (Chernoff-Hellinger divergence D(θ,W )).
D(θ,W ) = min
k,l:k 6=l
DL+(θ,W (k),W (l)) (2.17)
where DL+(θ,W (k),W (l)) is given by
DL+(θ,W (k),W (l))
= maxλ∈[0,1]
∑Q
q=1
∑m
j=1 θj[(1− λ)W (k, j; q)
+λW (l, j; q)−W (k, j; q)1−λW (l, j; q)λ]
(2.18)
Intuitively, DL+(θ,W (k),W (l)) measures the difference in connection patterns be-
tween a pair of communities, k and l; and thus the CH-divergence D(θ,W ) is the
minimum of such difference between any pair of distinct communities. In the following,
we explain more precisely the meaning of difference in connection pattern. Note that
mathematically θj [(1− λ)W (k, j; q) + λW (l, j; q)−W (k, j; q)1−λW (l, j; q)λ] measures
the difference between θjW (k, j; q) and θjW (l, j; q). Moreover, θjW (k, j; q) log(n)
gives, for a vertex in community k, the expected number of wq-weighted edges with
community j; and θjW (l, j; q) log(n) gives, for a vertex in community l, a similar num-
ber. Therefore, θj [(1− λ)W (k, j; q) + λW (l, j; q)−W (k, j; q)1−λW (l, j; q)λ] measures
the difference between communities k and l in terms of the number of wq-weighted
edges with community j. Finally, summing over different communities j and different
edge weights wq delivers the expression in (2.18). DL+(θ,W (k),W (l)) is non-negative.
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Larger value of DL+(θ,W (k),W (l)) represents larger difference in connection pat-
terns between communities k and l, and DL+(θ,W (k),W (l)) is zero if and only if the
two communities have identical connection patterns, i.e., W (k, j; q) = W (l, j; q),∀j, q.
We further illustrate the definition of CH divergence in a special case of a homo-
geneous model (Jog and Loh (2015)), where its expression is significantly simplified.
In a homogeneous model, vertices are assigned to different communities with equal
probabilities; and the distribution of an edge only depends on whether the pair of
vertices belong to the same communities:
θj =
1
m
, ∀j; (2.19)
W (k, l; ·) =

Wwithin(·) if k = l
Wbetween(·) if k 6= l.
(2.20)
Under homogeneity, the CH divergence reduces to the Hellinger divergence (correspond-
ing to λ = 1
2
), measuring the difference in within-community and between-community
connection patterns:
D(θ,W )
=DL+(θ,W (k),W (l)) ∀k 6= l
= max
λ∈[0,1]
Q∑
q=1
m∑
j=1
θj[(1− λ)W (k, j; q) + λW (l, j; q)−W (k, j; q)1−λW (l, j; q)λ]
= max
λ∈[0,1]
1
m
Q∑
q=1
∑
j∈{k,l}
[(1− λ)W (k, j; q) + λW (l, j; q)−W (k, j; q)1−λW (l, j; q)λ]
= max
λ∈[0,1]
1
m
Q∑
q=1
Wwithin(q) +Wbetween(q)−Wwithin(q)1−λWbetween(q)λ −Wbetween(q)1−λWwithin(q)λ
=
1
m
Q∑
q=1
(
√
Wwithin(q)−
√
Wbetween(q))
2.
(2.21)
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The first equation follows symmetry, the second equation directly applies the definition
in (2.18), the third equation uses (2.19) and W (k, j; ·) = W (l, j; ·) = Wbetween(·)
∀j 6= k, l, the fourth equation applies (2.20), and the last equation results from λ = 1
2
being the maximizer.
Now we can state the main theoretical results. Combining Theorem 3 and Claim 4
in Yun and Proutiere (2016), we have:
Theorem 1 (Threshold for Exact Recovery). Exact recovery is solvable for LSBM
(n,θ, log(n)
n
W )) if D(θ,W ) > 1.
The theorem shows that: if the difference in connection patterns of any pair of
communities is large enough, we can correctly recover the entire community structure
from one observed network with high probability. This theorem provides theoretical
foundation for the use of the MAP estimator (because it is the “optimal” algorithm in
terms of exact recovery), and it is very similar to the consistency results in classical
statistics.
Some comment on the case where D(θ,W ) < 1 is useful. In this case, the
MAP estimator fails exact recovery (i.e. has misclassification) with strictly positive
probability. This result should not be interpreted as discouraging: although the
probability of having misclassification does not vanish with the growth of the sample
size, the misclassification rate defined as the proportion of vertices misclassified could
still be low. In our Monte Carlo simulations, we observe that even when the CH
divergence is below 1, we still have reasonably good classification. Therefore, even if
our application falls in the second case, the MAP estimator is still a sensible choice.
To apply this theorem to our model, note that W corresponds to a composition of
the edge formation probability Φ(γ′β), the conditional weight distribution h, and the
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scaling factor log(n)
n
. In the Monte Carlo exercises, and the real data application, we
will calculate the CH divergence according to Definition 3 and (2.22)
W (k, l; q) =
n
log(n)
Φ( γ(k, l)′β )hkl(q) (2.22)
where γ(k, l)′β is the median of (γ(k, l, zi, zj)′β) over (i, j) pairs such that xi =
k, xj = l or xi = l, xj = k. This accommodates our introduction of covariates in the
edge formation process.
Estimation Algorithm
Apart from the theoretical challenge, the large size of the campaign finance network
poses additional computational challenges. The parameter space of x is mn. With 3
categories and 5,806 vertices, the parameter space is far larger than the number of
atoms in the universe.67 Therefore, exact solution to MAP in (2.14) is infeasible, and
instead we need an efficient approximation method. In light of these considerations,
we propose a Bayesian algorithm to approximate the posterior distribution of the
latent ideology as well as other parameters.
In this Bayesian approach, the latent ideology vector X, and the parameters ε,θ, β
are treated as random variables with certain prior probability distributions. Adjacency
matrix y and reported affiliation x̂ are treated as one realization of the random
variables Y and X̂. Observable characteristics z are treated as fixed and exogenous.
The prior distribution of the latent X is given by (2.4) in the network formation
model. The prior distribution of θ, the parameter governing the unconditional
67According to Jackson (2010), the estimated number of atoms in the universe is on the order of
2270.
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probability distribution of ideology, is assumed to be a Dirichlet distribution:
θ ∼ Dir(αθ), (2.23)
where αθ ∈ Rm+ is a vector of pre-specified concentration parameters. The prior
distribution of ε, the parameter governing measurement error, is assumed to be a Beta
distribution:
ε ∼ Beta(αε1, αε2), (2.24)
where (αε1, αε2) ∈ R2+ is a vector of pre-specified concentration parameters. The prior
distributions of h = {hkl}1≤k≤l≤m, the conditional distribution of edge weight (transfer
amount), is assumed to be a Dirichlet distribution:
hkl ∼ Dir(αhkl), (2.25)
where αhkl ∈ RQ+ is a vector of pre-specified concentration parameters. The prior
distribution of β, the parameter governing edge formation probability, is assumed to
be a multivariate normal distribution:
β ∼ N (0, τ 2I), (2.26)
where τ ∈ R+ is pre-specified standard deviation.
Given the prior probability distributions of X, θ, β, ε, and h, the goal of
Bayesian estimation is to update the belief on their joint distribution using data
y, x̂ and z, i.e., to compute the posterior distribution P(θ, β, ε,h,X|y, x̂, z). Once
the posterior distribution is computed, it is straightforward to assess different ob-
jects of interest, especially the marginal distributions P(Xi|y, x̂, z). There is nei-
ther an analytically nor a numerically convenient form to directly characterize
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of the joint posterior distribution. Fortunately, calculations of conditional dis-
tributions P(Xi|x−i,y, x̂, z,θ, β, ε,h, ), P(θ|y, x̂, z,β, ε,h,x), P(β|y, x̂, z,θ, ε,h,x),
P(ε|y, x̂, z,θ,β,h,x), and P(h|y, x̂, z,θ,β, ε,x) are relatively easy. Therefore, a Gibbs
sampler algorithm is used to construct the joint posterior distribution. Gibbs sampler
is a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm, which repeatedly samples a set
of random variables conditional on the values of all other random variables. It is
particularly useful when sampling from conditional distributions is convenient.
Computing the Posterior Distribution P(θ, β, ε,h,X|y, x̂, z). By Bayes’ rule,
the posterior distribution of Xi is given by:
P(Xi = k|x−i,y, x̂, z;θ, β, ε,h, ) =
P(y, x1, ..xi−1, xi = k, xi+1, ...xn, x̂|z,θ, β, ε,h)∑m
l=1 P(y, x1, ..xi−1, xi = l, xi+1, ...xn, x̂|z,θ, β, ε,h)
,
which can be reduced to:
P(Xi = k|x−i,y, x̂, z,θ, β, ε,h, ) ∝
θk(1− ε)
∏
j 6=i
[ηij(k, xj)hkxj (yij)]
1(yij>0)[1− ηij(k, xj)]1(yij=0) if k = x̂i
θk
ε
m− 1
∏
j 6=i
[ηij(k, xj)hkxj (yij)]
1(yij>0)[1− ηij(k, xj)]1(yij=0) if k 6= x̂i
∀i ∈ Vo,
(2.27)
where θk is the ideology prior, (1− ε) and εm−1 are measurement accuracy of the report,
and
∏
j 6=i[ηij(k, xj)hkxj(yij)]
1(yij>0)[1 − ηij(k, xj)]1(yij=0) is information embedded in
network connections. The posterior is an interaction of the three. When ε > 0, i.e.
allowing for measurement error, if the network data highly favors an ideology different
from x̂i, it is possible for the posterior to override the prior, i.e. a posterior mode
at k 6= x̂i. This can be viewed as a data-oriented correction of measurement error.
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Similarly,
P(Xi = k|x−i,y, x̂, z,θ, β, ε,h, ) ∝
θk
∏
j 6=i
[ηij(k, xj)hkxj(yij)]
1(yij>0)[1− ηij(k, xj)]1(yij=0) ∀i ∈ V\Vo,
(2.28)
where θk is the ideology prior, and
∏
j 6=i[ηij(k, xj)hkxj (yij)]
1(yij>0)[1− ηij(k, xj)]1(yij=0)
is information embedded in network connections. The posterior is an interaction of
the two. Summoning conjugacy, the posterior distribution of θ is given by:
θ|y, x̂, z,β, ε,h,x ∼ Dir(αθ + [nk]1≤k≤m), (2.29)
where nk =
∑
1≤i≤n 1(xi = k) is the number of vertices with xi equal to k. The
posterior distribution of ε is given by:
ε|y, x̂, z,θ,β,h,x ∼ Beta(αε1 + ne, αε2 + nt), (2.30)
where ne =
∑
i∈Vo 1(x̂i 6= xi) is the number of vertices whose self report is different
from its ideology, and nt =
∑
i∈Vo 1(x̂i = xi) is the number of vertices whose self
report is the same as its ideology. The posterior distribution of h is given by:
hkl|y, x̂, z,θ,β, ε,x ∼ Dir(αhkl + [nkl,q]1≤q≤Q), (2.31)
where nkl,q =
∑
1≤i<j≤n max{1(xi = k, xj = l), 1(xi = l, xj = k)}1(yij = q) is
the number of edges with transfer amount wq between PCs of ideologies k and l.
Constructing the posterior distribution of β is more delicate. β is essentially the
coefficient vector in a Probit regression model, whose posterior distribution does not
have an analytically convenient form. Therefore, instead of directly sampling from a
closed form distribution, a data augmentation strategy introduced in Albert and Chib
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(1993) is used. First, sample auxiliary variable u = {uij}1≤i<j≤n from the following
truncated normal distributions:
uij ∼

N (γ(xi, xj, zi, zj)′β, 1)|uij > 0 if yij > 0
N (γ(xi, xj, zi, zj)′β, 1)|uij < 0 if yij = 0.
(2.32)
Conditional on the auxiliary variable u, the posterior distribution of β is given by:
β|y, x̂, z,θ, ε,h,x,u ∼ N
(
(τ−2I + Γ′Γ)−1Γ′u, (τ−2I + Γ′Γ)−1
)
, (2.33)
where Γ =
[
γ(xi, xj, zi, zj)
′]
1≤i<j≤n.
The Gibbs sampler algorithm is summarized below:
1. Initialize x0,θ0,β0, ε0, h0.
2. Iteratively sample from conditional posterior distribution. Specifically, in iter-
ation t, we sample one set of parameters (xt,θt, εt,ht,βt) with the following
procedure:
a) Sample {xi}t1≤i≤n sequentially from distribution
P(Xi|y, x̂, z,θt−1,βt−1, εt−1,ht−1, xt1, ..xti−1, xt−1i+1, ...xt−1n ) using (2.27) and
(2.28).
b) Sample vector θt from distribution P(θ|y, x̂, z,βt−1, εt−1,ht−1,xt) using
(2.29).
c) Sample εt from distribution P(ε|y, x̂, z,βt−1,ht−1,xt,θt) using (2.30).
d) Sample vectors ht from distribution P(h|y, x̂, z,βt−1,xt,θt, εt) using (2.31)
e) Sample auxiliary vector ut from distribution P(u|y, z,βt−1,xt) using (2.32).
f) Sample vector βt from distribution P(β|y, x̂, z,xt,θt, εt,ht,ut) using (2.33).
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3. Burn in the first T1 iterations. Use samples from iterations T1 + 1 to T1 + T2 to
construct posterior distribution.
The first step initializes the Markov chain. The initial values should not affect the
steady state and can be determined either at random or by other algorithms. We
use the former in our application. The second step simulates the Markov chain by
repeatedly sampling one parameter conditional on the values of all other parameters.
The sampling order of the parameters is arbitrary, and a different order can be used,
e.g. one can sample θ before x. In order to speed up convergence, we use the newly
sampled parameter immediately in the following sampling procedures and do not wait
until the next iteration, e.g., xt sampled from (a) is used in the sampling of θt in (b).
The final step discards the initial portion of the Markov chain, namely the first T1
iterations, where steady state is not reached. Pooling the remainder samples gives an
approximate joint posterior distribution P(θ, β, ε,h,X|y, x̂, z).
2.5 Monte Carlo Evidence
In this section, we present Monte Carlo evidence to evaluate the performance of
the community recovery algorithm proposed in Section 2.4. We conduct four sets of
Monte Carlo simulations that differ in the specifications of the edge formation process
and the network size, both of which affect the Chernoff-Hellinger divergence measure
as defined in (2.18) because they enter the expression of W (k, l; q) (see Eq. (2.22)).
The first three sets of Monte Carlo simulations share a framework that is similar
to the homogeneous labeled stochastic block model as in Jog and Loh (2015), even
though the edge distributions are not exactly homogeneous due to the introduction
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of the covariates in the edge formation probability. Our Monte Carlo results show a
strong confirmation of Theorem 1 that CH divergence of 1 is a sharp threshold for
exact recovery. In the first specification, the network edge formation patterns and the
network size imply a CH divergence of 1.0074, and we find that the misclassification
rate is on average 1.10%. The second specification differs from the first one only in the
weight distribution, resulting in a smaller CH divergence of 0.4719 and we find a larger
average misclassification rate of 5.68%. The third specification differs from the second
one only in the network size, which results in a larger CH divergence of 1.7537 and
we find a smaller average misclassification rate of 0. In the fourth set of Monte Carlo
simulations, the network size is similar to the real data (about 6,000 vertices), and the
edge distributions are heterogeneous in a flexible way, resulting in a CH divergence of
6.0110. This is intended to assess the performance of the algorithm in a data set that
resembles the real data. The results show that the algorithm performs surprisingly
well with an average misclassification rate of 0.0002%, although it is slower due to
the scale of the network. We summarize our main simulation results in the text, but
many of the less essential details are left in Appendices 4.3-4.6.
Common Specifications Across All Four Sets of Monte Carlo Simulations.
The specifications that are common across all four sets of Monte Carlo studies are
listed as follows. The aspects of the specifications that are unique to each set of Monte
Carlo studies, as well as their specific results, are presented separately in subsequent
subsections.
• The number of ideologies: m = 3.
• Marginal distribution of ideology: θ = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3).
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• Probability of measurement error: ε = 0.05.
• Fraction of vertices with reported affiliation: 40%.
• Edge formation probability is specified by yij > 0 iff
γ(xi, xj, zi, zj)
′β + eij > 0,
where γ(xi, xj, zi, zj) = (γx,γz) is a list of 19 variables and β = (βx,βz) ∈ R19.
To make the simulated data as close as possible to the real data we use for
the empirical analysis, we include in the vector zi the PC’s budget, state,
industry, dummy for House campaign, dummy for Senate campaign, dummy
for Presidential campaign, dummy for qualified PAC, dummy for qualified
Party, dummy for national committee, dummy for authorized by a candidate,
and dummy for joint fund-raiser, and we construct γz ∈ R13 based on (zi, zj);
specifically,
γz =

1statei=statej , 1industryi=industryj ,
1(housei=1)∨(housej=1), 1(senatei=1)∨(senatej=1), 1(presidenti=1)∨(presidentj=1),
1(qualified PACi=1)∨(qualified PACj=1), 1(qualified Partyi=1)∨(qualified Partyj=1),
1(nationali=1)∨(nationalj=1), 1(authorizedi=1)∨(authorizedj=1), 1(fundraiseri=1)∨(fundraiserj=1),
[ln bi + ln bj] , [(ln bi)
2 + (ln bj)
2] , ln bi ln bj

.
(2.34)
We set
βz =
 0.3, 0.3, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.2, 0.2,
0.15, 0.15, 0.15, 0.01,−0.01, 0.001

in all four sets of Monte Carlo simulations.
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γx ∈ R6 includes a constant term and interaction terms of xi and xj ; specifically,
γx =
 1, 1xi=xj=Dem, 1xi=xj=Rep, 1xi=xj=Ind,
1(xi=Dem,xj=Ind)∨(xi=Ind,xj=Dem), 1(xi=Rep,xj=Ind)∨(xi=Ind,xj=Rep)
 .
(2.35)
• Transfer amount is discretized into four bins. Therefore, conditional on yij > 0,
yij ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.
Monte Carlo I: 500 Networks with n = 100, CH Divergence
Exceeding 1
In the first set of Monte Carlo simulations, 500 networks are simulated and esti-
mated. They have network size n = 100, the coefficients in the network formation
probability are given by βx = (−1.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0, 0), and the edge’s weight dis-
tributions are given by hDem,Dem = hRep,Rep = hInd,Ind = (0.05, 0.1, 0.4, 0.45), and
hDem,Rep = hDem,Ind = hRep,Ind = (0.4, 0.3, 0.2, 0.1). Note that the specification of
βx = (−1.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0, 0) implies that the link formation depends on whether the
two vertices are of the same ideology or are of differen ideologies, and fits into the
homogeneity special case we described in Eq. (2.20). The implied CH divergence
according to (2.21) and (2.22) is 1.0074 > 1.
For these simulations, the total execution time is 235,405 seconds (about 65 hours).
The speed of convergence in terms of the number of iterations varies, which is shown
in Figure 4.1 where we plot the histogram of the number of iterations (including
burn-in and posterior) across the 500 networks we simulated. The distribution of
misclassification rates is summarized in Figure 4.2 and Table 4.3.68 They are small
68Estimated ideology is defined as the posterior mode.
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in general, and in 37.4% of the simulations, there is no misclassification.69 Moreover,
98.8% of the simulations have misclassification rates lower than the measurement error
rate 0.05, which implies that in most cases our algorithm successfully corrects some
of the misreports. Table 4.4 provides a detailed tabulation of the estimated vs. true
ideologies.
The results above focus only on the posterior mode, and the following analysis
further investigates the patterns of the posterior distributions. For the correctly
classified vertices, our categorical classification based on posterior mode is rather
precise. Figure 4.3 shows that the differences in posterior probability between the
highest posterior probability (i.e., the posterior of the true ideology) and the second
highest posterior probability are highly concentrated around 1. This indicates that
for most of these vertices, the posterior distribution is strongly informative of the
true ideology. For the misclassified vertices, however, the scales of misclassification
vary. Figure 4.4 shows that the differences in the posterior probability between the
highest posterior probability and the posterior probability of the true ideology are
approximately uniformly distributed between 0 where the classification is only a bit
off and 1 where the classification is far off. This suggests that the misclassification
is likely to be caused by unusual realizations of the networks process rather than
the failure of our estimation algorithm. The randomness in the network formation
renders the ideology information unclear or even misleading for some vertices, though
this occurs rarely. Additional analysis of the posterior mean of other parameters are
6937.4% exact recovery is lower than the theoretical prediction, for several reasons. First, probability
of exact recovery approaches 1 only when network size approaches infinity. In this case, the network
size is only 100, which may be too small. Second, our model is not exactly the same as the model in
Jog and Loh (2015) because we include covariates in the edge formation probability, which is more
complicated. Third, we do not use an exact MAP estimator, which may also introduce approximation
error.
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presented in Tables 4.5-4.8. These tables show that the algorithm recovers the true
parameters effectively, except for the weight distribution parameters hkl. We will show
that these parameters will be estimated more precisely as the network size gets larger
in Monte Carlo simulations III (where n = 500) and IV (where n = 6000).
Monte Carlo II: 500 Networks with n = 100, CH Divergence
Less Than 1
The specifications for the second set of Monte Carlo simulations are the same
as those for the first set except for the weight distributions hDem,Dem, hRep,Rep and
hInd,Ind. Specifically, the edge’s weight distributions are given by hDem,Dem = hRep,Rep =
hInd,Ind = (0.2, 0.15, 0.35, 0.3), and hDem,Rep = hDem,Ind = hRep,Ind = (0.4, 0.3, 0.2, 0.1).
Again, 500 networks with size n = 100 are simulated and estimated. The implied CH
divergence according to (2.21) and (2.22) decreases to 0.4719, which is now less than
1.
The total execution time for these simulations is 418,322 seconds (about 5 days).
The speed of convergence in terms of the number of iterations is relatively slow; Figure
4.5 depicts the histogram of the number of iterations (including burn-in and posterior).
Figure 4.6 and Table 4.9 summarize the distribution of misclassification rates across
the 500 simulations. Comparing with Monte Carlo I, the misclassification rates are
higher; for the worst case, the misclassification rate is as high as 24%. Only 2.8% of the
simulations have 0 misclassification. This is consistent with the theoretical prediction
of Theorem 1 that a CH divergence lower than 1 is associated with low probability of
exact recovery. Table 4.10 provides a detailed tabulation of the estimated vs. true
ideologies in this set of Monte Carlo simulations. Figure 4.7 plots, for the correctly
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classified vertices, the histogram of the difference in posterior probability between the
highest posterior probability (i.e., the posterior for the true ideology) and the second
highest posterior probability. It is shown to be mostly concentrated at 1, though
relative to Figure 4.3 for Monte Carlo I, the difference is somewhat more likely to
be less than 1 and is more spread out. This indicates that, when CH is less than
1, our categorizations are not as informative even though we obtained the correct
classification. Similarly, Figure 4.8 plots, for the misclassified vertices, the histogram
of the difference in posterior probability between the highest posterior probability
and the posterior probability of the true ideology. The difference is rather evenly
distributed, which is similar to Figure 4.4 in Monte Carlo I. Additional analysis of the
posterior mean of other parameters are presented in Tables 4.11-4.14. These tables
show that the algorithm recovers the true parameters effectively, except for the weight
distribution parameters hkl.
Monte Carlo III: 500 Networks with n = 500, CH Divergence
Exceeding 1
The specifications for the third set of Monte Carlo simulations are the same as
those of Monte Carlo II except for the network size. Now we simulate 500 networks,
each with a network size of n = 500. As a result of the increase in the network size,
the implied CH divergence according to (2.21) and (2.22) is now 1.7537, which is
larger than 1.
The total execution time for these simulations is 31,974 seconds (about 9 hours).
The speed of convergence is fast in terms of the number of iterations (ranging from 600
to 900); Figure 4.9 depicts the histogram of the number of iterations (including burn-in
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and posterior). The misclassification rates in all 500 simulations are 0. Therefore,
this set of simulations over-perform the previous two in terms of both convergence
speed and accuracy rate. Figure 4.10 plots the histogram of the difference in posterior
probability between the highest posterior probability (i.e., the posterior for the true
ideology) and the second highest posterior probability for the correctly classified
vertices (which are all vertices because of 0 misclassification rate). The difference
is almost completely concentrated at 1, indicating that our categorization based on
posterior mode is very informative; in fact, for 99.9976% of the correctly classified
vertices, the posterior probability on the true ideology is 1. Additional analysis of the
posterior mean of other parameters are presented in Tables 4.15-4.18. These tables
show that the algorithm recovers the true parameters effectively, including the weight
distribution parameters hkl (see Table 4.17).
Monte Carlo IV: 100 Networks with n = 6, 000, CH Divergence
Exceeding 1
In the fourth set of Monte Carlo simulations, we make several important changes.
First, we increase the network size to n = 6000, which is comparable to the size
of the political contribution network in our data. Also importantly, we deviate
from the symmetry in the within-community and between-community link formation
probabilities. Both changes are intended to assess the performance of our estimation
algorithm in an environment that resembles the actual data. We again simulate and
estimate 100 networks. Specifically, the coefficient in the network formation probability
is given by βx = (−3, 1, 1, 0.7, 0.3, 0.3), and the edge’s weight distributions are given by
hDem,Dem = hRep,Rep = (0.1, 0.2, 0.2, 0.5), hInd,Ind = (0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25), hDem,Rep =
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(0.5, 0.2, 0.2, 0.1), and hDem,Ind = hRep,Ind = (0.3, 0.3, 0.3, 0.1). Using expressions
(2.18) and (2.22) to evaluate pairwise divergence between ideology communities,
we have DL+(θ,W (Dem),W (Rep)) = 13.1003, and DL+(θ,W (Dem),W (Ind)) =
DL+(θ,W (Rep),W (Ind)) = 6.011, and thus the CH divergence 6.011 > 1.
The total execution time for the fourth set of simulations is 930,673 seconds (about
11 days ). The speed of convergence is fast in terms of the number of iterations
(ranging from 600 to 900); Figure 4.11 depicts the histogram of the number of
iterations. Therefore, the long execution time is a result of heavy computation in each
iteration, not the number of iteration. Misclassification rates are 0 for 99 simulations,
0.0167% (i.e., 1 vertex is misclassified) for 1 simulation. For the correctly classified
vertices, the numerical posterior distributions of ideology are degenerate in the true
ideology. For the only vertex that is incorrectly classified in this set of simulations,
the difference between the highest posterior probability and the posterior probability
of the true ideology is 0.13. These results suggest that the simulated data exhibit
strong information on the community structure, and that our algorithm is efficient
in identifying this structure. Additional analysis of the posterior mean of other
parameters are presented in Tables 4.19-4.22. These tables show that the algorithm
recovers the true parameters effectively, including the weight distribution parameters
hkl.
To summarize, our algorithm has excellent performance when the data is generated
with CH divergence greater than 1. It has reasonably good performance even when
the data is generated with CH divergence lower than 1. The results also suggest that
a large network is not necessarily undesirable. On the one hand, it brings in more
computational burden and increases the runtime; on the other hand, it also embodies
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more information and speeds up the convergence.
2.6 Empirical Implementation and Results
Empirical Implementation.
We empirically infer the ideologies of 5,806 PCs from the giant component in the
campaign finance network depicted in Figure 2.3. There are 3 categories of ideologies:
Democratic, Republican, and Independent. For the small number of PCs whose
self-reported affiliations do not belong to these categories, we treat them as if we do
not observe their report. The set Vo contains PCs with self-reported affiliations x̂i’s.
We assume the following functional form for the edge formation probability:
γ(xi, xj, zi, zj)
′β
= β1 + β21xi=xj=Dem + β31xi=xj=Rep + β41xi=xj=Ind
+ β51(xi=Dem,xj=Ind)∨(xi=Ind,xj=Dem) + β61(xi=Rep,xj=Ind)∨(xi=Ind,xj=Rep)
+ β71statei=statej + β81industryi=industryj + β91(housei=1)∨(housej=1)
+ β101(senatei=1)∨(senatej=1) + β111(presidenti=1)∨(presidentj=1)
+ β121(qualified PACi=1)∨(qualified PACj=1) + β131(qualified Partyi=1)∨(qualified Partyj=1)
+ β141(nationali=1)∨(nationalj=1) + β151(authorizedi=1)∨(authorizedj=1)
+ β161(fundraiseri=1)∨(fundraiserj=1) + β17 [ln bi + ln bj] + β18
[
(ln bi)
2 + (ln bj)
2
]
+ β19 ln bi ln bj,
(2.36)
where the first term is a constant characterizing the baseline connection probability
between Democratic and Republican PCs; the second to the sixth terms characterize
the connection probabilities for other ideology pairs; the seventh and the eighth terms
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capture the effect of the two PCs belonging to the same state or industry; the ninth to
the sixteenth terms capture the effects of PCs’ institutional characteristics: whether
one of them is a House campaign, a Senate campaign, a Presidential campaign, a
qualified PAC, a qualified Party, a national committee, authorized by a candidate, or
a joint fundraiser; and the seventeenth to the nineteenth terms capture the effect of
both PCs’ budgets on link formations probability, which is a restrictive form of that
in (2.8) and assumes that the effect of financial and institutional characteristics are
the same across ideological pairs. The main reason for this parsimonious specification
is to reduce the computational intensity. The estimation results do not seem to show
signs of severe mis-specification. The transfer amount Yij is discretized into multiples
of $500, and can take values of {0, 1, 2, ..., 100} where 100 includes all the transfer
higher than $50,000. The initial values in the Gibbs sampler are randomly generated,
and different sets of initial values are used.
Estimation Results: Posterior Mean and Standard Deviations.
Table 2.10 presents the posterior mean and standard deviation of β, the coefficients
in edge formation probability. The second to the sixth coefficients are all positive,
indicating that Democratic and Republican PCs (the baseline case) have the lowest
connection probability. Additionally, the Democratic PCs have stronger within party
connection than the Republican PCs. Moreover, Independent PCs have a higher
probability of connecting with Democratic or Republican PCs than other Independent
PCs. It is also interesting to note that, everything else equal, pairs of Republican PCs
are less likely to form a link than Republican/Independent or Democratic/Independent
pairs of PCs.
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Tables 2.11 and 2.12 present the posterior mean and standard deviation of θ, the
unconditional probability of ideology; and ε, the measurement error. Tables 2.11 shows
that in the population of all PCs, 40.01% are Democratic, 42.74% are Republican,
and 17.24% are Independent. The posterior standard deviations of these estimates
are small. Table 2.12 shows that the self-reported ideologies of the PCs are likely to
be erroneous with probability 7.37%.
Due to the large number of parameters in the weight distribution function, we
present the estimates of h in Figure 2.10, which shows the posterior means of all the
values of (hkl,1, ..., hkl,100) for all k, l ∈ {Dem, Rep, Ind} pairs graphically.
β Posterior Mean Posterior Standard Deviation
constant -7.4729 0.0166
1xi=xj=Dem 1.3301 0.0099
1xi=xj=Rep 0.8210 0.0130
1xi=xj=Ind 0.6405 0.0134
1(xi=Dem,xj=Ind)∨(xi=Ind,xj=Dem) 1.2909 0.0121
1(xi=Rep,xj=Ind)∨(xi=Ind,xj=Rep) 1.5797 0.0119
Same state 0.6399 0.0043
Same industry 0.2185 0.0117
One of them is a House campaign 0.5306 0.0034
One of them is a Senate campaign 0.3783 0.0035
One of them is a Presidential campaign 0.0212 0.0113
One of them is a qualified PAC 0.7006 0.0049
One of them is a qualified Party -0.5334 0.0066
One of them is a national committee 0.9421 0.0133
One of them is authorized by a candidate -0.4473 0.0090
One of them is a joint fundraiser -0.7623 0.0059
(ln bi + ln bj) -0.0442 0.0023
((ln bi)
2 + (ln bj)
2) 0.0162 0.00004
ln bi ln bj -0.0010 0.0002
Table 2.10: Posterior Distribution of β
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θ Posterior Mean Posterior Standard Deviation
P(Dem) 0.4001 0.0045
P(Rep) 0.4274 0.0046
P(Ind) 0.1724 0.0036
Table 2.11: Posterior Distribution of θ
ε Posterior Mean Posterior Standard Deviation
0.0737 0.0042
Table 2.12: Posterior Distribution of ε
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Figure 2.10: Posterior Mean of h
Note: Bin size is 500. Probability of transfer amount higher than $50,000 is plotted at $50,000.
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Chernoff-Hellinger Divergence of the Estimated Model. Using the posterior
mode of x, and the posterior means of θ, β, h, we calculate the implied Chernoff-
Hellinger divergence:
DL+(θ,W (Dem),W (Rep)) = 14.7760,
DL+(θ,W (Dem),W (Ind)) = 26.6116,
DL+(θ,W (Rep),W (Ind)) = 22.4425,
and thus the CH divergence is 14.7760 > 1. Therefore, the data generating process,
corresponding to our estimated parameters, satisfies the condition for exact recovery
as stated in Theorem 1.
Comparing Estimated and Self-Reported Ideologies for PCs
that Self Report Ideologies
Using the posterior mode as a point estimate of the ideology, Table 2.13 presents
the cross tabulation of all PCs according to self-reported and estimated ideology.
Overall, 90.70% of our estimates match the self reports: 94.36% for self-reported
Democratic PCs, and 89.49% for self-reported Republican PCs.
Estimated Dem Estimated Rep Estimated Ind
Self-Reported Dem 954 (94.36%) 43 (4.25%) 14 (1.38%)
Self-Reported Rep 46 (4.60%) 894 (89.49%) 59 (5.91%)
Self-Reported Ind 16 (29.09%) 14 (25.45%) 25 (45.45%)
No Reported Affiliation 748 (20.00%) 1,202 (32.13%) 1,791 (47.87%)
Table 2.13: Tabulation of Estimated vs. Self-Reported Ideology
Note: The percentages are calculated for each row.
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Re-examining the Network Statistics Using Estimated
Ideologies
In Section 2.3, we presented the network statistics based on self-reported ideologies
for those PCs that self reported their ideologies. Here we re-examine these statistics
based on estimated ideologies of all PCs. Conditional on the estimated ideologies,
the empirical distribution of transfer amount is shown in Figure 2.11, and the mean
of each distribution is shown in Table 2.14. On average, the transfer amount is the
highest for Democratic PC pairs and Republican PC pairs, and this is partially due
to the heavy tail of the within-party contributions. The transfer amount is smaller
between Democratic and Republican PCs, and smallest when it involves Independent
PCs. This is consistent with the estimates on connection probability. Independent
PCs have overall high connection probability, but the associated transfer amount is
small. Democratic and Republican PCs have relatively lower within-party connection
probability, but the associated transfer amount is larger.
Dem, Dem Rep, Rep Ind, Ind Dem, Rep Dem, Ind Rep, Ind
26,311.03 22,165.53 8,144.17 18,507.13 3,206.26 3,769.65
Table 2.14: Mean of Transfer Amount Conditional on Estimated Ideology
Next, we compare the contribution patterns of the PCs according to their self-
reported vs. estimated ideologies. For each PC i, let numDemi, numRepi, and
numIndi denote its numbers of connections with (estimated) Democratic, Republican,
and Independent PCs respectively. In Figures 2.12-2.14, we plot the distributions of
numDem (dark bar), numRep (white bar), and numInd (gray bar) for different groups
of PCs, focusing on the difference between self-reported and estimated ideologies. The
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Figure 2.11: Empirical Distribution of Transfer Amount Conditional on Estimated
Ideology
Note: Bin size is 500. Observations with transfer amount higher than $50,000 are plotted at $50,000.
left panel in Figure 2.12 presents the distributions for PCs that self reported to be
Democratic, and the right panel for PCs that did not self report but are estimated
to be Democratic PCs. Figures 2.13 and 2.14 are similar, but for Republican and
Independent PCs respectively. Qualitatively, the degree distributions have similar
patterns for self-reported and estimated PCs with the same ideology. As a robustness
check, we redo the analysis above, with each connection weighted by transfer amount.
Specifically, for each PC, we calculate its total amount of transfer to and from
(estimated) Democratic, Republican, and Independent PCs respectively, and then
plot the distributions of these numbers for different groups of PCs. The histograms
are shown in Figures 2.15, 2.16, and 2.17, respectively for Democratic, Republican
and Independent PCs. Again, the distributions are similar for self-reported and
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estimated PCs with the same ideology. These results demonstrate that PCs without
self-report, classified according to our estimation results, behave similarly to PCs with
the corresponding self reports of affiliations.
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Figure 2.12: Self-reported vs. Estimated Democratic PCs: Distributions of Number
of Connections
Note: These figures only include observations with positive number of connections. Observations
with more than 200 connections are plotted at 200.
Estimation Results: Analyzing the Posterior Distribution of
PCs’ Political Ideologies
Now we analyze the posterior distribution of political ideology. Figure 2.18 plots, for
PCs whose estimates are the same as the self reports (i.e., the reported ideology has the
highest posterior probability), the distribution of the differences between the highest
and the second highest posterior probability. These differences concentrate around 1,
meaning the posterior probabilities concentrate on the self-reported affiliation. This
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Figure 2.13: Self-reported vs. Estimated Republican PCs: Distributions of Number of
Connections
Note: These figures only include observations with positive number of connections. Observations
with more than 200 connections are plotted at 200.
confirms that we do not obtain these classifications by luck. We do a similar analysis
in Figure 2.19, for PCs whose estimates differ from the self reports, by plotting the
distributions of the differences between the highest posterior probability and the
posterior probability of the reported ideology. These distributions have larger spread,
but still a mass around 1. This indicates that these are not “near misses”: our estimate
strongly favors an ideology different from the PC’s self-reported ideology.
Diagnostics of the Discrepancy. We further investigate the reason for the dis-
crepancy between our estimates and the self reports by comparing PCs with different
estimated ideology but the same self reported affiliation.
First of all, their financial conditions are different. Table 2.15 shows that self-
reported Democratic PCs that are estimated as Republican are mostly PCs with high
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Figure 2.14: Self-reported vs. Estimated Independent PCs: Distributions of Number
of Connections
Note: These figures only include observations with positive number of connections. Observations
with more than 200 connections are plotted at 200.
budget, and self-reported Democratic PCs that are estimated as Independent are
mostly PCs with low budget. Similarly, among self-reported Republican PCs, the ones
estimated to be Democratic or Independent are mostly PCs with lower budget.
Estimated Dem Estimated Rep Estimated Ind
Self-Reported Dem 32.26 206.52 3.50
Self-Reported Rep 10.00 77.96 6.77
Self-Reported Ind 31.00 3.00 46.00
Table 2.15: Median Budget (in $1,000)
Second, their contribution patterns are different. For each PC i, we define
DemSharei as its share of connections with (estimated) Democratic PCs DemSharei =
numDemi
numDemi+numRepi+numIndi
, and similarly for RepSharei and IndSharei. In Table 2.16,
we compare the means of DemShare, RepShare, and IndShare for different groups of
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Figure 2.15: Self-reported vs. Estimated Democratic PCs: Distributions of Transfer
Amount
Note: Bin size is 25,000. Observations with more than $500,000 transfer to and from one class of
committees are plotted at $500,000.
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Figure 2.16: Self-reported vs. Estimated Republican PCs: Distributions of Transfer
Amount
Note: Bin size is 25,000. Observations with more than $500,000 transfer to and from one class of
committees are plotted at $500,000.
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Figure 2.17: Self-reported vs. Estimated Independent PCs: Distributions of Transfer
Amount
Note: Bin size is 25,000. Observations with more than $500,000 transfer to and from one class of
committees are plotted at $500,000.
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Figure 2.18: Distribution of Difference in the Posterior Probability of Ideology
Note: Horizontal axis is the difference between the highest posterior probability (i.e., the posterior
probability of the self-reported ideology) and the second highest posterior probability. Bin size is
0.025.
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Figure 2.19: Distribution of Difference in the Posterior Probability of Ideology
Note: Horizontal axis is the difference between the highest posterior probability and the posterior
probability of the self-reported ideology. Bin size is 0.025.
PCs. As a robustness check, we also calculate the shares in terms of transfer amount
and present the results in the same table. The table supports our categorization of
some PCs as Republican (Democratic) whose self-reports are Democratic (Republican)
because they have significantly higher shares of connections with the Republican
(Democratic) PCs, a pattern exhibited by all estimated Republican (Democratic) PCs.
Next, we will discuss the discrepancy in more detail case by case. The discrepancies
will fall into one of six cases, as shown in the panel label of Figure 2.20. Figure 2.20
depicts the distribution of the number of connections with PCs with different ideologies
according to our estimates.
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Number of Connection Transfer Amount
Dem Share Rep Share Ind Share Dem Share Rep Share Ind Share
Reported Dem, Estimated Rep 8.71% 19.65% 71.64% 28.36% 20.51% 51.13%
All PCs Estimated as Dem 72.58% 4.40% 23.02% 78.24% 4.15% 17.62%
Reported Rep, Estimated Dem 49.99% 13.44% 36.58% 54.56% 21.20% 24.24%
All PCs Estimated as Rep 6.69% 52.98% 40.33% 6.01% 55.77% 38.22%
Table 2.16: Mean of DemShare, RepShare, and IndShare
In the first case, some self-reported Democratic PCs are estimated to be Republican.
In the data, these PCs have a small number of connections with PCs that self reported
affiliations, most of which are Democratic. However, they are mostly connected
with PCs without self reported affiliations, most of which are Independent by our
estimates. As our estimate β suggests, Republican PCs have the highest connection
probability with Independent PCs. Therefore, although they self reported to be
Democratic and are connected with few self-reported Republican or Independent PCs,
their overall contribution patterns are close to that of the Republican PCs. In the
degree distribution presented in Figure 2.20 for this case, it can be seen that the tail
distribution is very close to that of the self-reported Republican PCs in Figure 2.13.
In the second case, some self-reported Democratic PCs are estimated as Indepen-
dent. Only one of these PCs has one connection with another Independent PC, and
the rest have no connection with Independent PCs. According to estimate β, classi-
fying them as Independent, rather than Democratic, better rationalize this pattern
because Independent-Independent connection probability is lower than Democratic-
Independent connection probability.
In the third case, some self-reported Republican PCs are estimated as Democratic.
These PCs have similar number of connections to all three classes of PCs, with slightly
more Democratic connections. Their number of connections to the Republican and
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the Independent PCs are not jointly high enough to be estimated as Republican.
In the fourth case, some self-reported Republican PCs are estimated as Independent.
These PCs have more connections with Republican than Democratic PCs, but not
large enough connections with Independent PCs to be estimated as Republican. In
other words, they do not exhibit the heavy tail on connection with Independent PCs
which is observed for other self-reported Republican PCs.
In the fifth case, some self-reported Independent PCs are estimated as Democratic.
These PCs’ numbers of connections with Democratic PCs significantly outweigh that
with the Republican and Independent PCs. There are not large enough connections
with Republican PCs to be estimated as Independent.
In the sixth case, some self-reported Independent PCs are estimated as Republican.
These PCs do not have large enough connections with Democratic PCs to be estimated
as Independent.
Discussion. Here we present and analyze the discrepancy between our estimate and
the self-report, in an attempt to better understand the implications of our model and
algorithm. We are not making a claim that these PCs strategically misreported their
party affiliations. We show that under our model, their contribution patterns to other
PCs are different from the majority of the PCs self reporting the same affiliation as
they did. Simplifications in our model are also potential reasons for the discrepancy.
For example, our model does not capture all aspects of the incentives in political
contribution between PCs. Additionally, we only study the contributions among PCs,
and do leave out other campaign activities such as collection of individual contribution
and independent expenditures. In Appendix 4.7 we list the PCs that self reported to
be Democratic (Republican), but are estimated to be Republican (Democratic).
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Figure 2.20: Distributions of Number of Connections with Different Committees
Note: Observations with more than 200 connections are plotted at 200.
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2.7 Conclusion
About two thirds of the political committees registered with the Federal Election
Commission do not self identify their party affiliations. In this paper we propose
and implement a novel Bayesian approach to infer about the ideological affiliations
of political committees based on the network of the financial contributions among
them. In Monte Carlo simulations, we demonstrate that our estimation algorithm
achieves very high accuracy in recovering their latent ideological affiliations when the
pairwise difference in ideology groups’ connection patterns satisfy a condition known
as the Chernoff-Hellinger divergence criterion. We illustrate our approach using the
campaign finance record in 2003-2004 election cycle. Using the posterior mode to
categorize the ideological affiliations of the political committees, our estimates match
the self reported ideology for 94.36% of those committees who self reported to be
Democratic and 89.49% of those committees who self reported to be Republican.
Since PCs are required to report to the FEC the financial contributions among each
other, our proposed methods to infer the ideological affiliations of political committees
via financial contributions network can be implemented readily. To the extent that the
estimated ideologies for the PCs are close to their true latent ideologies, our estimated
PC ideology can fill the missing “ideologies” problem for researchers who are interested
in studying individuals’ political contribution patterns using FEC’s “Contributions
by Individuals” data. Moreover, since our estimation methods can be implemented
using data from only one election cycle, we can estimate the ideological affiliations
of the same PCs using data from different election cycles. This would allow us to
study the possible evolutions of ideological affiliations of PCs over time. We can
also exploit the permanent presence of the national committees such as Democratic
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National Committee (DNC) and Republican National Committee (RNC) and use
their network links as a vehicle to study the possible changes of party platforms that
are not necessarily reflected in official documents. These are exciting areas for future
research.
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Chapter 3
Appendix for Chapter 1
3.1 Bargained Wage
Unemployed worker’s value function is
ρV0(a,Γ) =U(ab)
+ λ0
∫ pmax
p0(a,Γ)
[V1(a, φ0(a, x,Γ), x,Γ)− V0(a,Γ)]dF (x)
+ δπ0
∫ pmax
p0(a,Γ)
[V1(a, φ0(a, y,Γ), y,Γ)− V0(a,Γ)]dΓ0(y)
+ λ1π1
∫ pmax
p0(a,Γ)
∫ y
p0(a,Γ)
[V1(a, φ0(a, x,Γ), x,Γ)− V0(a,Γ)]dF (x)dΓ0(y)
+ λ1π1
∫ pmax
p0(a,Γ)
∫ pmax
y
[V1(a, φ0(a, y,Γ), y,Γ)− V0(a,Γ)]dF (x)dΓ0(y),
(3.1)
where state variable Γ = {Γ0,Γ1}, and p0(a,Γ) is the reservation productivity, i.e.
V0(a,Γ) = V1(a, ap0(a,Γ), p0(a,Γ),Γ). (3.2)
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Simplify the expression using the property of φ0 implied from the bargaining process,
ρV0(a,Γ) =U(ab)
+ λ0
∫ pmax
p0(a,Γ)
β[V1(a, ax, x,Γ)− V0(a,Γ)]dF (x)
+ δπ0
∫ pmax
p0(a,Γ)
β[V1(a, ay, y,Γ)− V0(a,Γ)]dΓ0(y)
+ λ1π1
∫ pmax
p0(a,Γ)
∫ y
p0(a,Γ)
β[V1(a, ax, x,Γ)− V0(a,Γ)]dF (x)dΓ0(y)
+ λ1π1
∫ pmax
p0(a,Γ)
∫ pmax
y
β[V1(a, ay, y,Γ)− V0(a,Γ)]dF (x)dΓ0(y).
(3.3)
Employed worker’s value function is
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ρV1(a, w, p,Γ)
= U(w) + δ[V0(a,Γ)− V1(a, w, p,Γ)]
+ λ1
∫ p
q(a,w,p,Γ)
[V1(a, φ1(a, x, p,Γ), p,Γ)− V1(a, w, p,Γ)]dF (x)
+ λ1
∫ pmax
p
[V1(a, φ1(a, p, x,Γ), x,Γ)− V1(a, w, p,Γ)]dF (x)
+ δπ0
∫ p
q(a,w,p,Γ)
[V1(a, φ1(a, y, p,Γ), p,Γ)− V1(a, w, p,Γ)]dΓ1(y)
+ δπ0
∫ pmax
p
[V1(a, φ1(a, p, y,Γ), y,Γ)− V1(a, w, p,Γ)]dΓ1(y)
+ λ1π1
∫ p
q(a,w,p,Γ)
∫ y
q(a,w,p,Γ)
[V1(a, φ1(a, x, p,Γ), p,Γ)− V1(a, w, p,Γ)]dF (x)dΓ1(y)
+ λ1π1
∫ p
q(a,w,p,Γ)
∫ pmax
y
[V1(a, φ1(a, y, p,Γ), p,Γ)− V1(a, w, p,Γ)]dF (x)dΓ1(y)
+ λ1π1
∫ pmax
p
∫ p
q(a,w,p,Γ)
[V1(a, φ1(a, x, p,Γ), p,Γ)− V1(a, w, p,Γ)]dF (x)dΓ1(y)
+ λ1π1
∫ pmax
p
∫ y
p
[V1(a, φ1(a, p, x,Γ), x,Γ)− V1(a, w, p,Γ)]dF (x)dΓ1(y)
+ λ1π1
∫ pmax
p
∫ pmax
y
[V1(a, φ1(a, p, y,Γ), y,Γ)− V1(a, w, p,Γ)]dF (x)dΓ1(y),
(3.4)
where q(a, w, p,Γ) is the cutoff productivity for wage raise, i.e.,
φ1(a, q(a, w, p,Γ), p,Γ) = w, (3.5)
or equivalently,
V1(a, w, p,Γ) = (1− β)V1(a, aq(a, w, p,Γ), q(a, w, p,Γ),Γ) + βV1(a, ap, p,Γ). (3.6)
Simplify the expression using the property of φ1 implied from the bargaining process,
151
ρV1(a, w, p,Γ)
= U(w) + δ[V0(a,Γ)− V1(a, w, p,Γ)]
+ λ1
∫ p
q(a,w,p,Γ)
{
[βV1(a, ap, p,Γ) + (1− β)V1(a, ax, x,Γ)]− V1(a, w, p,Γ)
}
dF (x)
+ λ1
∫ pmax
p
{
[βV1(a, ax, x,Γ) + (1− β)V1(a, ap, p,Γ)]− V1(a, w, p,Γ)
}
dF (x)
+ δπ0
∫ p
q(a,w,p,Γ)
{
[βV1(a, ap, p,Γ) + (1− β)V1(a, ay, y,Γ)]− V1(a, w, p,Γ)
}
dΓ1(y)
+ δπ0
∫ pmax
p
{
[βV1(a, ay, y,Γ) + (1− β)V1(a, ap, p,Γ)]− V1(a, w, p,Γ)
}
dΓ1(y)
+ λ1π1
∫ p
q(a,w,p,Γ)
∫ y
q(a,w,p,Γ)
{
[βV1(a, ap, p,Γ) + (1− β)V1(a, ax, x,Γ)]− V1(a, w, p,Γ)
}
dF (x)dΓ1(y)
+ λ1π1
∫ p
q(a,w,p,Γ)
∫ pmax
y
{
[βV1(a, ap, p,Γ) + (1− β)V1(a, ay, y,Γ)]− V1(a, w, p,Γ)
}
dF (x)dΓ1(y)
+ λ1π1
∫ pmax
p
∫ p
q(a,w,p,Γ)
{
[βV1(a, ap, p,Γ) + (1− β)V1(a, ax, x,Γ)]− V1(a, w, p,Γ)
}
dF (x)dΓ1(y)
+ λ1π1
∫ pmax
p
∫ y
p
{
[βV1(a, ax, x,Γ) + (1− β)V1(a, ap, p,Γ)]− V1(a, w, p,Γ)
}
dF (x)dΓ1(y)
+ λ1π1
∫ pmax
p
∫ pmax
y
{
[βV1(a, ay, y,Γ) + (1− β)V1(a, ap, p,Γ)]− V1(a, w, p,Γ)
}
dF (x)dΓ1(y).
(3.7)
First, define F̄ (·) = 1− F (·), Γ̄0(·) = Γ0(pmax)− Γ0(·), Γ̄1(·) = Γ1(pmax)− Γ1(·).
Simplify (3.7) by integrating by part, using property (3.6) and collecting terms of
V1(a, w, p,Γ),
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(ρ+ δ)V1(a, w, p,Γ) =U(w) + δV0(a,Γ)
+ λ1(1− β)
∫ p
q(a,w,p,Γ)
F̄ (x)
dV1(a, ax, x,Γ)
dx
dx
+ λ1β
∫ pmax
p
F̄ (x)
dV1(a, ax, x,Γ)
dx
dx
+ δπ0(1− β)
∫ p
q(a,w,p,Γ)
Γ̄1(y)
dV1(a, ay, y,Γ)
dy
dy
+ δπ0β
∫ pmax
p
Γ̄1(y)
dV1(a, ay, y,Γ)
dy
dy
+ λ1π1(1− β)
∫ p
q(a,w,p,Γ)
∫ y
q(a,w,p,Γ)
F̄ (x)
dV1(a, ax, x,Γ)
dx
dxdΓ1(y)
+ λ1π1(1− β)
∫ pmax
p
∫ p
q(a,w,p,Γ)
F̄ (x)
dV1(a, ax, x,Γ)
dx
dxdΓ1(y)
+ λ1π1β
∫ pmax
p
∫ y
p
F̄ (x)
dV1(a, ax, x,Γ)
dx
dxdΓ1(y).
(3.8)
For the special case where w = ap, q(a, ap, p,Γ) = p, and (3.8) becomes
(ρ+ δ)V1(a, ap, p,Γ) =U(ap) + δV0(a,Γ)
+ λ1β
∫ pmax
p
F̄ (x)
dV1(a, ax, x,Γ)
dx
dx
+ δπ0β
∫ pmax
p
Γ̄1(y)
dV1(a, ay, y,Γ)
dy
dy
+ λ1π1β
∫ pmax
p
∫ y
p
F̄ (x)
dV1(a, ax, x,Γ)
dx
dxdΓ1(y).
(3.9)
Differentiate (3.9) with respect to p,
dV1(a, ap, p,Γ)
dp
=
aU ′(ap)
ρ+ δ + λ1βF̄ (p) + [λ1π1βF̄ (p) + δπ0β]Γ̄1(p)
. (3.10)
To solve for bargained wage, note that φ1(a, pL, pH ,Γ) is equal to φ∗1 that solves
V1(a, φ
∗
1, p
H ,Γ) = βV1(a, ap
H , pH ,Γ) + (1− β)V1(a, apL, pL,Γ). (3.11)
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Plug in expressions (3.8) and (3.9) and use the property that q(a, φ∗1, pH ,Γ) = pL,
U(φ1(a, p
L, pH ,Γ)) =βU(apH) + (1− β)U(apL)
− δπ0(1− β)2
∫ pH
pL
Γ̄1(y)
dV1(a, ay, y,Γ)
dy
dy
− λ1(1− β)2
{∫ pH
pL
F̄ (x)
dV1(a, ax, x,Γ)
dx
dx
+ π1
∫ pmax
pH
∫ pH
pL
F̄ (x)
dV1(a, ax, x,Γ)
dx
dxdΓ1(y)
+ π1
∫ pH
pL
∫ y
pL
F̄ (x)
dV1(a, ax, x,Γ)
dx
dxdΓ1(y)
}
,
(3.12)
where dV1(a,ax,x,Γ)
dx
is given in (3.10).
Simplify (3.3) by integrating by part,
ρV0(a,Γ) =U(ab)
+ λ0β
∫ pmax
p0(a,Γ)
F̄ (x)
dV1(a, ax, x,Γ)
dx
dx+ δπ0β
∫ pmax
p0(a,Γ)
Γ̄0(y)
dV1(a, ay, y,Γ)
dy
dy
+ λ1π1β
∫ pmax
p0(a,Γ)
∫ y
p0(a,Γ)
F̄ (x)
dV1(a, ax, x,Γ)
dx
dxdΓ0(y).
(3.13)
To solve for unemployed worker’s reservation productivity, note that p0(a,Γ) is
equal to p∗0 that solves
V1(a, ap
∗
0, p
∗
0,Γ) = V0(a,Γ). (3.14)
Plugging in expressions (3.13) and (3.9) gives an implicit function for p0(a,Γ)
U(ap0(a,Γ)) =U(ab) + β(λ0 − λ1)
∫ pmax
p0(a,Γ)
F̄ (x)
dV1(a, ax, x,Γ)
dx
dx
+ δπ0β
∫ pmax
p0(a,Γ)
(Γ̄0(y)− Γ̄1(y))
dV1(a, ay, y,Γ)
dy
dy
+ λ1π1β
∫ pmax
p0(a,Γ)
(Γ̄0(x)− Γ̄1(x))F̄ (x)
dV1(a, ay, y,Γ)
dx
dx,
(3.15)
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where dV1(a,ax,x,Γ)
dx
is given in (3.10).
By the definition of p0(a,Γ),
φ0(a, p,Γ) = φ1(a, p0(a,Γ), p,Γ). (3.16)
In summary, the bargained wage is characterized by (3.10), (3.12), (3.15), and
(3.16).
For CRRA utility with α 6= 1, (3.12) simplifies to
lnφ1(a, p
L, pH ,Γ) = ln a+
1
1− α
ln
{
β(PH)1−α + (1− β)(PL)1−α
− (1− α)δπ0(1− β)2
∫ pH
pL
Γ̄1(y)y
−α
ρ+ δ + λ1βF̄ (y) + [λ1π1βF̄ (y) + δπ0β]Γ̄1(y)
dy
− (1− α)λ1(1− β)2
[ ∫ pH
pL
F̄ (x)x−α
ρ+ δ + λ1βF̄ (x) + [λ1π1βF̄ (x) + δπ0β]Γ̄1(x)
dx
+ π1
∫ pmax
pH
∫ pH
pL
F̄ (x)x−α
ρ+ δ + λ1βF̄ (x) + [λ1π1βF̄ (x) + δπ0β]Γ̄1(x)
dxdΓ1(y)
+ π1
∫ pH
pL
∫ y
pL
F̄ (x)x−α
ρ+ δ + λ1βF̄ (x) + [λ1π1βF̄ (x) + δπ0β]Γ̄1(x)
dxdΓ1(y)
]}
,
(3.17)
and (3.15) simplifies to
ln p0(a,Γ) =
1
1− α
ln
{
b1−α + (1− α)β(λ0 − λ1)
∫ pmax
p0(a,Γ)
F̄ (x)x−α
ρ+ δ + λ1βF̄ (x) + [λ1π1βF̄ (x) + δπ0β]Γ̄1(x)
dx
+ (1− α)δπ0β
∫ pmax
p0(a,Γ)
(Γ̄0(y)− Γ̄1(y))y−α
ρ+ δ + λ1βF̄ (y) + [λ1π1βF̄ (y) + δπ0β]Γ̄1(y)
dy
+ (1− α)λ1π1β
∫ pmax
p0(a,Γ)
(Γ̄0(x)− Γ̄1(x))F̄ (x)x−α
ρ+ δ + λ1βF̄ (x) + [λ1π1βF̄ (x) + δπ0β]Γ̄1(x)
dx
}
;
(3.18)
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for CRRA utility with α = 1, (3.12) simplifies to
lnφ1(a, p
L, pH ,Γ) = ln a+ β ln pH + (1− β) ln pL
− δπ0(1− β)2
∫ pH
pL
Γ̄1(y)y
−1
ρ+ δ + λ1βF̄ (y) + [λ1π1βF̄ (y) + δπ0β]Γ̄1(y)
dy
− λ1(1− β)2
[ ∫ pH
pL
F̄ (x)x−1
ρ+ δ + λ1βF̄ (x) + [λ1π1βF̄ (x) + δπ0β]Γ̄1(x)
dx
+ π1
∫ pmax
pH
∫ pH
pL
F̄ (x)x−1
ρ+ δ + λ1βF̄ (x) + [λ1π1βF̄ (x) + δπ0β]Γ̄1(x)
dxdΓ1(y)
+ π1
∫ pH
pL
∫ y
pL
F̄ (x)x−1
ρ+ δ + λ1βF̄ (x) + [λ1π1βF̄ (x) + δπ0β]Γ̄1(x)
dxdΓ1(y)
]
,
(3.19)
and (3.15) simplifies to
ln p0(a,Γ) = ln b+ β(λ0 − λ1)
∫ pmax
p0(a,Γ)
F̄ (x)x−1
ρ+ δ + λ1βF̄ (x) + [λ1π1βF̄ (x) + δπ0β]Γ̄1(x)
dx
+ δπ0β
∫ pmax
p0(a,Γ)
(Γ̄0(y)− Γ̄1(y))y−1
ρ+ δ + λ1βF̄ (y) + [λ1π1βF̄ (y) + δπ0β]Γ̄1(y)
dy
+ λ1π1β
∫ pmax
p0(a,Γ)
(Γ̄0(x)− Γ̄1(x))F̄ (x)x−1
ρ+ δ + λ1βF̄ (x) + [λ1π1βF̄ (x) + δπ0β]Γ̄1(x)
dx.
(3.20)
156
3.2 Additional Table for Data Description
Career Advancement UE Transition EE Transition EU Transition
#(Transition) #(Individual) % #(Individual) % #(Individual) % #(Individual) %
0 1,772 42.27 1,836 43.80 4,066 96.99 1,941 46.30
1 2,178 51.96 2171 51.79 125 2.98 2,085 49.73
2 231 5.51 179 4.27 1 0.02 161 3.84
3 10 0.24 6 0.14 0 0 5 0.12
4 1 0.02 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 4,192 100.00 4,192 100.00 4,192 100.00 4,192 100.00
Table 3.1: Tabulation of Individuals’ Numbers of Transitions
Notes: (1). A UE transition is defined as the transition from non-executive to executive. (2). An EE
transition is defined as the transition from one executive job to another. (3). An EU transition is
defined as the transition from executive to non-executive. (4). A career advancement is defined as
either a UE or EE transition.
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Dependent variable: 1(Career Advancement)∈ {0, 1}
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1 (Job Transition
Among Executive Friends) 0.0470∗∗∗
(0.0055)
. . . from School 0.0166∗∗∗
(0.0049)
. . . from Work 0.0532∗∗∗
(0.0050)
. . . from Social Activity 0.0174∗∗
(0.0059)
Observations 33,536 33,536 33,536 33,536
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 3.2: Co-movement in Socially Connected Executives’ Job Transitions
Notes: (1). This table summarizes the results of an OLS regression with year and individual fixed
effects, where the dependent variable is whether an individual experiences a career advancement.
(2). A career advancement is defined as either a transition from non-executive job to executive job
(UE) or a transition between executive jobs with productivity increase (EE). (3). Variable 1 (Job
Transition Among Executive Friends) is a dummy variable that equals one if any friend experiences a
transition between executive jobs with productivity increase (EE) or a transition from executive job
to non-executive job (EU) in the same year or the previous year. (4). The scope of friends varies for
different network specifications. Column (1) uses the simplified network, which does not distinguish
between types of social connections; column (2) uses the school network; column (3) uses the work
network; and column (4) uses the social-activity network. (5). Other covariates include age2, age3,
whether an individual was an executive in the previous year, and the productivity of the job in the
previous year if the individual was an executive. (6). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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3.3 Estimation Strategy
Likelihood L1
The likelihood contribution of a worker i with m career advancements at time
t1, t2, ...tm is
fi(wi;θ) =
exp
(
− 1
2
(lnwi − lnφi − µa)TΣ−1i (lnwi − lnφi − µa)
)
√
(2π)m|Σi|
, (3.21)
where
lnwi =

lnwit1
...
lnwitm

m×1
, lnφi =

φ1(1, p
L
it1
, pHit1 ,Γit1)
...
φ1(1, p
L
itm , p
H
itm ,Γitm)

m×1
, µa =

µa
...
µa

m×1
,
(3.22)
and
Σi =

σ2a + σ
2
ε ... σ
2
a
... ... ...
σ2a ... σ
2
a + σ
2
ε

m×m
. (3.23)
For all the UE transitions, the model implies an additional constraint on the
parameter space: pHit ≥ p0,it(θ), the observed productivity of the accepted job is no
less than the calculated reservation productivity. I incorporate this constraint as a
penalty term in the objective function. Instead of directly solving the constrained
optimization problem
max
∑
i
ln fi(wi;θ)
s.t. pHit ≥ p0,it(θ) for UE transition,
(3.24)
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set the following objective function to solve an unconstrained optimization problem
max
∑
i
ln fi(wi;θ)− κ
∑
i
gi(θ), (3.25)
where κ is a small positive number, and gi(θ) =
∑
t∈{t1,...,tm} git(θ) is a penalty function
defined as
git(θ) =

0 for EE transition,
− ln(pHit − p0,it(θ)) for UE transition where pHit > p0,it(θ),
+∞ for UE transition where pHit ≤ p0,it(θ).
(3.26)
Function g is an interior penalty function, which guarantees that the solution to (3.25)
satisfies the constraint. When κ is small enough, the solution to (3.25) will be close
to the solution to original constrained problem (3.24).70
Likelihood L2
The likelihood contribution of the productivity of a socially isolated worker i’s
first job pi is
fi(pi;θ) =
φ( ln pi−µp
σp
)
σp(Φ(
ln pmax−µp
σp
)− Φ( ln p̃−µp
σp
))
· 1
pi
, (3.27)
where φ and Φ are the pdf and cdf of the standard normal distribution, p̃ =
max{pmin, p0}, and p0 is the reservation productivity for an isolated worker satis-
70I use κ = 10−6 in the estimation.
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fying
ln p0 =

ln b+ exp(β0)
1+exp(β0)
(λ0 − λ1)
∫ pmax
p0
x−1 ·
Φ(
ln pmax−µp
σp
)−Φ(x−µp
σp
)
Φ(
ln pmax−µp
σp
)−Φ( ln p
min−µp
σp
)
ρ+ δ + λ1
exp(β0)
1+exp(β0)
·
Φ(
ln pmax−µp
σp
)−Φ(x−µp
σp
)
Φ(
ln pmax−µp
σp
)−Φ( ln p
min−µp
σp
)
dx if α = 1,
1
1−α ln
{
b1−α + (1− α) exp(β0)
1+exp(β0)
(λ0 − λ1)
∫ pmax
p0
x−α ·
Φ(
ln pmax−µp
σp
)−Φ(x−µp
σp
)
Φ(
ln pmax−µp
σp
)−Φ( ln p
min−µp
σp
)
ρ+ δ + λ1
exp(β0)
1+exp(β0)
·
Φ(
ln pmax−µp
σp
)−Φ(x−µp
σp
)
Φ(
ln pmax−µp
σp
)−Φ( ln p
min−µp
σp
)
dx
}
if α 6= 1.
(3.28)
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3.4 Additional Table for Model Fit
Moments Data Model
Co-movement in School Network
Fraction of unemployed individuals experiencing UE transition
. . . . . . if there is no school friend experiencing EU transition 0.1601 0.1612
. . . . . . if there are school friends experiencing EU transition 0.1631 0.1767
. . . . . . if there is no school friend experiencing EE transition 0.1603 0.1636
. . . . . . if there are school friends experiencing EE transition 0.1784 0.1922
Fraction of employed individuals experiencing EE transition
. . . . . . if there is no school friend experiencing EU transition 0.0065 0.0063
. . . . . . if there are school friends experiencing EU transition 0.0086 0.0091
. . . . . . if there is no school friend experiencing EE transition 0.0071 0.0068
. . . . . . if there are school friends experiencing EE transition 0.0079 0.0128
Co-movement in Work Network
Fraction of unemployed individuals experiencing UE transition
. . . . . . if there is no work friend experiencing EU transition 0.0805 0.1381
. . . . . . if there are work friends experiencing EU transition 0.1766 0.1784
. . . . . . if there is no work friend experiencing EE transition 0.1547 0.1615
. . . . . . if there are work friends experiencing EE transition 0.1934 0.1920
Fraction of employed individuals experiencing EE transition
. . . . . . if there is no work friend experiencing EU transition 0.0026 0.0041
. . . . . . if there are work friends experiencing EU transition 0.0080 0.0079
. . . . . . if there is no work friend experiencing EE transition 0.0055 0.0056
. . . . . . if there are work friends experiencing EE transition 0.0156 0.0175
Co-movement in Social-Activity Network
Fraction of unemployed individuals experiencing UE transition
. . . . . . if there is no social-activity friend experiencing EU transition 0.1624 0.1600
. . . . . . if there are social-activity friends experiencing EU transition 0.1547 0.1871
. . . . . . if there is no social-activity friend experiencing EE transition 0.1607 0.1629
. . . . . . if there are social-activity friends experiencing EE transition 0.1667 0.2051
Fraction of employed individuals experiencing EE transition
. . . . . . if there is no social-activity friend experiencing EU transition 0.0072 0.0062
. . . . . . if there are social-activity friends experiencing EU transition 0.0071 0.0096
. . . . . . if there is no social-activity friend experiencing EE transition 0.0071 0.0067
. . . . . . if there are social-activity friends experiencing EE transition 0.0076 0.0100
Table 3.3: Model Fit: Moments in Job Transitions
Notes: A UE transition is defined as the transition from non-executive to executive. An EE transition
is defined as the transition from one executive job to another with a productivity increase. An EU
transition is defined as the transition from executive to non-executive.
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3.5 Simulating Random Network with A Given
Degree Sequence
To simulate a random network with a given degree sequence, I follow the Steger
and Wormald (1999) algorithm.71 The algorithm starts with an empty graph and
adds edges sequentially. Each time, generate a potential edge by sampling uniformly
a pair of nodes that have not yet received their full allotment of edges. Add this edge
if it does not induce a loop or multiple edges. Continue this process until no more
permissible pairs can be found. If the algorithm gets stuck in the sense that there are
unmatched nodes left over that are not allowed to be paired with each other, start
over and try again.
To simulate a series of monotonically growing (over time) networks, first generate
the initial network exactly as described above. For the subsequent networks, to
simulate Y t, start the algorithm with Y t−1 instead of an empty graph and add edges
as described above.
71It is a variant of the pairing model (also known as the configuration model or stubs model). See
Blitzstein and Diaconis (2011) for a survey of other algorithms.
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Chapter 4
Appendix for Chapter 2
4.1 Construction of Variable industry∗
We construct PCs’ characteristic “industry∗” using the industrial breakdown
information from OpenSecrets.org. Their breakdown has three nested levels - from
coarse to fine - “sector”, “industry”, and “category”. 72 We define variable industry∗ to
be the sector for PCs in sectors that are relatively homogeneous such as agricultural
business. We define industry∗ to be a finer level, industry or category, for PCs
in sectors that are relatively heterogeneous such as miscellaneous business. The
reason is that we use interaction term “same industry∗” in our analysis; and we want,
within each industry∗, similar level of heterogeneity. A detailed description of the
construction of the variable industry∗ is given below, and the corresponding codebook
is given in Table 4.1.
1. industry∗=sector if:
A PC belongs to one of the following sectors: Agribusiness, Communica-
tions/Electronics, Construction, Defense, Energy & Natural Resources, Finance,
Insurance & Real Estate, Health, Labor, Lawyers & Lobbyists, Transportation.
72The codebook is available at https://www.opensecrets.org/downloads/crp/CRP_
Categories.txt.
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2. industry∗=industry if:
a) A PC belongs to the Miscellaneous Business sector.
b) A PC belongs to the Other sector, but not in the Other industry.
c) A PC belongs to the Ideological/Single-Issue sector, but not in one of
the following industries: Misc Issues, Republican/Conservative, Demo-
cratic/Liberal, Leadership PACs, Candidate Committee.
3. industry∗=category if:
a) A PC belongs to the Other industry in the Other sector, but not in the
Other category.
b) A PC belongs to the Misc Issues industry in the Ideological/Single-Issue
sector.
4. industry∗=NA if:73
a) A PC belongs to one of the following sectors: Unknown, Joint Candidate
Committee, Party Committee, Candidate, Non-contribution.
b) A PC belongs to one of the following industries in the Ideological/Single-
Issue sector: Republican/Conservative, Democratic/Liberal, Leadership
PACs, Candidate Committee.
c) A PC’s sector, industry and category are all Other.
73We define the interaction term “same industry∗” to be 0 if one or both PCs’ industry∗s are
NAs.
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Code Description
A Agribusiness
B Communic/Electronics
C Construction
D Defense
E Energy/Nat Resource
F Finance/Insur/RealEst
H Health
H6000 Welfare & Social Work
J1300 Third-party committees
J3000 Consumer groups
J4000 Fiscal & tax policy
J7200 Elderly issues/Social Security
J7600 Animal Rights
J8000 Labor, anti-union
J9000 Other single-issue or ideological groups
K Lawyers & Lobbyists
M Transportation
N00 Business Associations
N01 Food & Beverage
N02 Beer, Wine & Liquor
N03 Retail Sales
N04 Misc Services
N05 Business Services
N06 Recreation/Live Entertainment
N07 Casinos/Gambling
N08 Lodging/Tourism
N12 Misc Business
N13 Chemical & Related Manufacturing
N14 Steel Production
N15 Misc Manufacturing & Distributing
N16 Textiles
NA Not Available
P Labor
Q04 Foreign & Defense Policy
Q05 Pro-Israel
Q08 Women’s Issues
Q09 Human Rights
Q11 Environment
Q12 Gun Control
Q13 Gun Rights
Q14 Abortion Policy/Anti-Abortion
Q15 Abortion Policy/Pro-Abortion Rights
W02 Non-Profit Institutions
W03 Civil Servants/Public Officials
W04 Education
X5000 Military
Table 4.1: Codebook for Variable industry∗
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4.2 Contribution Limit
Contribution limits for the 2003-2004 Election Cycle are given in Table 4.2.74 They
differ by the identity of the contributor and that of the recipient. As a contributor,
individual, national party committee, non-national party committee, multicandidate
PAC, and non-multicandidate PAC have different contribution limits. As a recipient,
candidate or candidate committee, national party committee, non-national party
committee, and other PC have different contribution limits. As shown in the table,
there is no limit for contribution between party committees, national or local. For the
rest of the contributions between PCs, the limits range from $2,000 to $25,000, most
of which are set at $5,000.
74Source: http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/ContributionLimits2003-2004.htm.
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4.3 Figures and Tables: Monte Carlo I
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Figure 4.1: Histogram of Number of Iterations
Note: Bin size is 1000.
Average Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
0.011020 0.011637 0.000000 0.080000
Table 4.3: Summary Statistics on Misclassification Rates
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Figure 4.2: Histogram of Misclassification Rate
Note: Bin size is 0.01.
Estimated Dem Estimated Rep Estimated Ind
True Dem 32.7520% 0.1820% 0.1540%
True Rep 0.1700% 32.7440% 0.2000%
True Ind 0.1840% 0.2120% 33.4020%
Table 4.4: Tabulation of Estimated vs. True Ideology
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β Bias Standard Deviation
constant -0.020032 0.306216
1xi=xj=Dem 0.014907 0.075353
1xi=xj=Rep 0.008465 0.075682
1xi=xj=Ind 0.017410 0.078703
1(xi=Dem,xj=Ind)∨(xi=Ind,xj=Dem) 0.001838 0.064869
1(xi=Rep,xj=Ind)∨(xi=Ind,xj=Rep) -0.001370 0.064845
Same state 0.001803 0.043134
Same industry 0.002705 0.044662
One of them is a House campaign -0.001016 0.046084
One of them is a Senate campaign -0.004365 0.046909
One of them is a Presidential campaign -0.001202 0.046442
One of them is a qualified PAC 0.000268 0.044655
One of them is a qualified Party 0.001389 0.042022
One of them is a national committee 0.001199 0.050153
One of them is authorized by a candidate 0.001038 0.046411
One of them is a joint fundraiser -0.001212 0.051018
(ln bi + ln bj) 0.004666 0.103812
((ln bi)
2 + (ln bj)
2) -0.000569 0.013868
ln bi ln bj -0.000553 0.025041
Table 4.5: Parameters Governing Edge Formation Probabilities β
Note: Bias is defined as the difference between the average of posterior means across simulations
and the true parameter value. Standard Deviation is defined as the standard deviation of posterior
means across simulations.
θ Bias Standard Deviation
P(Dem) -0.000223 0.004705
P(Rep) -0.000224 0.004567
P(Ind) 0.000447 0.004620
Table 4.6: Parameters Governing the Fraction of Ideologies θ
Notes: Bias is defined as the difference between the average of posterior means across simulations
and the true parameter value. Standard Deviation is defined as the standard deviation of posterior
means across simulations.
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hDem,Dem Bias Standard Deviation
0.136574 0.014174
0.101386 0.011487
-0.102415 0.014947
-0.135545 0.017527
hRep,Rep Bias Standard Deviation
0.136643 0.014089
0.102114 0.012182
-0.102477 0.014942
-0.136280 0.017799
hInd,Ind Bias Standard Deviation
0.134438 0.014390
0.100568 0.011735
-0.101278 0.014835
-0.133727 0.017879
hDem,Rep Bias Standard Deviation
-0.097963 0.013732
-0.033662 0.011047
0.032859 0.009625
0.098766 0.010588
hDem, Ind Bias Standard Deviation
-0.096669 0.013237
-0.032747 0.011223
0.032331 0.009789
0.097085 0.009931
hRep, Ind Bias Standard Deviation
-0.097534 0.013724
-0.032846 0.011521
0.032789 0.009901
0.097592 0.010524
Table 4.7: Parameters Governing the Weight Distribution h
Notes: Bias is defined as the difference between the average of posterior means across simulations
and the true parameter value. Standard Deviation is defined as the standard deviation of posterior
means across simulations.
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Figure 4.3: Histogram of Difference in Posterior Probability for Correctly Classified
Vertices
Note: Each observation is a vertex. Horizontal axis is the difference between the highest posterior
probability(i.e., the posterior probability of the true ideology) and the second highest posterior
probability. Bin size is 0.025.
ε Bias Standard Deviation
-0.002427 0.000660
Table 4.8: Parameter Governing Measurement Error ε
Notes: Bias is defined as the difference between the average of posterior means across simulations
and the true parameter value. Standard Deviation is defined as the standard deviation of posterior
means across simulations.
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Figure 4.4: Histogram of Difference in Posterior Probability for Misclassified Vertices
Note: Each observation is a vertex. Horizontal axis is the difference between the highest posterior
probability and the posterior probability of the true ideology. Bin size is 0.025.
4.4 Figures and Tables: Monte Carlo II
Average Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
0.056800 0.033604 0.000000 0.240000
Table 4.9: Summary Statistics on Misclassification Rates
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Figure 4.5: Histogram of Number of Iterations
Note: Bin size is 1000.
Estimated Dem Estimated Rep Estimated Ind
True Dem 31.5080% 0.9440% 0.8760%
True Rep 1.0740% 31.3140% 0.8820%
True Ind 0.8940% 1.0100% 31.4980%
Table 4.10: Tabulation of Estimated vs. True Ideology
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β Bias Standard Deviation
constant -0.053234 0.278777
1xi=xj=Dem 0.004676 0.088396
1xi=xj=Rep 0.005889 0.085760
1xi=xj=Ind 0.008628 0.090062
1(xi=Dem,xj=Ind)∨(xi=Ind,xj=Dem) -0.005467 0.069264
1(xi=Rep,xj=Ind)∨(xi=Ind,xj=Rep) 0.000659 0.071066
Same state 0.004227 0.043947
Same industry 0.002177 0.043028
One of them is a House campaign 0.001558 0.046981
One of them is a Senate campaign 0.000138 0.051027
One of them is a Presidential campaign 0.001651 0.046874
One of them is a qualified PAC 0.002929 0.048328
One of them is a qualified Party 0.002520 0.043062
One of them is a national committee 0.001504 0.048683
One of them is authorized by a candidate 0.005082 0.047008
One of them is a joint fundraiser 0.007028 0.049847
(ln bi + ln bj) 0.013339 0.095571
((ln bi)
2 + (ln bj)
2) -0.001264 0.013323
ln bi ln bj -0.002407 0.023131
Table 4.11: Parameters Governing Edge Formation Probabilities β
Note: Bias is defined as the difference between the average of posterior means across simulations
and the true parameter value. Standard Deviation is defined as the standard deviation of posterior
means across simulations.
θ Bias Standard Deviation
P(Dem) 0.000043 0.004747
P(Rep) -0.000114 0.004533
P(Ind) 0.000071 0.004761
Table 4.12: Parameters Governing the Fraction of Ideologies θ
Note: Bias is defined as the difference between the average of posterior means across simulations
and the true parameter value. Standard Deviation is defined as the standard deviation of posterior
means across simulations.
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hDem,Dem Bias Standard Deviation
0.039407 0.010862
0.070890 0.011031
-0.070779 0.012694
-0.039519 0.011386
hRep,Rep Bias Standard Deviation
0.038909 0.010678
0.072241 0.011493
-0.071994 0.012912
-0.039157 0.012040
hInd,Ind Bias Standard Deviation
0.039131 0.011047
0.071208 0.011610
-0.070468 0.013130
-0.039871 0.012104
hDem,Rep Bias Standard Deviation
-0.100952 0.014387
-0.036391 0.011860
0.036400 0.011109
0.100943 0.010614
hDem,Ind Bias Standard Deviation
-0.100720 0.013911
-0.035439 0.011370
0.035755 0.009990
0.100404 0.010030
hRep,Ind Bias Standard Deviation
-0.101129 0.014001
-0.036941 0.011595
0.036431 0.010460
0.101638 0.010507
Table 4.13: Parameters Governing the Weight Distribution h
Note: Bias is defined as the difference between the average of posterior means across simulations
and the true parameter value. Standard Deviation is defined as the standard deviation of posterior
means across simulations.
ε Bias Standard Deviation
-0.002484 0.000581
Table 4.14: Parameter Governing Measurement Error ε
Note: Bias is defined as the difference between the average of posterior means across simulations
and the true parameter value. Standard Deviation is defined as the standard deviation of posterior
means across simulations.
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Figure 4.6: Histogram of Misclassification Rate
Note: Bin size is 0.01.
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Figure 4.7: Histogram of Difference in Posterior Probability for Correctly Classified
Vertices
Note: Each observation is a vertex. Horizontal axis is the difference between the highest posterior
probability(i.e., the posterior probability of the true ideology) and the second highest posterior
probability. Bin size is 0.025.
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Figure 4.8: Histogram of Difference in Posterior Probability for Misclassified Vertices
Note: Each observation is a vertex. Horizontal axis is the difference between the highest posterior
probability and the posterior probability of the true ideology. Bin size is 0.025.
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4.5 Figures and Tables: Monte Carlo III
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Figure 4.9: Histogram of Number of Iterations
Note: Bin size is 1000.
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β Bias Standard Deviation
constant -0.000600 0.045500
1xi=xj=Dem 0.000375 0.013841
1xi=xj=Rep 0.001279 0.014102
1xi=xj=Ind 0.000725 0.014023
1(xi=Dem,xj=Ind)∨(xi=Ind,xj=Dem) 0.001145 0.012192
1(xi=Rep,xj=Ind)∨(xi=Ind,xj=Rep) 0.000070 0.011883
Same state -0.000222 0.008429
Same industry -0.000045 0.008724
One of them is a House campaign -0.000023 0.009036
One of them is a Senate campaign -0.000173 0.009085
One of them is a Presidential campaign -0.000214 0.009082
One of them is a qualified PAC -0.000737 0.008557
One of them is a qualified Party -0.000620 0.008545
One of them is a national committee 0.000057 0.009115
One of them is authorized by a candidate -0.000122 0.009020
One of them is a joint fundraiser 0.000534 0.009923
(ln bi + ln bj) 0.000375 0.015589
((ln bi)
2 + (ln bj)
2) -0.000113 0.002002
ln bi ln bj 0.000054 0.004421
Table 4.15: Parameters Governing Edge Formation Probabilities β
Note: Bias is defined as the difference between the average of posterior means across simulations
and the true parameter value. Standard Deviation is defined as the standard deviation of posterior
means across simulations.
θ Bias Standard Deviation
P(Dem) 0.000469 0.007948
P(Rep) -0.000514 0.007469
P(Ind) 0.000046 0.007534
Table 4.16: Parameters Governing the Fraction of Ideologies θ
Note: Bias is defined as the difference between the average of posterior means across simulations
and the true parameter value. Standard Deviation is defined as the standard deviation of posterior
means across simulations.
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hDem,Dem Bias Standard Deviation
0.003591 0.005047
0.007005 0.004737
-0.006713 0.006200
-0.003883 0.006027
hRep,Rep Bias Standard Deviation
0.003633 0.005297
0.007228 0.004696
-0.007282 0.006413
-0.003580 0.005937
hInd,Ind Bias Standard Deviation
0.003769 0.005023
0.007100 0.004713
-0.007326 0.005899
-0.003543 0.005966
hDem, Rep Bias Standard Deviation
-0.009173 0.006111
-0.003547 0.005576
0.002779 0.004879
0.009941 0.003743
hDem,Ind Bias Standard Deviation
-0.009563 0.005808
-0.003075 0.005394
0.003214 0.004920
0.009424 0.003579
hRep, Ind Bias Standard Deviation
-0.009567 0.005856
-0.003141 0.005524
0.003000 0.004760
0.009708 0.003814
Table 4.17: Parameters Governing the Weight Distribution h
Note: Bias is defined as the difference between the average of posterior means across simulations
and the true parameter value. Standard Deviation is defined as the standard deviation of posterior
means across simulations.
ε Bias Standard Deviation
-0.002183 0.001299
Table 4.18: Parameter Governing Measurement Error ε
Note: Bias is defined as the difference between the average of posterior means across simulations
and the true parameter value. Standard Deviation is defined as the standard deviation of posterior
means across simulations.
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Figure 4.10: Histogram of Difference in Posterior Probability for Correctly Classified
Vertices
Note: Each observation is a vertex. Horizontal axis is the difference between the highest posterior
probability(i.e., the posterior probability of the true ideology) and the second highest posterior
probability. Bin size is 0.025.
4.6 Figures and Tables: Monte Carlo IV
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β Bias Standard Deviation
constant -0.000099 0.003286
1xi=xj=Dem 0.000333 0.002225
1xi=xj=Rep 0.000288 0.002065
1xi=xj=Ind 0.000045 0.002128
1(xi=Dem,xj=Ind)∨(xi=Ind,xj=Dem) 0.000012 0.002087
1(xi=Rep,xj=Ind)∨(xi=Ind,xj=Rep) 0.000441 0.002084
Same state 0.000135 0.001168
Same industry -0.000033 0.001090
One of them is a House campaign -0.000167 0.001289
One of them is a Senate campaign -0.000063 0.001331
One of them is a Presidential campaign -0.000026 0.001187
One of them is a qualified PAC 0.000091 0.001104
One of them is a qualified Party 0.000060 0.001147
One of them is a national committee 0.000015 0.001267
One of them is authorized by a candidate -0.000166 0.001376
One of them is a joint fundraiser 0.000039 0.001281
(ln bi + ln bj) -0.000084 0.000527
((ln bi)
2 + (ln bj)
2) 0.000005 0.000216
ln bi ln bj 0.000030 0.000583
Table 4.19: Parameters Governing Edge Formation Probabilities β
Note: Bias is defined as the difference between the average of posterior means across simulations
and the true parameter value. Standard Deviation is defined as the standard deviation of posterior
means across simulations.
θ Bias Standard Deviation
P(Dem) -0.000759 0.006007
P(Rep) 0.000469 0.004874
P(Ind) 0.000289 0.005318
Table 4.20: Parameters Governing the Fraction of Ideologies θ
Note: Bias is defined as the difference between the average of posterior means across simulations
and the true parameter value. Standard Deviation is defined as the standard deviation of posterior
means across simulations.
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hDem,Dem Bias Standard Deviation
0.000352 0.000592
0.000110 0.000951
0.000025 0.000896
-0.000488 0.001082
hRep,Rep Bias Standard Deviation
0.000309 0.000557
-0.000051 0.000850
0.000283 0.000831
-0.000542 0.001025
hInd,Ind Bias Standard Deviation
-0.000002 0.001127
0.000030 0.001127
0.000158 0.001154
-0.000186 0.001181
hDem,Rep Bias Standard Deviation
-0.001770 0.001944
0.000260 0.001699
0.000455 0.001516
0.001056 0.001108
hDem,Ind Bias Standard Deviation
-0.000148 0.001221
-0.000079 0.001344
-0.000163 0.001343
0.000389 0.000966
hRep,Ind Bias Standard Deviation
-0.000176 0.001315
-0.000162 0.001176
-0.000244 0.001361
0.000581 0.000852
Table 4.21: Parameters Governing the Weight Distribution h
Note: Bias is defined as the difference between the average of posterior means across simulations
and the true parameter value. Standard Deviation is defined as the standard deviation of posterior
means across simulations.
ε Bias Standard Deviation
-0.001132 0.002546
Table 4.22: Parameter Governing Measurement Error ε
Note: Bias is defined as the difference between the average of posterior means across simulations
and the true parameter value. Standard Deviation is defined as the standard deviation of posterior
means across simulations.
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Figure 4.11: Histogram of Number of Iterations
Note: Bin size is 1000.
4.7 List of PCs with Estimated Ideology Different
from Self Report
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FEC ID Committee Name
C00113662 NEW MEXICANS FOR BILL RICHARDSON
C00165753 LEADERSHIP ’02 (FKA FRIENDS OF ALBERT GORE JR INC)
C00247734 COMMITTEE TO ELECT WILLIAM J JEFFERSON TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS
C00401364 FRIENDS OF JOHN SWEENEY
C00178418 BOUCHER FOR CONGRESS COMMITTEE
C00387829 DEMOCRAT GRAYSON FOR THE HOUSE
C00396101 JON PORTER FOR CONGRESS COMMITTEE
C00316596 CHRIS JOHN FOR CONGRESS
C00316141 RE-ELECT HAROLD FORD
C00220145 GENE TAYLOR FOR CONGRESS COMMITTEE
C00223230 FRIENDS OF JOHN TANNER
C00366401 MARK PRYOR FOR US SENATE
C00315176 FEINSTEIN FOR SENATE
C00347310 FRIENDS OF CHRIS DODD 2004
C00386292 NORTH DAKOTA 2004
C00143438 FRIENDS OF BYRON DORGAN
C00305110 A LOT OF PEOPLE WHO SUPPORT JEFF BINGAMAN
C00364364 DANIEL K INOUYE IN 2004
C00280917 DANIEL K INOUYE IN 98
C00396044 JOHN KENNEDY FOR US SENATE INC
C00391110 VICTORY 2004
C00389957 COBLE FOR US SENATE
C00224972 FRIENDS OF SENATOR ROCKEFELLER
C00215830 JOHN BREAUX COMMITTEE
C00391862 LOUISIANA SENATE 2003
C00325126 FRIENDS OF MARY LANDRIEU INC
C00317214 MARY LANDRIEU FOR SENATE COMMITTEE INC
C00202754 FRIENDS OF KENT CONRAD
C00368209 NELSON 2006
C00306712 NELSON 2000
C00385013 NEVADA SENATE 2004
C00204370 FRIENDS FOR HARRY REID
C00387449 MONTANA NEVADA VICTORY FUND
C00308676 WYDEN FOR SENATE
C00201533 TIM JOHNSON FOR SOUTH DAKOTA INC
C00402008 MONTANA ARKANSAS VICTORY FUND
C00255463 FRIENDS OF BLANCHE LINCOLN
C00385633 ARKANSAS SENATE 2004
C00349217 CARPER FOR SENATE
C00344051 BILL NELSON FOR U S SENATE
C00306860 EVAN BAYH COMMITTEE
C00383497 BAUCUS VICTORY FUND
C00328211 FRIENDS OF MAX BAUCUS 2002
Table 4.23: PCs that Self Reported to be Democratic, but are Estimated to be
Republican
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FEC ID Committee Name
C00400598 ILLINOIS US SENATE VICTORY COMMITTEE
C00387001 OHIO VICTORY COMMITTEE
C00406322 REPUBLICAN PARTY OF KENDALL COUNTY
C00188078 SEVENTH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT REPUBLICAN PARTY OF WISCONSIN
C00350496 BRADY FOR CONGRESS
C00371443 DANNY DAVIS FOR CONGRESS
C00400531 KY 04 CONGRESSIONAL VICTORY COMMITTEE
C00376749 RODNEY ALEXANDER FOR CONGRESS INC.
C00272211 PETE KING FOR CONGRESS COMMITTEE
C00272153 COMMITTEE TO ELECT MCHUGH
C00378158 ZARELLI FOR CONGRESS
C00396523 ROSELYN FOR CONGRESS
C00401703 FRIENDS OF ALJANICH
C00385542 PHELPS FOR CONGRESS
C00388884 HOOSIERS FOR HARDY
C00400556 LA 03 CONGRESSIONAL VICTORY COMMITTEE
C00400507 LA 07 CONGRESSIONAL VICTORY COMMITTEE
C00190637 TIERNEY FOR CONGRESS COMMITTEE
C00386060 DEROSSETT FOR CONGRESS
C00399675 FRIENDS OF STEVE MORROW
C00392860 BRAUNER FOR CONGRESS
C00398776 HUFFMAN FOR CONGRESS
C00403642 PAUL RODRIGUEZ FOR CONGRESS
C00386078 BELL FOR CONGRESS COMMITTEE
C00388991 RICCARDI FOR CONGRESS
C00399295 MATT MUEDA FOR CONGRESS
C00395061 JANE ESHAGPOOR FOR CONGESS
C00398834 ASAY FOR CONGRESS COMMITTEE
C00331108 REP DON YOUNG CONSTITUTIONAL DEFENSE FUND
C00320168 ASA HUTCHINSON FOR CONGRESS COMMITTEE
C00395731 TERESA DOGGETT TAYLOR FOR CONGRESS
C00333294 DOUG OSE FOR CONGRESS ’98
C00219204 PORTER GOSS RE-ELECTION TEAM
C00335190 CONNELLY FOR CONGRESS
C00300699 NODLER FOR CONGRESS COMMITTEE
C00096412 COMMITTEE TO REELECT CONGRESSMAN CHRIS SMITH
C00091298 THE COMMITTEE TO RE-ELECT CONGRESSWOMAN MARGE ROUKEMA
C00334334 DON SHERWOOD FOR CONGRESS
C00397075 SANTA CRUZ ACTION COMMITTEE
C00394346 BUSH ADMINISTRATION RETIREMENT FUND PAC (BARF PAC)
C00405688 DUMP BUSH MISSOULA
C00374652 DIANE ALLEN FOR US SENATE
C00389692 DR KATHURIA FOR US SENATE
C00349795 GORMLEY FOR SENATE PRIMARY ELECTION FUND
C00366237 CHAFEE FOR SENATE
C00325571 SENATOR JOHN WARNER COMMITTEE
Table 4.24: PCs that Self Reported to be Republican, but are Estimated to be
Democratic
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4.8 Alternative Model: No Measurement Error, but
with Hold Out Sample
In this alternative model, we randomly select 200 PCs in Vo to be the holdout
sample. Additionally, we assume no measurement error, i.e., ε = 0 and xi = x̂i
when x̂i is available. We estimate this model pretending x̂i is not available for the
holdout sample. In order to assess our estimates, we compare the estimated posterior
distribution and the self report for the holdout sample.
Posterior distributions of β, θ, h are summarized in Table 4.25, 4.26, and Figure
4.12.
β Posterior Mean Posterior Standard Deviation
constant -72.9487 1.1780
1xi=xj=Dem 47.9304 0.4056
1xi=xj=Rep 47.8478 0.4027
1xi=xj=Ind 47.8889 0.3907
1(xi=Dem,xj=Ind)∨(xi=Ind,xj=Dem) 48.3420 0.4055
1(xi=Rep,xj=Ind)∨(xi=Ind,xj=Rep) 48.4466 0.4062
Same state 0.7792 0.0114
Same industry 0.5151 0.0272
One of them is a House campaign 0.5315 0.0082
One of them is a Senate campaign 0.2261 0.0044
One of them is a Presidential campaign -0.2852 0.0169
One of them is a qualified PAC 0.3990 0.0051
One of them is a qualified Party -0.7151 0.0133
One of them is a national committee 0.7163 0.0116
One of them is authorized by a candidate -0.4360 0.0071
One of them is a joint fundraiser -0.8477 0.0102
(ln bi + ln bj) 1.4648 0.0579
((ln bi)
2 + (ln bj)
2) 0.0056 0.0003
ln bi ln bj -0.1017 0.0038
Table 4.25: Alternative Model: Posterior Distribution of β
In the following part, we focus on the holdout sample. Table 4.27 cross tabulates
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θ Posterior Mean Posterior Standard Deviation
P(Dem) 0.3839 0.0045
P(Rep) 0.3913 0.0045
P(Ind) 0.2248 0.0038
Table 4.26: Alternative Model: Posterior Distribution of θ
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Figure 4.12: Posterior Mean of h
Note: Probability of transfer amount higher than $50,000 is plotted at $50,000.
PCs in the holdout sample according to self-reported and estimated ideology. Our
estimated ideology matches the self report for 87.76% of those who reported to be
Democratic and 79.17% of those who reported to be Republican.
In this part, we analyze the posterior distribution of political ideology. Figure
4.13 plots, for PCs whose estimates are the same as the self-reports (i.e., the reported
ideology has the highest posterior probability), the distribution of the differences
between the highest and the second highest posterior probability. These differences
concentrate around 1, meaning the posterior probabilities concentrate on the self-
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reported affiliation. This confirms that we do not obtain these classifications by
luck.
We do a similar analysis in Figure 4.14, for PCs whose estimates differ from
the self-reports, by plotting the distributions of the differences between the highest
posterior probability and the posterior probability of the self-reported ideology. The
distributions for PCs which self reported to be Democratic (Republican) but are
estimated as Republican (Democratic) are concentrated around 0, indicating that
these are “near misses”.
Finally, Table 4.28 and 4.29 list the PCs that self reported to be Democratic
(Republican), but are estimated to be Republican (Democratic).
Estimated Dem Estimated Rep Estimated Ind
Self-Reported Dem 86 (87.76%) 9 (9.18%) 3 (3.06%)
Self-Reported Rep 10 (10.42%) 76 (79.17%) 10 (10.42%)
Self-Reported Ind 1 (16.67%) 3 (50.00%) 2 (33.33%)
Table 4.27: Tabulation of Estimated vs. Self-Reported Ideology
Note: The percentages are calculated for each row.
FEC ID Committee Name
C00327403 FRIENDS OF JONATHAN MILLER
C00367060 JOHN MILKOVICH FOR CONGRESS
C00381350 MARK BUDETICH
C00388454 JOHNSON FOR US SENATE
C00390245 REYES FOR CONGRESS
C00394858 VICTORY 04
C00399097 JOHN SALAZAR AND KEN SALAZAR JOINT COMMITTEE
C00399154 BURKS FOR US SENATE CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE
C00402149 FRIENDS TO ELECT JEFF MILLER
Table 4.28: PCs that Self Reported to be Democratic, but are Estimated to be
Republican
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Figure 4.13: Distribution of Difference in the Posterior Probability of Ideology
Note: Horizontal axis is the difference between the highest posterior probability (i.e., the posterior
probability of the self-reported ideology) and the second highest posterior probability. Bin size is
0.025.
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Difference in Posterior Probability
D
en
si
ty
Reported Dem, Estimated Rep
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Difference in Posterior Probability
D
en
si
ty
Reported Dem, Estimated Ind
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Difference in Posterior Probability
D
en
si
ty
Reported Rep, Estimated Dem
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Difference in Posterior Probability
D
en
si
ty
Reported Rep, Estimated Ind
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Difference in Posterior Probability
D
en
si
ty
Reported Ind, Estimated Dem
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Difference in Posterior Probability
D
en
si
ty
Reported Ind, Estimated Rep
Figure 4.14: Distribution of Difference in the Posterior Probability of Ideology
Note: Horizontal axis is the difference between the highest posterior probability and the posterior
probability of the self-reported ideology. Bin size is 0.025.
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FEC ID Committee Name
C00188078 SEVENTH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT REPUBLICAN PARTY OF WISCONSIN
C00349795 GORMLEY FOR SENATE PRIMARY ELECTION FUND
C00367839 SALAZAR FOR CONGRESS
C00371443 DANNY DAVIS FOR CONGRESS
C00375485 RUSTY GLOVER FOR CONGRESS
C00386078 BELL FOR CONGRESS COMMITTEE
C00387571 STARK FOR CONGRESS
C00389130 FRIENDS OF JOE NEGRON
C00390203 RISLEY FOR CONGRESS
C00404772 RANDY EASTWOOD FOR CONGRESS
Table 4.29: PCs that Self Reported to be Republican, but are Estimated to be
Democratic
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